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**CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH
KOREA UNDER XI JINPING**

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ABSTRACT

With an obvious increase in the uncertainty of instability in the current world, the Korean Peninsula issue is an unprecedented situation that changes profoundly and indicates that its more than half a century security pattern is entering the eve of historic structural changes. The main driver of this change is how to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, whether to implement a policy, and how to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

This dissertation deals with China's foreign policy on North Korea under Xi Jinping from 2013 to the present. I use primary document sources, speeches, statistics, interview, and news to analyze and explain the history of Chinese-Korean relations and about the main principles of the current Chinese foreign policy. I also studied the positions of the main international actors towards the Korean problem to explain these countries' complex interest relationship. I examine the economic change after the start of Kim Jong-un's regime and the Chinese-North Korean economic exchange expressing the frontier trade with the statistics, as well as the main Chinese policy method on North Korea's issues. In this paper, I attempt to study China's interests and attitudes on the DPRK issues, as well as the other main actors involved, and try to find a solution to these issues.

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INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What is the Korean Peninsula problem? Why isn't China particularly concerned about North Korea, and what kind of benefits do they get?
- What are the main East Asian and the U.S. positions on the Korean Peninsula? Why can't the Korean Peninsula be unified? What are the various issues and challenges surrounding the wider integration process in East Asia?
- How is Xi Jinping going to control North Korea under his regime? How China will use cross-border cooperation in its bilateral relations?

B. IMPORTANCE

The Korean Peninsula is a complicated region where the strategic interests of the United States, China, Japan, and Russia lie. It also occupies an important position in the geopolitical landscape of Northeast Asia. From a geographical point of view, the northern part of the Korean Peninsula has a border on the three northeastern provinces of China and the northeastern border of Russia. Facing southeast of the Korean Strait and the Japanese archipelago, across the southern coast of the Pacific, is a direct route to Hawaii and onto the continental United States. It is one of the Asia-Pacific region's most crucial strategic choke points. Because of this special geographical position, the Korean Peninsula has become the first place in the modern era of imperialist powers to be vied for, and thus resulting in numerous large-scale wars. The history of the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War and

other wars fought around the Korean Peninsula have sufficiently demonstrated that the Korean Peninsula is one of the vital strategic locations in East Asia that the world's powers want to control and occupy, subsequently to establish their own hegemony.

During the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War, the Korean Peninsula was at the forefront of Asia where the grievous tragedy known as the Korean War took place. The Korean Peninsula was split between the North and the South in opposition to each other, and the confrontation between the two sides has lasted more than sixty years. Yet, still no solid reconciliation or reunification efforts have been successful. After the end of the Cold War, the residual issues of the war have not been fully accounted for or resolved. This is not only a reflection of the North-South relations on the Korean Peninsula, but also illustrates that North Korea, the United States, and Japan did not achieve amicable relations. Entering the twenty-first century, the regional situation around the Korean Peninsula is still full of uncertainty and instability; especially regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons program in recent years. The situation on the peninsula worsened after the fourth nuclear test was carried out, intensifying an already perpetual state of tension, and causing the region once again to become a hot spot in the world. At the moment, the DPRK nuclear issue is the most pressing issue in Northeast Asia, in addition to being one of the key factors affecting the international strategic layout of the Asia-Pacific region.

China's policy stance on the DPRK nuclear issue is part of its overall policy towards the DPRK and a very important issue in Sino-DPRK relations and the balance of the world order. The Chinese attitude towards North Korea is vis-to-vis neighboring countries and the international community.

C. PROBLEMS

North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests so far. Starting on October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in defiance of international order and international condemnation. On April 13, 2012, North Korea launched its first operating system "Red Star 3." On May 13, 2012, the Fifth Session of the 12th DPRK's Supreme People's Congress amended the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea Constitution;" the preamble now says, "Comrade Kim Jong-il has made our country an undefeated political power, a nuclear-owned country, and an invincible military power."¹ After then, the Korean Peninsula situation was sent into a vicious circle.

Since 2013, North Korea has claimed that it was a "safe and successful" nuclear test. However, relevant countries, through means such as earthquake monitoring and sampling, found that the test only triggers earthquakes of magnitude 4 on the Richter scale, about hundreds of tons of TNT equivalent power. This is a failed nuclear test, so to speak. Then, North Korea conducted three nuclear tests in 2009, 2013 and January 2016. On September 9, 2016, North Korea celebrated its National Day, and on the same day, their nuclear weapons research issued a statement saying North Korea has conducted to identify its new development of nuclear power, nuclear tests, and nuclear warhead explosion tests as a complete success. From the perspective of the size of a nuclear test, North Korean tests for the explosive force and operational control, though improved, had an explosive yield at ten times compared to the first test. But, according to the seismic departments, China detected North Korean nuclear tests five times caused by the earthquakes with magnitudes between 4 and 5. Coupled with the economic situation in North Korea and the level of industrial development, it is said North Korea's nuclear technology is still in progress. There is no doubt that successive tests show that North Korea persists on its nuclear position, but many times in the motivation of low-level testing

¹ Fu Ying translate : "The historical evolution and prospects of the DPRK nuclear issue,傅莹撰文:“朝核问题的历史演进与前景展望” [J] China News Weekly (Beijing) (Searching date: 01.05.2017)

does not seem to be alone due to its safety factor. Because this kind of behavior, in addition to a benefit to its national security, will expose North Korean nuclear technology bottlenecks and defects, so North Korea's nuclear power has a different purpose.

The fifth North Korean nuclear test has been negatively affected by China's relations with the country and the international opinion. "Labor News" of North Korea published on April 2nd, 2016, an article titled, "the Korean institute of international political problems commentator debunk political order injustice in the world today." In this paper, in addition to the criticism of the United States and its followers to hegemonism, it tramples on the weak national sovereignty, and points out that "[some countries] do not hesitate to abandon the common victory - precious friendship relations - for this country or that country surreptitiously a so-called 'agreement' to suppress the reality of justice and truth;" although it didn't use name-calling, its words were expressed between the known, which referred to China when relations between the two countries have not come to moderation, the fifth nuclear test adds to the gloom. On September 9th, 2016, the Chinese foreign ministry issued a statement that it is resolutely opposed to North Korea's behavior, demanding that North Korea stop the deterioration of all their actions. On September 10th, 2016, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui met the North Korean ambassador Chi Zai-Long to Chia to conduct another nuclear test and show that China's position urges it to return to the correct direction of denuclearization as soon as possible². China's position on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has always been one of firmness and clarity, regardless of the UN Security Council's resolutions, and its constant test behavior will inevitably strain the relations between the two countries. North Korea's aim basically has two aspects: on the one hand, to express dissatisfaction and anger in China and, in the court of public opinion, to put pressure on China to try to make them take the North's side on the nuclear issue; and on the other hand, it reminds China that the North is an independent country. China is not the United States and considers absolute influence on North Korea. And to solve the nuclear issue, the United States and China should have direct talks with North Ko-

² "Zhang met with DPRK ambassador to China to show his position on the DPRK nuclear test," "张业遂约见朝鲜驻华大使 就朝鲜核试验表明立场" [N]Yang Guang net
<http://news.cnr.cn/native/gd/20160911/t20160911_523127429.shtml> (Date of retrieval: 03.03.2017)

rea, rather than on-the-run by putting pressure on other countries.

- Hot topic overview-main actors around the North Korea from 2011 - 2017

At the end of 2011 to the beginning of 2017 was an extremely important period for the Northeast Asian region. In December 2011, after the death of Kim Jong-il, chairman of the National Defense Commission, North Korea ushered in its third-generation leader Kim Jong-un. Following the elections of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army in February 2012, on April 13, 2012, Kim Jong-un was elected as the first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and the first chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission; thus, becoming the new top leader of the DPRK.

On November 2012 in China, the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) gave birth to a new central collective leadership, and Xi Jinping was elected as the new General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. In March 2013, at the first meeting of the 12th National People's Congress, Xi Jinping was elected as the new Chinese President and appointed Li Keqiang as the premier of the State Council, establishing the "Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang" new national leadership system.

In the U.S. on November 2012, President Barack Obama was re-elected by the end of the U.S. presidential elections. In January 2013, Obama became president once again, officially beginning his second term in office. And in 2016, Donald Trump defeated the democratic candidate Hillary Clinton to become the new U.S. President of the next term.

In the Japanese House of Representatives elections in December 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party seized the victory, ending the three-year Democratic Party ruling period. Liberal Democratic Party President Shinzo Abe was elected as the new prime minister, opening the

"Abe 2.0" era. And in 2014, Abe was re-elected to start his second term as the Prime Minister of Japan.

South Korea's presidential elections were in December 2012, and the ruling party presidential candidate Park Geun-hye was elected as the first female President of South Korea. She was later impeached on March, 2017, and sent to jail. For the next term beginning in February 2017, Moon Jae-in was inaugurated as the newest South Korean President. During this small span of time, the Korean Peninsula and the surrounding countries has had new leaders assume office.

In 2017, Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain approved the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, which authorized the British Prime Minister Theresa May to start the program to officially withdraw from the European Union. At the end of the French elections, Emmanuel Macron achieved victory and assumed office on May 14 of this year and has declared that they will withdraw France from the EU. In 2018, the Russian general elections will also proceed, but will Vladimir Putin of the United Russia party continue its mandate? This is not just one or two countries' general elections or a coincidence, this is a process of changing the pattern of the world economic and political system. These new leaders came to power bringing new changes, but at the same time, also facing new challenges.

D. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Several scholars studied China's foreign policy towards North Korea and their nuclear issues. Compared with the relatively developed countries in Europe and North America, China and North Korea are lagging behind. There are a variety of issues that hinder China's cooperation with the region; of course, there are environmental points or energy points, but security is one of the most important issues. On the Korean Peninsula, security becomes a shadow that crosses over China and the DPRK. China's policy towards North Korea and its own economic development is the key point of development of the Korean Peninsula situation of stabilization. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a stable and peaceful environment is an important base of China's economic development. With China as a regional power, the question is how to keep a balance with all parties to win the opportunity for the future development of the country, becoming the main direction of Chinese scholars in future research. In recent years, with the change of international situations, the world's major countries gradually turned their eyes on Asia. The research monographs and papers are gradually enriched with the Asia-Pacific countries and hot issues around the region.

The policy scholars who deal with China and North Korea are roughly divided into two categories. The first type are the Chinese domestic scholars who support a relatively moderate policy of China to the DPRK. To maintain the status, they do not want a breakthrough change, so that the Chinese economy would have a bad influence. Because most Chinese scholars think that the relationship between China and North Korea is like "lips and teeth," if you don't have your lips, your teeth are going to be cold.

Gao Lianfu's *Northeast Asian Countries' Foreign Strategy* is a comprehensive and systematic introduction of the Northeast Asian countries to implement a foreign strategy. The author of the book focuses on the analysis of Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, and other nearby countries of their foreign strategy and direction. It uses a multi-angle analysis of

important issues in the Asia-Pacific region at the macro- and micro-level, and analyzes the Northeast Asian countries in the political, economic, and security aspects.³

Chen Fengjun's and Wang Chuanjian's *Asia-Pacific Power and the Korean Peninsula* discusses the relationship of the United States, Japan, Russia and their relationships between the Korean Peninsula. They review the historical development of the relationship between those great powers and the Korean Peninsula, so that the reader can clearly see the development of their foreign policy and greatly benefit from reading this book by understanding the related countries' foreign strategy for the Korean Peninsula in a developmental context.⁴

The second type are non-Chinese scholars who strongly demand to change the current situation and achieve their own purposes on North Korea, or they think China must play an important role in the North Korean issue and giving up "China's responsibility theory." This is so that China uses more powerful means to control North Korea, leading the country to abandon their development of nuclear weapons and use of external threats, as well as some North Korean scholars who want to become "independent" from China and other countries who duped North Korea for their own benefits.

Lee, Jong-seok [South Korea], who has Ph.D. in Political Science, Sungkyunkwan University Research Fellow, from the Sejong Institute, mentioned in his book *North Korea-China Relations in the Cold War Period* that even during the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1969, when North Korea and China had the most violent confrontations, the conflict had never been formally expressed, except in extreme cases in the private sector. This secret bilateral relationship between North Korea and China continues even today. As the North Korean econ-

³ Gao Lianfu, "Northeast Asian Countries Foreign Strategy," 高连福: 《东北亚国家对外战略》[J] Social Science Literature Publishing. August 2002

⁴ Chen Fengjun and Wang Chuanjian, scholar of East Asian policy. [B] Peking University press, 2002

omy is in crisis, China is secretly supporting hundreds of thousands of tons of food every year in North Korea.⁵

Lim Soo-ho and Choi Jang-ho, in their “*KDI North Korea Economic Review in 2016*” studied the North Korea-China economic exchanges with a digital analysis to easily understand North Korea’s economic development⁶.

Dongjin Jeong, in his dissertation “*China’s policy towards North Korea*” of Mater for Naval Postgraduate school in 2012, made his conclusion that he has confidence that China has the power to and needs to act as a responsible superpower to build good connections with other countries to solve the North Korean nuclear problems.⁷

Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has a PhD from Harvard University and was the 10th National Security Advisor in the U.S., uses in his book, “*The Grand Chessboard*”, the Heartland Theory to analyze the countries around East Asia and their interests and to point out the importance of North Korea’s geographical position in the international relations.⁸

⁵ [South Korea] Lee, Jong-seok, Ph.D. in Political Science, Sungkyunkwan University Research Fellow, from the Sejong Institute

⁶ [South Korea] Lim Soo-ho, Head of Team North Korean Economy, Reunification of Korean Peninsula researchers from Korea Development Institute.

Choi Jang-ho Associate Research Fellow from Korea Development Institute.

⁷ [South Korea] Dongjin Jeong dissertation *China’s policy towards North Korea* [D] The nuclear issue of Mater for Naval Postgraduate school in 2012

⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has a PhD from Harvard University and was the 10th National Security Advisor in the US, *The Grand Chessboard - American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives -The far eastern anchor*: [B] Publisher Basic Books: 1997 edition

Hwang Cheol [North Korea] wrote in his article “Our method of economic management,” from Kim Il-sung University, 2nd Edition, 2016, that “As the size of the economy grows, and the number of companies increases, the enthusiasm of the producers and the level of management of the businesspeople increase.” North Korea can make an independent market within the country and finally can break the economy tether from China and other countries.⁹

From these kinds of representative works, we can understand the impact of China's pivotal position in today's world and its far-reaching influence on the Korean Peninsula's stability and development, especially the geopolitical policy in Northeast Asia.

But in these writings, with the international situation continuing to change what kind of policy China's is implementing on the DPRK, the future pursuit of what kind of national interests and strategic direction is not clear enough. Due to the particularity about the Korean Peninsula problem, it is necessary to solve the process's complexity, long-term effects, and uncertainty of its future. Therefore, most of the works are only to study the past and present, and the more important future research needs to be deepened. Research space.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This dissertation is based on the historical materialism and dialectical materialist scientific theory. Different types of primary sources include: documents from the departments of various states; public speeches, interviews; and statistics. Secondary sources include: academic papers; journalistic sources; and scholarly books. This paper tries to be objective, detailed, and accurate during its research, especially in the selection of materials and the references of opin-

⁹ Hwang Chul , "How to Manage Our Style Economy," 황철 “우리식 경제관리방법,” [J] Kim Il Sung University, No. 2, 2016, p.80

ions. Adhering to the combination of historical theory, the framework of the theory in this paper uses new information, fully enumerates the facts, combines theory with historical data, and brings it to a conclusion. This paper argues about the principle of realism and nationalism between these countries, makes full use of a predictive analysis of its contents, includes a looking-forward analysis, strives to be justified, and leads to a logical conclusion. It examines what kinds of positions the main international actors have toward the Korean problem especially China. The methods employed rely on comparative case studies and the analysis of sources.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This dissertation deals with China's foreign policy towards North Korea under Xi Jinping from 2013 to the present. In the first chapter I will explain the history of Chinese-Korean relations and about the main principles of the current Chinese foreign policy. In the second chapter I will study about the positions of the main international actors towards the Korean problem, such as the U.S., South Korean, Japanese, and Russian interests on the Korean Peninsula. I will use some sources to analyze these countries' complex interest relationship. In third chapter, I will explain the economic change after Kim Jong-un's regime and the Chinese-North Korean economic exchange expressing the frontier trade with the statistics materials, as well as the main Chinese policy method towards North Korea's issues.

I. THE HISTORY OF CHINESE-KOREAN RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

On the road realization of a comprehensive well-off society under the purpose of the Chinese Communist Party, there are very little benefits that China could get directly from the DPRK; in other words, North Korea assists as the Chinese people's economic interests are limited. First, North Korea has no oil resources, so its economic structure is very simple and difficult to develop in the current oil-based industry system. Second, the North Korean landscape is mostly made up of mountains, and it is difficult to develop and use. Third, coupled with North Korea's political instability, Xi Jinping's government, which focuses all the energy on the "rise of China" to achieve "China's Dream," brought no small trouble. As I mentioned in the introduction, most Chinese people described the DPRK as China's lips. Although the lips are not as important as the internal organs, teeth without lips will be cold, bringing a lot of trouble. So, that the history of China and North Korea is similar the relationship between teeth and lips

A. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

China's policy stance on the DPRK nuclear issue is part of China's overall policy toward the DPRK and a very important issue in Sino-DPRK relations. There were no bilateral relationships as important, as unique, and as highly sensitive as China-DPRK relations in the history of its foreign relations. From the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, Sino-DPRK experienced a profound change with the times. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China cherishes the traditional friendship between itself and the DPRK, which follows the basic policy for its development of its bilateral relations.¹⁰ The relationships between China and the DPRK

¹⁰ "Wang Yi, "We cherish the traditional friendship between China and the DPRK is committed to the normal development of bilateral relations," [N] "王毅: 我们珍视中朝传统友谊 致力于两国关系正常发展," <<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjzbzd/t1243606.shtml>> (Date of retrieval: 28.12.2016)

and its policy stance on the DPRK's nuclear situation is also a very important issue in Sino-DPRK relations. After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, China was forced to rise to the war to resist U.S. aggression, as well as lending aid to Korea and to the North Korean army that unofficially resisted South Korea and the U.S. coalition. On October 8, 1950, Mao Zedong issued an order to move the Chinese People's Volunteers Army from the Northeast Frontier Defense to the DPRK.¹¹

After the start of the Korean War in 1950, Mao Zedong initially said that he would not interfere in the Korean War, but he sent Korean-Chinese minority troops, who live on the Chinese-Korean border, unofficially,¹² to help North Korea resist the pressure of South Korea and the U.S. coalition. China formed a military alliance with North Korea of life and blood. After the Korean War was the breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations. In 1961, the DPRK signed with China and the Soviet Union the "Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty" and the "Soviet North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty." The "Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty" will automatically renew the expiration date every 20 years after both sides initially agreed.

In the late 1980s, international relations were changing. With the emergence of new patterns in Central and Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and even the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union prompted China to transition from a bilateral diplomacy to a multilateral diplomacy. After 1992, it began to enter a period of active exchange between the leaders of the two countries. After several rounds of discussions, Deng Xiaoping signed the Joint Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea that successfully established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea and advocated mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity

¹¹ "The Value of the Korean War" [N] Feng Huang net <<http://news.ifeng.com:8080/history/special/chubingjiazhi/>> (Date of retrieval: 24.05.2017)

¹² As told by my grandmother about the history of her two brother's deaths during the Korean Civil War.

through peaceful coexistence, equality and mutual benefit, and mutual non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of the principle.¹³

Then the failure of the "Three Movements" of the Joseon Dynasty, China's northeastern region immediately became the rear of the Korean people's anti-Japanese repatriation. In 1945, the Yalta Conference formed a "trusteeship" of the Korean Peninsula in favor of the United States to play a geopolitical balance. The DPRK and the northeastern region of China were also regarded by the Soviet Union as their own interests. Followed by the Korean War shortly after, it made China and North Korea become ever more closed once again. As early as the '40s in the last century, the Kuomintang government has post-war arrangements and ideas about North Korea, but because of the disagreement with the U.S. government, it had to temporarily give up the plan. After the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (the War of Resistance) and the Chinese Civil War, the Kuomintang enunciated its relationship between North Korea. Because they have no reserve power to take care of the Korea Peninsula, it came under control of the U.S. and Russia. With the support of Douglas MacArthur, Rhee Syngman established Republic of Korea. With the support of the Soviet Union, Kim Il-sung established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea before the elections in southern Korea.

The developmental problems of Sino-Korean relations are political in nature. Although the DPRK's economic growth struggles are considerate, the political diplomacy between China and DPRK is of greater significance than that of economic cooperation. In other words, political exchanges still direct the trend of Sino-DPRK relations, while simultaneously contributing to China-DPRK relations in the process.

¹³ Liu Jin, "contemporary Sino-Korean relations," China Social Science Press, 1998 edition

After Kim Jong-un was in the saddle, the DPRK changed dramatically and these kinds of changes had positive aspects for both two countries' stability and economic situations. The geopolitical neighborhood between China and DPRK have different interests with other countries. The political stability of the DPRK and the certainty of policy support will help achieve economic development. North Korea's stability is also important for the Chinese economic and surrounding political stability. The political stability and the deterministic system of political predictability help achieve economic development between China and DPRK.

After the end of the Cold War, great changes took place in the world. The old pattern, which was headed by the United States and the Soviet Union was broken and multipolar patterns began to form. With its in-depth development, the overall international situation developed towards a different direction with ease. Faced with the new international environment, the relationships between countries paid more attention to a pragmatic and flexible approach to achieve and maximize their own interests. China's reformation and openness system drove the world into the new period, which called for it to adjust its foreign policy. China put forward a "willing to work with all our neighbors to establish and develop long-term, stable, good-neighborly, and friendly relations with each other with mutual understanding, mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit cooperation to become a good neighbor, good friend, and good partner."¹⁴ North Korean, United States, South Korean, Russian, Japanese, and other countries' relations were undergoing profound changes, adjusting their foreign relations, and, in other words for China and North Korea, repositioning their bilateral relationships.

There are periodic problems in the development of China-DPRK relations for political and diplomatic reasons, such as North Korea's economic developmental problems and more effects between China and the DPRK's political, diplomatic, and economic cooperation. Political exchanges still direct Chinese-DPRK relations. Bilateral economic cooperation relation-

¹⁴ at the beginning of 5 coles is qualitative, Pan Jing, Pan Rongying, Yi Seok. "The relationship between China and the Korean peninsula countries ask price compilation of data," (1991-1991. [M] (The world knowledge press, 03.04.2016)

ships also indirectly affect China-DPRK relations. On December 19, 2013, Chinese ambassador Yan Zheng analyzed the future of China and North Korea's relationship under Kim Jong-un's rule. Yan stated, "After Jang Seong-taek's execution, there was huge political turmoil in North Korea, garnering the attention of the international community, who were very concerned about China and the DPRK's relationship during that period."¹⁵

However, when a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry asked about China's stance towards Jang Seong-taek's dismissal and execution, with a neutral attitude expressed, "It is North Korea's internal affairs, as a friendly neighbor, we hope for the DPRK's national stability, economic development, and that the DPRK's citizens can receive happiness. China is concerned about the economic development and people's lives in the DPRK, but it doesn't mean China will intervene in the DPRK's internal affairs, nor does it require other countries to inform us of their internal situation in advance."¹⁶ Zhang Jang Seong-taek had overseen foreign economy, visiting many Chinese cities in the previous years during China's reform. "China is concerned about the economic development and the people's lives in the DPRK, but it doesn't mean it will intervene in the DPRK's internal affairs, nor does it require other countries to inform them of their internal situation in advance. Jang Seong-taek has overseen the foreign economy, visited China in the early years, but also visited many cities within the country, and has overseen China's reformation and opening up."¹⁷ China will continue to devote its traditional friendship and cooperation between itself and the DPRK. This summarizes China's position on the current political situation in North Korea and China-DPRK relations.

¹⁵ Yan Jing, "What is the relationship between China and Korea in Kim Jong-un's era?" 延静.金正恩时代中朝关系何去何从. [A] Da gong Net <<http://news.takungpao.com/opinion/highlights/2013-12/2116054.html>> (Date of retrieval: 16.12.2016)

¹⁶ Yan Jing, "What is the relationship between China and Korea in Kim Jong-un's era?" 延静.金正恩时代中朝关系何去何从[A] Da gong Net <<http://news.takungpao.com/paper/q/2013/1219/2115922.html>> (Date of retrieval: 16.12.2016)

¹⁷ "Xi Jinping met with Kim Jong-un envoy Cui Longhai," [N] Renmin Net. <<http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0525/c64094-21611331.html>> 习近平会见金正恩特使崔龙海 (Date of retrieval: 16.12.2016)

China has a significant interest on the Korean Peninsula issue. The Korean Peninsula is regarded as a strategic buffer zone for the security of Northeast China. It is also key to China's opposition against U.S. power and a buffer to not lead the U.S. target of directed resistance towards China. Brzezinski in the "The Grand Chessboard", pointed out that the Korean Peninsula's "geography is reinforced by history, and that it also dictates China's interest in Korea. At one time as a tributary state, a reunited Korea acted as an extension of American (and also indirectly of Japanese) influence would be intolerable to China. At the very minimum, China would insist that a reunited Korea be a non-aligned buffer between China and Japan, and to also expect that the historically-rooted Korean animosity towards Japan would, of itself, draw Korea into the Chinese sphere of influence. For the time being, however, a divided Korea suits China best, and thus China is likely to favor the content used by the existence of the North Korean regime."¹⁸ It shows that any other large country's, especially the United States', act of intervention in North Korea will cause China's vigilance.

China has huge economic benefits on the Korean Peninsula. In the reformation process of China from the 1980s, China's northern region has always lagged behind its southern region, and this gap is gradually expanding. One of the most important reasons is that the Korean Peninsula will block the chance of the cooperation window in this region between China and other countries, thus breaking the ring of reformation in the northern part of the China.

B. HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

The Sino-DPRK relation is a complex relationship at present. China's policies on the DPRK constitute a very complex framework. China, from the established diplomatic relations

¹⁸ Zbigiew Brzenzinski, [B] *The Grand Chessboard - American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives - The far eastern anchor*: Publisher Basic Books: 1997 edition, p. 165

with North Korea, has the basic principles on the North Korea issues, which includes both strong support, active encouragement, and contains non-intervention and resolute opposition.

(A) Strong support. At the end of the Korean War, China has unswervingly supported the socialist economic construction and improvement of the people's livelihood in North Korea and has always been the largest and most sustained foreign aid provider to North Korea. In the late era under Kim Jong-il, North Korea began to attach importance and strengthen the development of the national economy to solve the problem of food and energy shortages. Kim Jong-un pays attention to the emphasis on the development of the national economy and improvement of the people's livelihood, especially on April 15, 2012, during his initial public speech he put forward, "Never let the people go hungry."¹⁹ For North Korea, China has always given strong support and help through various forms: support the DPRK to improve people's livelihood; ease the humanitarian difficulties; and continue to give special attention and assistance. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the DPRK has made great efforts to improve North-South relations, improve the DPRK-U.S. and the DPRK-SOJ relations, and China has always given active support for it and is always willing to provide aid.

(B) Encouragement. On July 1, 2002, North Korea began the process of economic adjustment and gradual income of its market mechanisms. China encouraged this from the outside. During the Kim Jong-un era, North Korea significantly accelerated its pace of change, vigorously promoting the "new economic management system." First, the changes happened in the national economy, rural and agricultural areas, the production organization structure, the distribution policy, and the agricultural produce price system, such as a systematic adjustment and transformation. It was followed by the urban economic system in the factory business units to expand the production of business leaders decision-making autonomy,

¹⁹ "English Transcript of Kim Jong Un's Speech," [N] Northkoreatech net. <<http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/04/18/english-transcript-of-kim-jong-unsspeech/>> (Date of retrieval: 21.04.2017)

production, distribution, product sales, and other aspects of deep-level adjustment and transformation. This was all while relaxing the free market in the national economy in the scope of its activities to expand the role of market factors in the economic operation.

(C) Do not intervene. During the Kim Jong-il era, the DPRK advocated its "Army comes first politics." The center power of the state gradually moved from the center of the Labor Party to the National Defense Commission. In the Kim Jong-un era, the DPRK's highest power center began to shift from the National Defense Commission to the Labor Party and its central military committee. And thus, it carried out a series of major personnel adjustments, even having individual senior officials sentenced to death. China, with all these issues, treated it as the internal affairs of the DPRK Party and North Korea's armed forces. Adherence principles under the "non-interference in internal affairs" strictly followed the non-intervention attitude and position with all major affairs within the DPRK.

(D) Resolute opposition. The nuclear issue is the only difference of divergence between China and North Korea and the only obstacle to stable development of friendly relations and cooperation between China and the DPRK. China has always opposed the policy and conduct of the development of nuclear weapons in the DPRK and persevered in trying to persuade North Korea to return to denuclearization. Based on this position, China has actively initiated and led the process of the "six-party talks" and has drawn up and promoted the adoption of the "9.19 Joint Statement." Since 2006, China has clearly supported and actively participated in seven resolutions adopted by the Security Council, condemned North Korea's nuclear tests, missile tests, satellite launch tests closely related to missile technology against the will of the international community, and imposed the necessary sanctions on the DPRK.²⁰

²⁰ The United Nations Security Council adopted seven sanctions against the DPRK: [D] S/RES/1695(2006), S/RES/1718 (2006), S/RES/1874 (2009), S/RES/2087, (2012), S/RES/2094 (2013), S/RES/2270 (2016), S/RES/2321(2016)

II. MAIN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS INFLUENCING CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

Surrounding North Korea were several major actors who have had a huge impact, for not only in Northeast Asia, but also in the world. First, the U.S. is the largest economic community in the world, and as the most powerful country in the world, it acts as a “Big Brother” to coordinate every issue on the regional politics. North Korea’s slogan “Wipe out the U.S. imperialism” directly targets the United States, thus from the geographical point of view, the United States does not belong to Asia, but the it is a core country of East Asian politics. Second, South Korea is an involved country in North Korea’s issues, and the country is ranked 10th in global defense spending.²¹ Japan as the third largest economic country in the world is also the most important economic and military strategic partner of the United States to set a balance in Asia. It is also a very important economic partner in China. But Japan has had a bad modern history with other countries in East Asia and a common enemy of the North Korean government. And in order to adjust the political contradictions in Japan, the DPRK is politically indispensable in Japan. Russia, which has a great ambition and desire to be another “Big Brother” can against with U.S.’s political power. However, due to the too-simple economic structure, once the Western countries resort to the means to interfere with the decline in oil prices, Russia has almost no alternative to its industry. From the economic sanctions of the Western world in 2014, Russia has turned its attention to Asia and is actively developing economic cooperation with its neighboring countries in Asia.

A. THE U.S. INTERESTS AND POSITION ON NORTH KOREA

At the end of the Cold War, the United States took the policy of "internalization of the Korean Peninsula issue," which led to the Korean Peninsula’s “reunification gradually," while

²¹ Wikipedia [S] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures> (Date of retrieval: 20.04.2017)

the United States could wait and receive its own benefits. The United States could take this policy foothold, as it was based on the estimation that the DPRK will likely collapse. If the North took this outcome, then the U.S. can rely on the advantages of South Korea's unification with the North. The United States, of course, is optimistic, but the actual results show that the United States' intention to implement the "internalization of the Korean Peninsula" policy has not been successful, thus seeking domination by South Korea's policy on DPRK has been a failure. Not only did it fail to relieve the opposition between the two sides, but the problem has worsened. Because of the long-term confrontation of the North-South political and military aspects, there is no basis for a period of relaxation, but the North is to give priority to improve its relations with the United States. In this case, the United States' "North Korean problem internalization" policy should be changed.

1. U.S. “strategic patience” policy towards North Korea and “Asian pivot” policy towards Asia

During the period under President Obama, the U.S. government's strategy towards North Korea was “strategic patience.” In fact, his essence was to not much pay much attention to the Korean Nuclear issue but to China and Russia. But the United States has been pursuing an "Asian Pivot" policy aimed at Asia, it could say especially aimed at restraining China from the Obama administration for eight years from 2009. The key to the “Asian Pivot” policy was the strengthening of the military alliance, the completion of the missile defense network, and the establishment of a U.S.-led economic order led by TPP. It is true that this has continuously amplified the conflict between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. The reason the U.S. pursued this policy was because of concerns that if it could not control the growing Chinese power, the U.S. would lose control in Asia. However, China is growing with the expectation that the Trump administration will be able to pursue policies different from those of the Obama administration. During the U.S. presidential elections, Trump strongly expressed his protectionist and isolationist tendencies. This reflects the emotions of the American people before personal preference. However, looking at the tendencies of the Republican Party, which dominate

both houses of Congress, economic protectionism is likely to be controlled by the Republican Party. On the other hand, security isolationism is consistent with mainstream Republican tendencies. Therefore, Trump likely to find his legacy in security isolationism. In the beginning of May 2017, Trump had even raised talks with Kim Jong-un, which the United States had never proposed before. In the beginning of May this year, Trump had even mentioned of meeting with Kim Jong-un. Trump said, "If it would be appropriate for me to meet with him, I would absolutely, I would be honored to do it."²² Although there are no preconditions, "If it's under the, again, under the right circumstances. But I would do that."²³ But not one U.S. President has said anything like these of words. Main U.S. media sources also put it with heavy headlines saying, "No sitting U.S. president has ever met with the leader of North Korea while in power, and the idea is extremely controversial"²⁴ and "Mixed messages from the Trump administration regarding its policy on North Korea have also further obscured what the next phase of the standoff on the Korean Peninsula could be."²⁵

It seems that China's government thought it was the perfect time to reorganize the Asian order under the Trump Administration. This seems to be China's expectation. Trump has mentioned questions about the Taiwan issue, the "One China" principle, which is the foundation of U.S.-China relations. For China, the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula are all important benefits, but comparing with the other issues, the Korean Peninsula is the most subordinate of the three profits. Therefore, China is throwing a message to the new Trump administration that the sanctions could compromise the issue of sacrificing North Korea on the Korean Peninsula issue. This seems to reflect the intention to review the Asian order, which is getting a high level of U.S.-China relations, rather than a signal to take a hardline policy towards China. Therefore, China with Trump's administration must put these

²² Donald Trump's Interview with Bloomberg [N] <<https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-01/trump-says-he-d-meet-with-north-korea-s-kim-if-situation-s-right>> (Date of retrieval: 01.05.2017)

²³ Donald Trump's Interview with Bloomberg [N] <<https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-01/trump-says-he-d-meet-with-north-korea-s-kim-if-situation-s-right>> (Date of retrieval: 01.05.2017)

²⁴ [N] CNN NEWS <<http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/01/politics/donald-trump-meet-north-korea-kim-jong-un/>> (Date of retrieval: 05.05.2017)

²⁵ [N] CNN NEWS <<http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/01/politics/donald-trump-meet-north-korea-kim-jong-un/>> (Date of retrieval: 05.05.2017)

issues on the water, including the negotiations on the DPRK issue. It seems this is the consideration of these negotiations as to why China has issued a strong sanction to North Korea now.

Perhaps the extraordinary U.S. government, led by President Trump, may be able to improve the relationship between the United States and North Korea so that the North Korean situation will ease or even solve the issue during his term. Then he can write a brilliant history of his presidential legacy.

2. U.S. security actions towards North Korea

Following with U.S.'s "strategic patience" policy towards North Korea and "Asian pivot" policy towards Asia, Japan and South Korea have also adopted a policy of expanding their armaments in the context of the U.S. military's accelerating "East shift." This will not only break the existing strategic balance of military strategy in Northeast Asia in the next few years, but also the escalation of the arms race. At the same time, the Northeast Asian region of the Korean Peninsula will bring direct influence on the solution of the hot issues, lessen the region of mutual suspicion, and further enhance the trust between countries. The United States position on regional cooperation in Northeast Asia depends largely on its own national interests.

One interest is to promote Northeast Asian, and even the whole East Asian, regional trade and investment liberalization to ensure a large and open market, to ensure that the United States in the Northeast Asia has economic benefit maximization, and to improve relations because of the war in Iraq to domestic economic development speed to reverse the effect of it slowing down. The second interest is to maintain American dominance and control in the region and to prevent any country or group that may challenge the leadership, especially from China's "peaceful rise" that can bring challenges to its regional hegemony. The third is to consolidate and strengthen the U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-South Korean alliances to make it closer to

itself so that they can rely on the country as a foundation in response to the Korean Peninsula obtaining the sudden problem of a powerful weapon, to ensure the safety and stability of Northeast Asia, and to protect the benefits of the U.S. of political, economic, security and other strategic interests from the possibility of erosion. Around 17,000 U.S. military personnel and 300,000 South Korean troops are taking part in what the South Korean Defense Ministry described as the "largest ever" joint military exercises in from 2016.²⁶ and The United States has further strengthened its military deployment toward North Korea. It deployed the THAAD system and the Carl Winston Carrier to the Sea of Japan during the Korean election in May 2017. Administer Harry Harris, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, directed the U.S. Carl Vinson strike group to sail north to the Western Pacific after departing Singapore on Saturday, which they announced.²⁷

Either the U.S. military could soon get even bigger, as Trump has urged Congress to increase military spending next year by 10 percent, or \$54 billion. He told state governors earlier this year that his budget plan included a "historic increase in defense spending to rebuild the depleted military of the United States of America."²⁸

Just in 2017 The U.S. Department of Defense has deployed 24 new battalion AH-64D Apache helicopters in Pyongtaek, South Korea, in January. The number of Apache helicopters, which are called tram killers, increased to 48. According to Professor Hong Sung Pyo of NCA,

²⁶ "North Korea launches ballistic missiles",[N] <<http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/17/asia/north-korea-missile-launch/index.html>> (Searching date:02.02.2017)

"US aircraft carrier-led strike group headed toward Korean Peninsula," [N]CNN NEWS <<http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/08/politics/navy-korean-peninsula/>> (Searching date: 02.05.2017)

28 "WHAT NORTH KOREA'S MILITARY LOOKS LIKE COMPARED TO THE U.S." [N] Newsweek <<http://www.newsweek.com/what-north-koreas-military-looks-compared-us-589688>> (Searching date:28.05.2016)

the F / A-18E / F Super Hornet fighter and electric power are added to the U.S. Marine Corps in Pohang.²⁹

The United States is very clear that Northeast Asia has developed as capitalist countries, such as Japan and Korea, and hopes that through the development of the national economy that requires rapid growth and boom of socialist countries, China and North Korea will curb the socialist strength development and form a solid alliance between America, Japan, and South Korea into a coordination mechanism. However, because of history, there is a lot of estrangement and suspicion between Japan and South Korea, which leads to lower levels of trust. And socialist countries - China and North Korea - are wary of Japan. Also, former superpower Russia wants to get its own interests via the Korean Peninsula. Its root cause is in Asia, especially in Northeast Asia. Now, it is impossible to form the basic trust between countries and to achieve a high level of cooperation due to the causes of the problems existing in their history and culture. But this is also due to the root cause of Northeast Asia's polygonal alert security interests for their future uncertainty, which is caused by the great concern and a worried concentrated expression for the problem on the Korean Peninsula and the future development of these complicated conditions. Thus, the United States attaches great importance to the Korean Peninsula issue that sees it in a huge potential role of Northeast Asia as a strategic key point. It's important to consider several aspects. First is the Korean Peninsula since capitalist marine forces invaded socialism as the bridgehead of the forces of the mainland. It is then perfectly possible become a socialist mainland force occupying the forefront of a marine power of capitalism. The highlight of the strategic role is how important it is for both sides that can attack, retreat, defend, take the lead in occupying the salient strategic initiatives, and use it as a weapon and contain each other. And second, the instability of the Korean Peninsula has provided the strongest adhesives for the further consolidation and strengthening of the U.S.-South Korean alliance.

²⁹ [South Korea] US troops pouring military power on the peninsula”, “한반도에 군사력을 쏟아내는 미국”, [N] “<<http://m.news.naver.com/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=025&aid=0002700906>> (Searching date: 02.04.2017)

Due to Japan being a defeated country in the Second World War, its existing military and political forces could not provide the best guarantees for themselves. The country in the Korean War with the United States gave the chance of an economic rise. Japan, with the help of the United States in the war in Iraq deployed the first overseas troops, which is a key step for a symbol of national status for it to return as the second economic power in the world. They have deeply realized that in a period with the strategy of synchronous orbit, on the huge guarantee with the most powerful security and access to the biggest political and economic benefits is the quickest and simplest way - to be with America. At the same time, the United States and the Japanese government also took advantage of the Japanese people in surrounding countries hostile to Japan, that may, from the safety of its revenge, mentally and psychologically firmly strap Japan onto the array. The division of the Korean Peninsula was in an unstable state, and therefore, mostly in the American Northeast Asia strategy, discussed how to effectively grasp the Korean Peninsula for the United States to implement a manageable strategy for Northeast Asia for its role in which they are most concerned. It is both the checks and balances that contain the future of the nation's biggest potential enemy's weapon, as well as the United States who may be strong enough to protect Japan and itself. The United States and South Korean alliance uses this "natural barrier" to intervene and control things for Northeast Asia's best interests.

America's standpoint on the Korean Peninsula is the policy "on the premise of keeping the existing political and military advantage with strong military pressure, tough economic sanctions, popularly said as a 'knife that pressures the neck without falling,' and crushing and matching them with ease, while North Korea slowly changes its internal policy under the way the United States wants to push it. This is to have North Korea become an ally to the United States to resist China and Russia, while at the same time, cooperating with Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia with strategic advantages and interests."³⁰ Preventing the launch of

³⁰Gao Lianfu, "Northeast Asian Countries Foreign Strategy," 高连福: 《东北亚国家对外战略》[J] Social Science Literature Publishing. August 2002, p. 4

North Korean missiles and nuclear technology has become a top priority for the U.S. policy towards North Korea. The United States, from its Asia-Pacific global security strategy, has the need to keep North Korea from developing nuclear weapons to the Northeast Asian security threat, which is formed by the theatre missile defense system to speed up and establish East Asia. It will be bound to vehicles of the United States in Japan, while remaining at the forefront of military power in East Asia for a long time to deal with the so-called potential China "threat." The United States' policy toward North Korea seeks to eventually disarm North Korea, leading to a change of regime within the country.

At the same time, North Korea, based on the accurate judgment of the international situation at the same time, firmly tests and provides maximum security for itself, which is not subject to the United States and does not rely on China. What the United States fears most from the Northeast Asia's long-term strategic interests is the rapid rise of China. In this case, Trump and the U.S. government hope to achieve breakthrough feats on the Korean Peninsula in his limited term to reduce the internal political pressure. This is the question of "reconsolidating" the alliance between America, Japan, and South Korea to strengthen their goal on the containment of China. With this containment action, the United States seeks in the future to lay a solid foundation in more Northeast Asian interests. Thus, the United States has taken a carrot and stick double-sided strategy on North Korea, to a certain extent, trying to disable their nuclear production or by having them completely abandoning hostile nuclear activity. By doing so, the current strategy does not allow North Korea to transfer its nuclear technology, generating a ripple effect to not allow the issue to heighten. This already set up the image of the United States to maintain international peace and stability, and at the same time in the agitation of the Northeast Asian affairs, cage and consolidate the relationship between its Allies, hit the expansion and contain hostile forces, and leave the traditional friendship between the Three Kingdoms of Korea and China. This is the United States' real purpose on the Korean Peninsula.

The United States, through a series of policies and measures taken by the question of the Korean Peninsula, are interfering and delaying the established process of North Korea developing

nuclear weapons. Its essence has also intensified the strategic conflict between the U.S. and the DPRK, while delaying the unity of peace, development, and process of the Korean Peninsula; thus, delaying the whole Northeast Asia with the emergence of a high-level U.S.-oriented cooperation. In this process, much of China's diplomatic efforts are involved, not just for Japan and South Korea and their beautiful horse pursuit, but it also makes the use of the two Koreas' interests that cannot balance the fact that China and themselves had too much suspicion and estrangement. If from the point of this small area of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea is to become a utilitarian winner, and throughout all Northeast Asia, the United States is the biggest political winner, because they made full use of the Korean Peninsula to serve its global strategy to this purpose.

B. SOUTH KOREA'S INTERESTS AND POSITION ON NORTH KOREA

From a historical and geopolitical point of view, the Korean Peninsula can play a role in the sea bridge between the political, economic, and other fields connecting the mainland, and it has a big potential to become a geopolitical country. The relationship between South Korea and North Korea is complex and subtle. They are the same nation and speak the same language, but they can not forgive each other. In contrast, South Korea has relatively generous diplomatic security and economic consciousness with Japan, though they are different nations. From Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun's "Sunshine" policy on North Korea, to the hard-line policy of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, and after the interview with South Korean Secretary General of the National Assembly Woo Yun-geun, he said, "No matter who has the power, such as a new government, the attitude towards North Korea will certainly change. The 20th South Korean Congress will try to help the new government solve the DPRK nuclear issue."³¹ From his interview and recent news from South Korea Ministry of Unification Endorsement Department of South Korea briefing that South Korea approved civilian contact

³¹ Woo Yun-geun, South Korea Secretary General of the National Assembly, [I] An interview with author on December 29, 2016, in Saint- Petersburg

with North Korea,³² I can predict the birth of new government of Moon Jae-in and his attitude toward North Korea named the “Moonlight” policy after the peaceful impeachment of Park Geun-hye in March, 2017.

Of course, the main problem of the Korean Peninsula is the anxiety about North Korea's nuclear possession and possible future nuclear war. And not only South Korea, but also China and Russia, which is bordered by Japan and the United States with the Pacific Ocean in between, are paying attention to the Korean Peninsula. So, the Korean government is not having much effect in the process of denuclearization of North Korea as South Korea wished, despite being the closest country involved.

The 27th President Roh Moo-hyun 's "self-defense" policy was, "... ... Actually, there is diplomacy between South and North Korea, and diplomacy between Korea and China. ...However, we are always preparing for the time of war and China to do it either ..." ³³ This was a reform that couldn't be found in the former Korean government, and during this time, they could say they had honeymoon relationship with North Korea.

³²South Korea Ministry of Unification -Weekly Main News about the unification Endorsement department
“대한민국 통일부-주간 통일뉴스,” [J] p. 1

³³ Speech by Roh Moo-hyun, “Speech of the 50th Democratic Peace and Unification Advisory Council on December 21, 2006,” “노무현 연설: 2006 월 12 월 21 일 제 50 차 민주평화통일자문회의 연설,” [V] - Roh Moo-hyun Foundation

1. ROK-U.S. cooperation policy towards North Korea - GSOMIA

The "trilateral intelligence-sharing pact" to deal with North Korea's nuclear and missile threats was concluded on December 29, 2014.³⁴ Despite the controversy over South Korea's domestic public media and people's public intelligence to sharing military information with Japan, South Korea signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The significance of the "South Korea-United State-Japan Information Sharing Agreement" is as follows: first, establish an information-sharing system to be able to respond to North Korea positively to their nuclear and missile threats in a timely manner between Korea, the United States, and Japan. It has become a useful base for pre-suppression and for military or coercive diplomatic means. Second, upgrade the information capabilities of the ROK armed forces, which is insufficient in responding to the North Korean missile attacks, that have been supplemented by the use of Japan's information assets. Third, it will be the basis for the formation of the information system for the THAAD system for North Korean missile defense.³⁵

At the begging of Park Geun-hye's regime, she came up with policies on the "Korean Peninsula Trust Process"³⁶ to develop inter-Korean relations by forming inter-Korean trust based on robust security to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula. And President Park also mentioned the "Jackpot Unification" policy on New Year's Day 2014,³⁷ but during the inves-

³⁴Jeong Chul-ho, "Situation and Policy," February 2015 정철호 -정세와 정책 [M] (Civil Rights 227) ISSN 2288-663X-1 p. 1-2

³⁵Jeong Chul-ho, "Situation and Policy," February 2015 정철호 -정세와 정책 [M] (Civil Rights 227) ISSN 2288-663X p. 1-2

³⁶Professor Emeritus Ha Young-sun, "The Korean Peninsula Trust Process 2.0 - Combining Confidence and Trust in Confidence," "하영선; 한반도 신뢰프로세스 2.0 -억제관여 신뢰의 복합추진," [J] East Asia Institute, 2014 Edition - Introduction

³⁷Park Geun-hye, [S] New Year Press Conference in 2014 - Inquiries on the Blue House Unification Initiative 2014년 박근혜 신년기자회견- 청와대통일구상을 묻는 물음중에서

tigation of South Korea's "monopoly of government affairs by Choe Sun-sil," it was cleared that the "Jackpot Unification" policy comes from Choe Sun-si instead of President Park. Then, Park-Geun-hye's government tried to deploy the THAAD system in hurry to put the internal contradictions on North Korea, but thus the domestic contradictions became more acute under the Park Geun-hye regime. Park Geun-hye's government missed the most important moment to discuss with the new U.S. government to find the ways to deal with the DPRK nuclear issue while Japan's Prime Minister Abe went to the U.S. two times to meet with President Trump. During this time comes a new word, "South Korea Passing," because of South Korea's weak and incompetent government.

2. South Korea's security actions towards North Korea -THAAD

Under the Lee Myung-bak's and Park Geun-hye's regime, after North Korea's 4th nuclear test, the South Korean government talked about the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system with the U.S. government, and in defense to North Korea's provocations, the United States and South Korea officially started working group-level talks about the development of a U.S. missile defense system on South Korean soil. The deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has been a possibility for several years.³⁸ The South Korean Defense Ministry said on July 26, 2017, that the USFK deployed a portion of the high-altitude regional defense system (THAAD) at the end of the day to the Sungju Golf course in Gyeongbuk province.³⁹

³⁸ Han Min-gu, "Korea-US, THAAD Official Negotiation not yet," 한민구 "한·미, 사드 배치 공식협의 착수는 아직," [N] Naver news <<http://m.news.naver.com/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=008&aid=0003632316>>

³⁹ Ministry of National Defense, "Deploy part of the Sade system" , 한국 국방부-사드일부배치하다. [N] <http://kookbang.dema.mil.kr/kookbangWeb/view.do?bbs_id=BBSMSTR_000000000003&ntt_writ_date=20170427&parent_no=3>

The deployment of the THAAD system has exacerbated the relationship between South Korea, North Korea, China, and Russia. South Korea Secretary General of the National Assembly Woo Yun-geun mentioned that “THAAD is a very sensitive political problem in the East Asian regional policy. But from the government speech it just is targeting the North Korea’s nuclear foment.”⁴⁰ Although South Korea said THAAD system just for defense North Korea’s nuclear weapons but all the X-Band radar information will transcripts to the U.S. MD system. It is the main point that China and Russia and North Korea censure. China started boycott South Korea’s company (Lotte, which support a place for deployment THAAD on Korean peninsula, 74stores, which 90%of Lotte have been shut dow due to the fire control results of Chinese government) and stop tourist industry exchange and media market unofficially.

C. JAPAN'S INTERESTS AND POSITION ON NORTH KOREA

1. SOJ-U.S. cooperation policy towards North Korea

Japan stands on the same side as U.S. in the problem of the Korean Peninsula issue and tries to seek an opportunity to form its influences on multilateral cooperation in East Asia. Based on the national interests of Japan, the government of Prime Minister Abe has conducted their strategies from both a hard side and a soft side. On the one hand, Japan supports American sanctions towards North Korea by violating international law to try to become a new political power by dealing with the nuclear problem of North Korea. On the other hand, aiming at the resentment of Japan from the historical issue, Japan didn’t stress an obvious attitude clearly. Meanwhile, the Japanese government made use of the surrounding countries, especially the public from the Korean Peninsula, and the vigilance of Japan to instigate their national democratic feelings and a sense of crisis. Thus, the Japanese authorities in the Northeast Asian region policy has been widely supported by the country. The policy of the Japanese government

⁴⁰ Woo Yun-geun, South Korea Secretary General of the National Assembly [I] An interview with author on December 29, 2016, in Saint-Petersburg

has shifted from “conversation with North Korea” to “following America’s policies towards the Korean issues.” At the present, the Japanese government has hardly changed its direction in accordance with America, concentrating on a consultation system with China, America, and South Korea, in favor of the strategy of blocking North Korea, which might push the North Korea to a more dangerous road in the future.⁴¹

However, we should also realize that there are some limitations in the cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, because of the needy American domestic policy, economy, and self-defense. The American government doesn’t want to cause new dissatisfactions from other Asian countries and the international society. In the establishment of multilateral security mechanisms in Northeast Asia and economic assistance to the DPRK, Japan and America are chasing different interests. Japan does not want to wage war; a future nuclear war of North Korea does not meet the interests of Japan, but Japan needs to develop its own military forces and regional influence reasons. Starting from the national interests of Japan, it would not be easy for the Japanese government to permit the American government to conduct actions in the way America treated Iraq, because that will be harmful for Japan’s national image and its economic interests. Achieving the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S. is one of the important prerequisites for improving their status and influence in the new order of security in Northeast Asia. Thus, Japan needs to occupy a more favorable strategic position on the Korean Peninsula and continue to conduct its “economic policy” with North Korea and South Korea. However, contradictions and cooperative relations between China and Japan on security, energy, and other issues also reflect the complexity and urgency of security issues in the region. How to strengthen multilateral conversation in the region about political issues, improve security by cooperation between countries, and make full use of funds and technology would be the key to building a new international political and economic order in Northeast Asia through cooperation and symbiosis.

⁴¹ Li Genan, “Japan’s world strategy,” Press of Northern Normal University, 1994, p. 156

2. Japan's security actions towards North Korea

Over the past decades, Japan has increased its cost in military power and tried to give more freedom to Japan Self-Defense Agency. The growth of Japan's military power also applies some pressure to North Korea, which also increases the possibility of an outbreak of confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese government wants to get more security from America and break the military block to form its political position in the Asia-Pacific region.

The North Korea nuclear test was good news for the Japan's right-wing. Relations between China and South Korea were being tested, and the strategic space that South Korea has painstakingly managed in the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear test shrunk even further. Shinzo Abe, Japan's prime minister, has stressed that this is a big threat to Japan's security. Japan then sent two military aircrafts to assess⁴² the radiation dosages from the North Korean nuclear test, and said they will raise the accuracy of the patriot's missile range by 2017. Japan has deployed 48 to 60 units of F / A-18E / F for one aircraft carrier at the U.S. Marine Corps base in Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture⁴³ Iwakuni deployed 10 F-35B stealth fighters in January this year to carry out a beheading operation against North Korea's war.⁴⁴ The number is expected to increase to 16 by June. The F-22, the most powerful stealth fighter, has been deployed to Yokota Air Base near Tokyo and 24 aircraft including the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa.

⁴²“British Air Force, Japan dispatched fighter aircraft to the South China Sea in 20 years also the aircraft carrier,” “イギリス空軍、日本派遣の戦闘機を南シナ海へ 20年には空母も,” [N] Newsweek Japan vision (Date of retrieval: 02.12.2016)

⁴³ [South Korea] US troops pouring military power on the peninsula” , “한반도에 군사력을 쏟아붓는 미국”, [N] “<<http://m.news.naver.com/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=025&aid=0002700906>> (Searching date: 02.04.2017)

⁴⁴ [South Korea] US troops pouring military power on the peninsula” , “한반도에 군사력을 쏟아붓는 미국”, [N] “<<http://m.news.naver.com/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=025&aid=0002700906>> (Searching date: 02.04.2017)

nawa.⁴⁵ Arguably, North Korea's nuclear test has provided fodder for Mr. Abe's "North Korea threat" theory.

Mr. Abe, who has been trying to amend the security bill and the constitution, has repeatedly talked about the North Korea by trying to achieve a constitutional change through exaggerating the peninsula crisis. Abe's Cabinet has approved a defense policy that takes a liberal view of the constitution in 2013⁴⁶, allowing for Japanese involvement in the defense of its allies. Previously, the SDF could only act if Japan itself was directly threatened.⁴⁷

Abe sets a dead line for changing pacific constitution till 2020⁴⁸. Although the Korean Peninsula has been in crisis many times, the threat is closer to North Korea in or adjacent between China and Korea and other countries, with it being a potential threat to Japan. Japan can properly handle relations with North Korea in a more rational and restrained manner. Mr. Abe deliberately emphasized the urgency of the North Korean nuclear test, which is suspicious of the Japanese threat. The success of North Korea's nuclear power is likely to trigger a "security dilemma" in Northeast Asia, particularly in South Korea.

Thus, the North Korean issue would be one step for the Japanese government in its Asian-Pacific strategy. Under the circumstance included in Northeast Asia, Japan would like to probe

45 [South Korea] US troops pouring military power on the peninsula”, “한반도에 군사력을 쏟아붓는 미국”, [N]
“ <<http://m.news.naver.com/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=025&aid=0002700906>>
(Searching date: 02.04.2017)

46 “Japan split as nation mulls end of pacifism”, [N]
CNN<<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/01/world/asia/japan-constitution-protests/index.html>> (Searching date, 20.11.2016)

47 <<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/01/world/asia/japan-constitution-protests/index.html>> (Searching date:03.07.2016)

48 “Abe sets a dead line for changing pacific constitution till 2020”, [N] CNN
<<http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/03/asia/japan-abe-pacifist-constitution/index.html>> (Searching data: 2.5.2017)

the real attitudes of the international society towards this issue. The cooperation between Japan and the United States has been complicating the problem of the Korean Peninsula issue. This has forced South Korea to concentrate more on American attitudes, which will, in turn, increase the stem from China towards North Korea. In the long run, the Japanese government also seeks opportunities to increase its power and get rid of the control and influence of America and achieve its aim at becoming a strong political power.

D. RUSSIA'S INTERESTS AND POSITION ON NORTH KOREA

The problem with a solution on the unification of the North Korean is that the attitudes of the two countries have a tiny difference. China supports North Korea's peaceful reunification scheme under the condition of demilitarization of the Korean Peninsula. Russia has adopted an impartial and neutral attitude towards the unification of the North and the South and supports the reunification of the Korean Peninsula through inter-Korean peace talks.

There are two policies of the Russian Federation on the Korean Peninsula issues. The policy of Russia closely related to its national strategy, which is at the beginning, held the attitude "closed to the West," then changed to the "Moderate" policy which concerns both the West and the East. They expressed this by attending the economic integration in East Asia to promote the development its far eastern region and Siberian region. This is by attending the Korean Peninsula issue to consolidate its power as a super power and become a regional hegemony again.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Xu Wenji, "Russia's Korean Peninsula policy adjustment and its target composition," 徐文吉: "俄罗斯朝鲜半岛政策调整及其目标构图," [J] "Russia Central Asia Eastern European Studies," 2005, (01). doi:10.3969/j.issn.1671-8461, p. 1

1. Russia-China moderate policy towards North Korea

After the Cold War, there are new competitions and confrontations in the issues of security, economic cooperation, and non-traditional security issues. Russia is a typical country, which continually pursues to expand its policy. No matter whether is it the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation, it all regards the Korean Peninsula issue as a key spot for marine forces and land forces. The ice-free port of the Korean Peninsula issue would be the greatest military interest to Russia. After the Cold War, influenced by domestic and international issues, the policy towards the Korean Peninsula issue has changed from “closed to the South Korea” to “both are important.” In the North Korean nuclear issue, Russia keeps the basic standpoint of denuclearization on Korean Peninsula and is in favor for solving the problem through political and diplomatic means. This is by suggesting that the international society provide security guarantees to make North Korea give up its nuclear plan, thus making North Korea and China to become the solid backup and strategic buffer zone.

Russia is likely to take a similar position with China, which is lukewarm against strong sanctions for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The Russian Foreign Ministry said a statement issued shortly after North Korea's 4th nuclear test that Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development is a blatant UN violation of international law and Security Council resolutions, and that it is a danger of flagrant violations. At the same time, however, Russia demanded to find a solution through diplomatic means in the framework of the Six-Party⁵⁰

Russia needs a strong China and China needs a strong Russia. Both are supporting each

14. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the DPRK’s announcement of a hydrogen bomb test”. Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. “Комментарий официального представителя МИД России М.В.Захаровой в связи с заявлением правительства КНДР об испытании водородной бомбы” [D] <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2004721> (Searching date: 1.6.2016)

other to build a new international political and economic order. In the geographic political aspect, the cooperation between China and Russia would be a way to rid themselves of American pressure. China needs support from the international society on the issue of Taiwan, and Russia needs support from China against the sanctions from America. Asia will be unsteady in the future; the intervention of America is not suitable for the national strategy of China and Russia. Both need a strong ally and partner. As two of the Permanent Five countries, only cooperation between Russia and China could be the breakthrough of their interests on America. Although Russia wants to go back to Europe, there are still some problems and difficulties. Compared to the difficulties, cooperation with China would reach agreements easily, which would provide more profits to Russia. Aside from the advantages above, both are facing problems of ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism.

2. Russia's economic policy towards North Korea

South Korean Secretary General of the National Assembly Woo Yun-geun mentioned that, "If the Korean Peninsula is unified, Russia is the country that can achieve the best interests." during his interview on 19,12, 2017.⁵¹

Russia needs a peaceful regional environment to rejuvenate its economy. A steady situation of China and the Korean Peninsula would be good for Russia's national interests. However, at the present, Russia mainly focuses on improving its economy and to go back to Europe. The Korean Peninsula lies only close to the undeveloped region of Russia, which makes Russia not willing to have more concern and give attention to this issue. Russia joined in the multilateral conversation that made North Korea have the power to take action, which reinforces the power against American-Japan and American-South Korea cooperation. By doing so, there would be a balance across countries in this area. Meanwhile, Russia could seek their own na-

⁵¹ Woo Yun-geun, South Korea Secretary General of the National Assembly [I] An interview with author on December 29, 2016, in Saint-Petersburg

tional interests to maximize and, the same time, enhance their position in the region, seeking a balance of political relations in the area.

Just for example, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the 113th largest trading partner of Russia. In 2016 Russia's trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The biggest product group between Russia-North Korea is Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes. Second group is Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten. Third group is Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates. All the products is so simple basically is raw materials.⁵² In other word there is huge development prospection between Russia and North Korea.

The nuclear test has threatened Russia's border security, so North Korea's every move on the nuclear issue is a matter of Russian security. North Korea's primitive nuclear facilities have raised the threat by more than one level. U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker visited North Korea in 2004 and observed 5 MW reactors in Yongbyon nuclear site and the construction site of 50 MW reactors. He pointed out some worries: “[North Korea] is primitive and backward, and the adopted technology is highly unsafe; there will be major nuclear accidents that will happen sooner or later. The potential threats, such as earthquakes and nuclear leaks, are immeasurable for both China and Russia. Thus, Russia, as one of the Permanent Five, must be opposed to the North Korean nuclear issue, which is vital to its interests and international security⁵³. But in concrete sanctions, Russia has shown more posture. Russia, subject to western sanctions and exclusion, is reluctant to act as a leader in sanctions against North Korea.

In recent years, the relationship between the two countries has been growing steadily and

⁵²Russia-North Korea trade exchange[S] Federal Customs Service of Russia<<http://en.russian-trade.com/statistics/by-country/north-korea/export/2016/>> Searching date:05.01.2016)

⁵³Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker Hecker assesses North Korean hydrogen bomb claims, [A] <<http://thebulletin.org/hecker-assesses-north-korean-hydrogen-bomb-claims9046>>

high-level visits are increasing. In March 2015, the Russian side signed a trade agreement on energy cooperation, which aims to exceed \$1 billion in revenue by 2020. In addition, Russia has provided \$25 billion for the modernization of North Korea's railways⁵⁴. Although, this way to deal with Russia is not enough to offset the loss brought by the sanctions, but from the development of the relationship and the Far East countries, strengthening the influence in the Asia-Pacific region's point of view is still good strategic thinking. Especially in the case that North Korea has suffered from current UN sanctions, if Russia is to continue its good economic and trade exchanges, it is bound to bring North Korea to Russia's side and strengthen Russia's voice on the peninsula issue. Secondly, Russia will not because of the sanctions issue affect relations with China and Russia in terms of sanctions and the purpose of basic consistency with China, namely, under the condition of not affecting North Korea's livelihood of the people through limited sanctions to return to the "six-party talks."

⁵⁴ Ministry of National Defense of The People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国国防部 [D] <http://www.mod.gov.cn/opinion/2014-12/23/content_4560022.html> (Searching date: 26.05.2017)

III. CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY OF CHINA ON NORTH KOREA

A. CHINA AND NORTH KOREA ECONOMIC RELATIONS

1. North Korean economic change after the period of Kim Jong-un's regime

Since 2013, North Korea has developed through legislation and administration to further expand the degree of opening to the outside world, and in every way (province) of China is to set up the economic development zone; its openness is "unprecedented."⁵⁵ For North Korea from the perspective of the system, by improving and enhancing the labor productivity of a series of efforts, China has had an encouraging attitude. This is especially in China and the DPRK exchange of visits at all levels of during the intensive period of China through various forms of bilateral communication and reception. All levels of the DPRK delegation to North Korea, without reservation to introduce China's own successful experiences and failure lessons in the process of the reform and opening, made exploring new paths in the process of economic development with little detours and has made them more efficient.

After the Kim Jong-un took power, North Korea has tried to restore the economy by improving both the external sector (trade and investment) and the domestic sector (North Korea's style management system). Especially, North Korea expected to improve the foreign economic situation by diversifying trade channels and export items and by attracting foreign investment through special economic zones. However, as the phase of the international community sanctions is strengthened without visible results in the external economic sector, North

⁵⁵Lin Jin-shu, Jin Mei-hua, "The Reasons and Trends of the Economic Rejuvenation of Korea after the Reign of Kim Jong-un," "North Korea's Economic Development Zone," 林今淑、金美花:“金正恩执政后朝鲜经济好转原因及其走势,”“朝鲜各道将建经济开发区,” [J] Journal of Yanbian University (Social Science Edition), No. 2, 2016, p. 12-18

Korea begins to demand a domestic economic sector rather than the external economic sector. Indeed, North Korea's domestic market (informal sector) has been a dynamically moving and driving force behind the growth of North Korea in 2011-2016.

Beginning in 2012, the DPRK began piloting a new "group management system" on part of the cooperative farms, further narrowing the subgroups of the original cooperative farms to about five or even less. This allowed the farmers transfer some part of their farm to the State, and another part of it could be sold into the food market. Farmers have their own income and have the dominance.⁵⁶

In the New Year speech in 2013, Kim Jong-un proposed to build the DPRK as an economically, powerful country. He believed that building an economic power was the most important task of realizing the strategic goal of the socialist country of the Korean Communist Party. He put forward a series of measures and key directions for the development of the economy.⁵⁷ Kim Jong-un issued the adoption and promulgation of the Economic Development Law on May 29, 2013. On November 6, 2013, North Korea announced regulations on the creation of economic development zones, regulations on the establishment and operation of these zones, regulations on the operation of the zones' management institutions, and adopted "Decision to create economic development zones" to every province in North Korea by Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly on November 21, 2013.⁵⁸ The Ministry of Trade, the Cooperative Investment Committee, and the National Economic Development

⁵⁶Zhang Li, Du Baiyu "North Korea held a cabinet meeting to address the food problem," 张利、杜白羽, "朝鲜举行内阁会议强调解决粮食问题," [N] Xinhua. <http://news.Xinhuanet.com/world/2013-12/28/c_118749374.html> (Date of retrieval: 22.04.2016)

⁵⁷ "Kim Jong-un's New Year's Speech in 2013," 《金正恩发表 2013 年新年讲话》 [N], the Embassy of the People's Republic of China on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at <<http://www.Fmprc.Gov.cn/ce/cekp/chn/gdxw/t1002630.html>> (Date of retrieval: 04.01.2017)

⁵⁸ [North Korea] Lee Myung-sook, general remarks on economic development zone, "리명숙, 경제개발구에 대한 일반적 리해," [J] Kim Il Sung University Scholarship (Philosophy, Economics), Volume 60, Issue 2, 2014. p. 109-112

Committee were created for foreign economic efficiency in June 2014. It has shown a lot of emphasis on the development of transit trade and service industry through the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic Zone.

On June 18, 2014, North Korea unified the "Foreign Economic Efficiency" by integrating the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Investment Committee, which is responsible for attracting foreign capital, and the National Economic Development Committee.⁵⁹ The policy trend shifted more to the domestic sector starting in 2015, from which it began to appear the Self-Reliance domestic policy.⁶⁰ In particular, Chairman Kim Jong-un insisted that, "all factories and enterprises should eliminate import disease and develop a struggle to realize localization of materials, materials and equipment." He also mentioned that, "the imported disease is like a malignant tumor that destroys its own strength."⁶¹ It may have been due to these pressures that North Korea's total imports have declined by about 20% in 2015.⁶²

In 2016, North Korea was judged to be unable to recover its economy due to the strengthening of sanctions by the international community because of its nuclear test. The North Korean economy experienced a negative growth (-1.1%) for the first time since Kim Jong-un took power in 2015, so the stagnancy could continue for another two consecutive years. In response, North Korea has concentrated efforts to mobilize its residents and has produced artificial and short-term results.

⁵⁹ [South Korea] Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea "통일부, 주간북한동향," [J] Weekly North Korea Trend, No. 1209, June 14, 2014. 6. 14 ~ 6. 20

⁶⁰ [North Korea] Hwang Chul, "How to Manage Our Style Economy," 황철 "우리식 경제관리방법," [J] Kim Il Sung University, No.2, 2016, p. 80

⁶¹ [North Korea] Kim Jong-un a Speech of New Year's Day, January 1, 2017. 김정은, "2017년 신년사," [N] Labor Newspaper, <<http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?ptype=igisa2>> (Date of retrieval: 02.02.2017)

⁶² [South Korea] Nam Jin-wook, "Economic Trends in North Korea in 2015 Related Statistics," 남진욱, "2015 북한 경제동향 통계자료,"- [S] Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Corporation

The 70-day struggle, which took place from February to May 2016, was named "Battle of Loyalty" before the 7th party convention on May 2016.⁶³ It stressed that this is an "ideological war" which required self-reliance and self-improvement.⁶⁴ Labor Newspaper wrote: "In order to implement the DPRK Central Committee of the Workers' Party and the Central Military Commissions' slogan in the major factories, enterprises, farms and universities it needs to start activities to become the glorious winner of the 70 days struggle."⁶⁵ However, it is impossible to confirm the comprehensive achievements of the 70 day struggle. For example, The Chosun Newspaper reported: "During the 70-day struggle of loyalty, the institutions, factories, enterprises, and cooperative farm workers made unprecedented efforts," but it did not mention what was kinds of efforts accomplished.⁶⁶

In order to materialize the details, which was discussed during the North Korea's 7th Party Congress. The 200 Days of Struggle (June 1 to December 15, 2016) immediately came after the 70 days of struggle. A regional crowd competition has begun and observed the emphasis of achievement in the agriculture and construction sectors.⁶⁷ The Labor Newspaper

⁶³"The letter of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of the DPRK enthusiastically appealed to the 70th day struggles of loyalty before the North Korea Committee party's seventh convention, sent letters to the Labor Newspaper and the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of the DPRK," (February 26, 2016)

⁶⁴ [North Korea] "Let's raise the morale of the war mental battle," "일전투의 철야진군에서 사상전의 포성을 더 높이 올리자," [N] Labor Newspaper, 29.02.2016.

⁶⁵ [North Korea] "In the major factories, enterprises, farms and universities it needs to start activities to become the glorious winner of the 70 days struggle," "충정의 70 일 전투 기록장에 영웅적헌신과 눈부신 기적창조의 위훈을 아로새기자, 각지 농장, 기업소, 협동농장, 대학들에서 꺾기모 임 진행" [N] Labor Newspaper. 04.03.2016.

⁶⁶ [North Korea] "A congratulation documents for the 7th Workshop of the Workers' Party of North Korea the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party and Workers of the Cooperative Farms and Establishments," "조선로동당 제 7 차 대회 70 일 전투에서 빛나는 로력적 위훈을 세운 기관, 공장, 기업소, 협동농장 근로자들과 일군들 앞으로 축하전 문" [N] Chosun Shinbo 07.05.2016.

⁶⁷ [North Korea]"We should realize the first battlefield from the agricultural sector during the 200-day struggles of loyalty. There was nothing more important than agriculture doing the 200-day struggles of loyalty.", "노동신문, 자강력 제일주의를 틀어쥐고 당 대회 결정 관철을 위한 200 일 전투의 전군길을 힘 있게 다그치자" [N] The Labor Newspaper 09.06.2016)

wrote: "We should realize the first battlefield from the agricultural sector during the 200-day struggles of loyalty. There was nothing more important than agriculture doing the 200-day struggles of loyalty."⁶⁸ In Democratic Korea, it mentioned that: "Cooperative farm workers and farmers are spurring the victory of the 200-day struggle in Shinam, Changsan, and Dongshin."⁶⁹ However, the direction of the 200-day struggle is focused on the damage recovery due to the massive flood caused by typhoon "Ryan Rock" in North Hamgyong Province in September 2016. The flood occurred from August 29, 2016 to September 2, 2016, when typhoon Ryan Rock hit North Hamgyong province. North Korea Broadcasting Central reported that it was "a catastrophe." "There were hundreds of casualties, including deaths and missing persons, and over 68,900 people have been reported injured in North Korea."⁷⁰

The policy had the citizens participate, becoming a political and social burden on North Korea, for which the country had to take these factors into account until the policy changes in 2017. However, conflicts between the ruling and opposing figures arose in North Korea's non-formal (market) growth in 2016. This is evidenced by the observation of market prices and exchange rates, which have remained stable, despite the sanctions of the international community. The role of the informal sector seems to have played a positive role in the economic activities of the residents by alleviating external shocks, despite the difficulties North Korea faced in terms of foreign currency supply and demand.

⁶⁸ [North Korea] "The National Assembly, and the whole country go forward once more," "전당, 전국이 다시 한 번 총동원 앞으로," [N] Labor News 15.06.2016.

⁶⁹ [North Korea] "Let's make this year's farming brightly and efforts for next year," "올해 농사를 빛나게 결속한 기세로 다음 해 농사차비를 힘 있게 다그치자," [N] Democratic Korea 27.11.2016.

⁷⁰ [South Korea] "Typhoon in North Korea," 북한 태풍 [N] Money today, <http://search.mt.co.kr/index.html?srchFd=TOTAL&range=IN&category=TOTAL&reSrchFlag=&preKwd=&search_type=m&kwd=2016.+9.+15&pageNum=1&bgndt=20160915&enddt=20160915&subYear=&sortType=allwordsyn&subType=>> (Date of retrieval: 15.11.2016)

2.China's economic policy on North Korea from 2012-2016

There are periodic problems in the development of China-DPRK relations for political and diplomatic reasons, such as North Korea's economic developmental problems and more effects between China and the DPRK's political, diplomatic, and economic cooperation. Political exchanges still direct Chinese-DPRK relations. Bilateral economic cooperation relationships also indirectly affect China-DPRK relations

On December 19, 2013, the Chinese ambassador Yan Zheng analyzed the future of China's and North Korea's relationship under Kim Jong-un's rule. Yan stated, "After Jang Seong-taek's execution, there was huge political turmoil in North Korea, garnering the attention of the international community, who were very concerned about China and the DPRK's relationship during that period."⁷¹

However, when a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry asked about China's stance towards Jang Seong-taek's dismissal and execution, with a neutral attitude expressed he replied, "It is North Korea's internal affair, and as a friendly neighbor, we hope for the DPRK's national stability, economic development, and that the DPRK's citizens can receive happiness. China is concerned about the economic development and people's lives in the DPRK, but it doesn't mean China will intervene in the DPRK's internal affairs, nor does it require other countries to inform us of their internal situation in advance."⁷² Zhang Jang Seong-taek had overseen foreign economy, visiting many Chinese cities in the previous years during China's

⁷¹ Yan Jing, "What is the relationship between China and Korea in Kim Jong-un 's era?" 延静 "金正恩时代中朝关系何去何从." [A] Da Gong Net. <<http://news.takungpao.com/opinion/highlights/2013-12/2116054.html>> (Date of retrieval: 02.02.2017)

⁷² Yan Jing, "What is the relationship between China and Korea in Kim Jong-un 's era?" 延静 "金正恩时代中朝关系何去何从." [A] Da Gong Net. <<http://news.takungpao.com/paper/q/2013/1219/2115922.html>> (Date of retrieval: 02.02.2017)

reform.

“China is concerned about the economic development and the people's lives in the DPRK, but it doesn't mean it will intervene in the DPRK's internal affairs, nor does it require other countries to inform them of their internal situation in advance. Jang Seong-taek has overseen the foreign economy, visited China in the early years, but also visited many cities within the country, and oversaw China's reformation and opening up.”⁷³ China will continue to devote its traditional friendship and cooperation between itself and the DPRK. This summarizes China's position on the current political situation in North Korea and China-DPRK relations.

In 2013, with increased trade with China, North Korea's foreign trade reached a record high of \$7.34 billion. Exports and imports increased 11.7% and 5.0%, respectively, while overall trade increased 7.8%, despite the adverse environment of the third nuclear test and the UN sanctions. North Korea's trade also traded at a record high of \$6.5 billion.⁷⁴ Compared with 2013, the trade with China was just \$6.36 billion in 2014. This was a common phenomenon, not only in North Korea's mass imports (-3.0%), but also in exports (-2.4%), which were regarded as having no oil import statistics. Even though the nuclear test and the United Nations sanctions⁷⁵ have been implemented in 2013, mass exports and imports increased by 17.2% and 5.4%, respectively. However, in 2014, There was speculation that the political relations between the two countries, which have somewhat extinguished, have affected trade. The North Korean trade, which has been steadily growing, reached its trade decline slightly in 2014, but also declined in 2015. By 2015, North Korea's trade totaled \$4.91 billion, declined

⁷³ “Xi Jinping with Kim Jong-un Choi Ryong Hae,” “习近平会见金正恩特使崔龙海,” [N] Renmin. <<http://cpc.people.com.cn/2013/0525/c64094-21611331.html>> (Date of retrieval: 02.05.2017)

⁷⁴ [South Korea] Lee, Jong-gyu, “North Korea's Foreign Trade Trends in 2013,” 이종규, “2013년도 북한의 대외무역 동향” [J] KOTRA 2014. 5

⁷⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 209,[D] Resolution 209 (1965) of 04,09,1965

12.6% year-by-year and 16.4% year-by-year.⁷⁶ Until December 2015, North Korean trade showed a sharp decline (-14.7%). Both exports and imports have declined to more than two digits, and the decline in imports is greater than exports. First, the change in 2015 is clearly meaningful, because both countries' trade has declined in 2014 and 2015, with no imports of crude oil being considered in the statistics (under the same conditions).⁷⁷ North Korea's trade in 2016 increased by about 7.3% over the previous year. The declining trend of North Korean trade in 2014 and 2015 was reversed in 2016. Exports rose 6.1% to \$2.6 billion, while imports rose 8.3% to \$3.2 billion.⁷⁸ See chart 1.

<Chart 1> China -North Korea Trade (2012-2016)					
(Unit: US\$ billions, %)					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Export	34.5	36.3	35.2	29.5	31.9
(Increase)	(8.9)	(5.4)	(-3.0)	(-16.4)	(8.3)
Import	24.8	29.1	28.4	24.8	26.3
(Increase)	(0.8)	(17.2)	(-2.4)	(-12.6)	(6.1)
Total	59.3	65.4	63.6	54.3	58.3
(Increase)	(5.4)	(10.4)	(-2.8)	(-14.7)	(7.3)

⁷⁶ [South Korea/ China] [S] KITA / China Customs, <<http://stat.kita.net>>, vol.19 / No.1, 2017. (Date of retrieval: 11.01.2017)

⁷⁷[South Korea] Lim Soo-Ho · Choi Jang-ho, “North Korea Foreign Trade 2016 Evaluation and 2017 Outlook: Focusing on North Korea Trade,” 임수호·최장호, “북한 대외무역 2016 년 평가 및 2017 년 전망: 북중무역을 중심으로,” [J] KDI North Korea Economic Review, January 2016, Korea Development Institute

⁷⁸[South Korea] Lee Seok, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Development Institute 2016 North Korea Economic Trends Evaluation and Explanation Hypothesis, 이석. “한국개발연구원 선임연구위원 2016 년 북한경제 동향 평가와 설명 가설,” [A] January 2017, Korea Development Institute North Korea Economic Review vol.19 / No.1

In 2016, North Korea's trade environment deteriorated. Due to North Korea sanctions and China's eco-energy policy, the reduction of anthracite coal imports will inevitably lead to a decline in North Korea's main exports, with raw material prices dropping and the developments of Chinese economy slowing down. At the end of 2016, North Korea's unemployed exports increased again, but a significant decline in 2017 became inevitable in accordance with USCR 2321. USCR 2321, which passed on November 30, 2016, is expected to bring some effect of sanctions on North Korea, which surpasses USCR 2270, which has been treated as "the most powerful economic sanctions in the last 20 years." The core of USCR 2321 is in the anthracite export quota of about \$ 400 million a year.

Following the USCR 2321, on April 13, 2017, the Chinese State Information Office held a conference in the first quarter of 2017 about the import and export situation. The general administration of customs, a spokesman for Huang Songping, said that China's customs strictly abided by the UN security council's resolutions and the relevant state laws and regulations on implementing an embargo on North Korea. China imported 267.8 million tons of coal from North Korea in the first quarter, a 51.6% drop from the same period last year, all of which was imported before February 18. Huang Songping introduced to implement the UN security council resolution 2321 of sanctions against North Korea. On February 18, 2017, the Ministry of Commerce jointly with the General Administration of Customs has released on December 31, 2017, suspension of North Korea's announcement that originated from coal imports. Since February 19th, it has annual suspension since North Korea imported coal measures. In this situation, someone asked to import cheap North Korea cheap and plentiful labor to China then China and withdraw the sanctions principles. Of course, it would be more advantageous for China to import North Korean workers and produce items locally in China, but recently, it is a political burden that the Western society including the United States con-

⁷⁹ The data base comes from KDI (Korea Development Institute) documents from 2012 to 2016

siders North Korea's overseas dispatch of workers as a new sanction item for North Korea. Therefore, for the Chinese government, increasing the number of North Korea workers in the country is a safer approach considering both political risks and economic necessity.

Based on the Chinese customs statistics data, Chinese trade exchange with North Korea can divide them into general, modified, processed, and bonded trade. General trade accounts for the largest portion of China-North Korea's trade. China's main import item - anthracite coal from North Korea - has been on the decline since 2013. On the other hand, apparel import from North Korea increases. Due to China's inevitable trend reflecting the restructuring of environmental policies of the mining industry, even if not because of sanctioned to North Korea, North Korea's exports of anthracite to China declined; the decline is expected to increase further. Conversely, the apparel manufacturing business in North Korea is likely to increase more rapidly in the future.

3. Industry trade exchange between China and North Korea

North Korea's trade has attracted a great deal of international attention, because of the nuclear test and the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) sanctions on the country. There are no studies on the trading practices of border area trade and changes in the way of sanctions.

Frontier trade can only be done in a geographically bordered area, so for the case, it is only possible in Liaoning province and Jilin province in trade between China and North Korea. These frontier areas serve as the outposts of the Chinese-North Korean trade and took most part of their trade. Since the UNSC sanctions against North Korea in early 2016, Chinese companies have become increasingly active in ordering or processing orders for North Korea.

This is especially in the garment processing sector. Garment processing plants are operating and continuously working outside Pyongyang area.

In the historical perspective, the Liaoning province and Jilin province are one of the oldest provinces that has trade exchange with the Korean Peninsula, and the exchange with North Korea's trade to Jilin and Liaoning province is also important.

Liaoning province's Dandong city is the largest frontier area to North Korea and China, along with the largest population and is facing Sinuiju in North Korea. It has regional characteristics, such as Jilin province facing the border with North Korea, with both having many mountains and rivers (Yalu river). However, in Jilin province, they don't have estuaries that could flow into the sea like Dandong city. Dandong, a key of industrial city in Northeast China, has light textile and electronics industries and can be transported commodities to North Korea at any time, which is collected all over China. Approximately 60% of the transit cargo traffic between North Korea is transported to the Pyongyang metropolitan area via Dandong and Sinuiju.

<Chart2> Liaoning province - North Korea Trade		(Unit: US\$ millions,%)			
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Export (Increase)	1229 (8.1)	1424 (9.7)	1596 (12.0)	1455 (-8.8)	1524 (4.8)
Import (Increase)	911 (5.3)	1104 (16.0)	1139 (3.2)	1063 (-6.7)	1035 (-2.5)
Total (Increase)	2250 (6.9)	2528 (12.4)	2735 (8.2)	2518 (-7.9)	2559 (1.6)
surplus	348	321	457	393	489

Since the recent sanctions in North Korea, Liaoning's total trade to North Korea in 2016 was \$2.56 billion, up 1.6% from the same period in 2015. At the same time, China's total trade with North Korea was \$5.83 billion, and the total trade of Liaoning Province with North Korea accounted for 43.9% of total trade volume with China, a decrease of 2.5%.<See Chart 2>⁸⁰

From the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, merchants from the Korean Peninsula crossed the Tumen River and made trade exchanges with China. Since the establishment of North Korea in the 1950s, trade between the two countries has started to increase in earnest. In particular, in the late 1990s, Jilin province 's trade with North Korea showed a rapid rise, growing more than 11 times from \$90.75 million in 2000 to \$1.5 billion in 2016.<See chart 3>

⁸⁰ Statistics based on KITA and remake by author. [S] <www.kite.net> Date: 16.02.2017

<Chart3> Jilin province - North Korea Trade		(Unit: U.S.\$ millions, %)			
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Export (Increase)	419 (6.8)	526 (25.5)	755 (43.5)	598 (-20.8)	677 (13.2)
Import (Increase)	259 (-6.1)	336 (30.0)	432 (28.6)	406 (-6.1)	378 (-6.9)
Total (Increase)	678 (1.5)	862 (27.2)	1187 (37.7)	1004 (-15.5)	1055 (5.1)
surplus	160	190	323	192	299

⁸¹ Statistics based on KITA and remake by author, <www.kita.net> Date: 2017. 2.16

China implemented economic developmental policies in the northeast region in order to retrieve the reputation, made of the “northeast revitalization,” “Chang Ji Tu,” “One Belt, One Road,” and other economic strategies, so that China could dominant national relations in East Asia, religion among the United States, Japan, and other powerful countries. The process of this strategy includes the contents of the economic cooperation with North Korea, such as infrastructure expansion, maintenance, and construction of North China economic and industrial complex in the border area of North China.

⁸¹[South Korea] Statistics: KITA:Korea International Trade Association statistics [S], <www.kita.net> (Date of retrieval: 16.03.2017)

In this situation, the Chinese government is very likely to activate the frontier areas like Dandong and Yanbian, which is easy to advance into North Korea and Russia where economic cooperation is ongoing. And Yanbian area's special position could also help the Chinese government to achieve its goals easily. Lots of Korean-Chinese citizens living in the Yanbian area could make that cooperation more directly and easily, because of the language power and historical reasons; for example, by setting up a border international cooperation zone in Huling City, Hunchun, Tumen, and Helong City,⁸² nurture North Korea, dispatch workers overseas, and revitalize the Changbai Mountain tourism industry in Yanbian area.

B. CHINA 'S SECURITY POLICY ON NORTH KOREA

1. The "Six party talks"

Since the outbreak of North Korea's first nuclear crisis in 1993, China pursued and promoted a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue in accordance under the "three insistence" by the Chinese Communist Party, which also constitutes the guiding principle for China to launch and promote the "six-party talks" process.

From 1993 to 2003, before China formally initiated the "six-party talks," China took a position not to directly intervene, but instead promoted direct negotiations between the United States and the DPRK to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully and actively. During this period,

⁸² Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (China , Jilin province) has eight counties and cities, respectively, Yanji City, Hunchun City, Longjing City, and Long City, Tumen City, Dunhua City, Antu County, Wang Qingxian.

despite China's active participation in the “four-party talks” held in Geneva, it has always insisted that the Quartet talks focus on the issue of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.⁸³

In October 2002, the second nuclear crisis broke out. President George W. Bush said in a high-profile, “Do not rule out any options.” leading to a sharp rise of activity in the Korean Peninsula crisis, and even the risk of war outbreaking. The Chinese government has changed the principle of “no direct intervention” that has been persisted for many years, but instead wanted the United States and North Korea to carry out intensive mediation with their diplomacy. In April 2003 in Beijing, China hosted the Tripartite talks with the United States and North Korea to participate and later invited the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan to participate in the “six-party talks.” China's core issue on the “six-party talks” is to solve the DPRK nuclear issue peacefully and realize the denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula. China believes that the key holders to resolving the DPRK nuclear issue were the DPRK and the United States since 1993. What China can do through diplomatic means is to allow the DPRK and the United States to hand over a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue and achieve a peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

China positioned its own role as the organizer and mediator of the negotiations throughout the process of the “six-party talks.” China's most fundamental duty is being the chairman of the talks. On the one hand, per the different commons interests of different parties and different demands, its duty was planning the roadmap and issues to keep it comprehensive and balanced; on the other hand, persuaded the different parties to promote the talks from in an easy manner to get results of the stage step-by-step as to what China expected.

⁸³ "The fourth round of six-party talks on the joint statement,” “第四轮六方会谈共同声明,” [D] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/t212681.shtml> (Date of retrieval:29.09.2016)

China has a unique position and advantage over the other parties in the “six-party talks.” For example, China has maintained good political relations and smooth diplomatic channels with all other parties, especially between North Korea and the United States. This unique position could help China play a role in providing convenience and advantages. But on the other hand, with friendly relations between China and the DPRK, or the smooth political interaction between China and the United States, there are many complex negative factors, which limits China's influence on the United States or North Korea. In other words, China, as a mediator, has very limited influence on the United States or North Korea.

China succeeded in pushing forward the relevant parties to the "9.19 Joint Statement." On September 19, 2005, it not only established the policy and principle framework for mutual acceptance, but also established the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," "the establishment of a Korean peninsula permanent peace system," and "equal participation in the Northeast Asian security cooperation mechanism," and laid a comprehensive solution as the basis for tackling the problem.⁸⁴

In 2003, under the impetus of China, the DPRK nuclear issue was negotiated and became the “six-party talks.” The idea of the “six-party talks” is to establish a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia to ensure regional stability. Under the peaceful background, the “six-party talks” achieved the “9.19 Joint Statement” in 2005, and the DPRK agreed to abandon the nuclear issue. But after publishing the statement under the name of "anti-money laundering" in the United States, the U.S. immediately announced financial sanctions against North Korea. After several negotiations to solve the North Korean issue, they were unsuccessful. Then, North Korea embarked on the nuclear test ship. Although the United States was forced to compromise, so that the DPRK nuclear issue could restore itself. But when the South Kore-

⁸⁴ "The fourth round of six-party talks on the joint statement," “第四轮六方会谈共同声明,” [D] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/t212681.shtml> (Date of retrieval: 2016 年 9 月 29 日)

an conservative forces came to power, they took a tough policy to the DPRK and the government under Lee Myung Bak, and even joined the sponsors of the United Nations Human Rights Council on North Korea's human rights issue. It became a signal almost cutting off the DPRK and South Korea through the improvement of relations between themselves to seek security stabilization and even strengthened the determination of North Korea to develop its nuclear weapons. This determination was demonstrated immediately after the new leader of the DPRK Kim Jong-un.

The “six-party talks”, which were held in Beijing on December 2008, failed, and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the “six-party talks” in April 2009. Since then, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has stalled. North Korea continue its own way, and the United States and South Korea, Russia and Japan are facing the tasks how to take measures to promote North Korea initiative to abandon nuclear to achieve denuclearization of Korean Peninsula to maintain the security of Northeast Asia and stop the DPRK tests before the North Korea became a real “Nuclear State”. The key to solving this problem is in the DPRK and the United States. And the the various words from United States on the nuclear crisis not entirely because of the nuclear threat from North Korea, is to consider the long-term goal of returning to the Asia-Pacific strategy return.

As the most important zero sum game to the DPRK nuclear issue and the peninsula affairs, the United States and the DPRK have never been able to establish the necessary political mutual trust. Even if this form like "six-party talks" did not coordinate the position of the two countries and failed to improve the interaction between the two countries, the North Korea and U.S. always have divisions on the humanitarian assistance, food energy exchange for nuclear, inspection and suspension of missile test and other issues⁸⁵.

After Kim Jung-un came to power, how to reverse the situation of the DPRK from the isolated international community, to solve the diplomatic difficulties and solve the Korean nuclear crisis is a big issue. China must continue to coordinate the interests of all parties, to play a positive and constructive role in the DPRK issue in the future, China has the responsibility and

⁸⁵ Zhang Huasheng, “North Korea 's Nuclear Issue and China' s Countermeasures,” 张化生. “朝核问题与中国的对策”[J] *International Security Studies*, 2013 (5), p 52-61.

only China can play such role. Although the "six-party talks" have been suspended for many years, with difficult situation, but this is an effort of long-term historic choices from the 6 countries. China should strive to promote cooperation, shape the interests of the "six-party talks" mechanism under the DPRK nuclear issue to explore the reality fountains, in the elimination of North Korean security concerns at the same time, in a constructive attitude to carry out diplomatic rotation, the DPRK nuclear issue for the issue-oriented. To solve the DPRK nuclear issue through the parties.

So the associated departments of the Chinese government issued for the implementation of the relevant resolutions by the three government interdepartmental administrations in September 2013, April 2016, and June 2016, respectively.⁸⁶ China's and North Korea's relationship for decades of military equipment supply, was interrupted because North Korea blatantly conducted a nuclear test, which China resolutely opposed to North Korea developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. China has been seeking to push the other parties back to the "six-party talks" and resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation.

⁸⁶ Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry and Information, General Administration of Customs, National Atomic Energy Agency Announcement No. 59 of 2013 "Announcement on Prohibiting the List of Dual-use Items and Technologies for Export to North Korea," "中国商务部、工信部、海关总署、国家原子能机构 2013 年第 59 号公告关于禁止向朝鲜出口的两用物项和技术清单的公告 [D] <<http://www.Mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/201309/20130900317772.shtml>>

Announcement No.11 of 2016 the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China on the List of Mineral Products for the Korean Embargo, "中国商务部公告 2016 年第 11 号关于对朝鲜禁运部分矿产品清单公告," [D] <<http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/h/zongzhi/201604/20160401290257.shtml>>

Announcement No. 22 of 2016, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, State Atomic Energy Agency, General Administration of Customs, "Notice on the addition of a list of dual-use items and technologies forbidding export to the DPRK," "中国商务部、工信部、国家原子能机构、海关总署 2016 年第 22 号公告关于增列禁止向朝鲜出口的两用物项和技术清单的公告," [D] <<http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/201606/2016060133862.shtml>> (Date of retrieval: 01.02.2017)

2.The Effects of North Korean nuclear program

Nearly, with the increase of north Korea's nuclear bomb equivalent also is bigger, the Chinese people is threatened, especially in the event of a nuclear, nuclear pollution, the damage to the environment in China's northeast is disastrous, irreversible. Once the situation on the Korean peninsula tensions, influence not just north Korea itself, and global economic fluctuation, easy to create a market panic.

First of all, it is worthwhile that North Korea has made rapid progress in the weaponization of missile technology and nuclear capabilities. North Korea has initially mastered the rocket separation technology and long-range carrying nuclear warheads. Therefore, once the DPRK achieve a breakthrough in the nuclear warhead miniaturization and aircraft re-entry technology, then it will have the ability to intercontinental level of nuclear strikes, which bound to constitute a serious impact to the regional and global security situation. With the rapid development of computer simulation technology, many nuclear countries in a relatively short period of time can achieve the miniaturization of nuclear weapons.⁸⁷ Therefore, the international community needs to take some actions as soon as possible, otherwise the DPRK nuclear issue will become more complicated.

Second, the principle of denuclearization of the peninsula is facing serious challenges. From the point of view of the DPRK, the new leaders have set the "nuclear and satellite" as the primary revolutionary legacy of Kim Jong Il. Not only put the "nuclear country" written into the Constitution officially, but also put forward the "nuclear weapons and economic construction simultaneously" as a new strategy. These indications shows that the DPRK's new regime has been dissatisfied with the secret advancement of the nuclear program and as a bargaining chip for economic aid. Now Kim Jong-un began to openly status the North Korea as a "Nuclear states", forcing the international community to deal with nuclear issues with North Korea, and then to give up economic sanctions, signed a peace agreement.

⁸⁷ Li Shenming, Wang Yi Zhou, "Global Politics and Safety Seedlings", 李慎明, 王逸舟 "全球政治与安全化苗," (2014) [B]. Science will be documented in Science, 2014, p. 241

Therefore, on July 6, 2016, North Korea presented “Five proposed requirements of the denuclearization” for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to South Korea and the United States through a government spokesman. A statement by the North Korean government spokesman, “1: Release of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. 2: Abolition and verification of all nuclear weapons and bases in South Korea. 3: Suspension of deployment of Korean nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. 4: Declaration of the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. 5: Proclamation of withdrawal of U.S. forces presented.”⁸⁸ and of course, U.S. and other countries ignored the statements.

North Korea's discord has not only undermined the authority of the “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, but has also set a negative example for other countries trying to approach nuclear barriers. At present, the South Korean conservative forces are asking to the United States to re-deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, but also required South Korea to build their own nuclear weapons as soon as possible. Despite the prudent attitude from official stance, the South Korean government has asked the United States to loosen nuclear regulation and modify the existing U.S.-ROK atomic energy agreement⁸⁹. Compared with South Korea, Japan's nuclear voice is also rising. Not only some officials publicly declared that Japan should have nuclear weapons, some media's start to making a big propaganda, to took the opportunity to break through the nuclear ban copper. If could not under control this trend, then Northeast Asia will face nuclear arsenal, nuclear competition, a huge risk. North Korea's challenge to stimulate the militarization of Northeast Asia. From the Korean side, after the DPRK's third nuclear test, the main action taken by the South Korea's government. First, strengthen the U.S.-ROK military alliance, modify the joint operations plan, and the high-frequency military exercises with U.S. military, to strengthen the military shock to North Korea. Second, increase the defense budget, and vigorously enhance the military equipment. Is to strengthen the pre-emptive strike for the Korean army has been equipped with a range of 1,000 km cruise missiles, but as a supplementary strike force, South

79 [North Korea] Korean Center News Agency 조선인민민주주의 공화국 중앙통신 [N] Pyongyang on July 6, 2016

⁸⁹ Yin Yuzhi, “A Study on the Strategy of Kim Jong-un 's Regime,” 尹奎植 “对金正恩政权生巧战略的研究川,” [M] Military Forum, No. 74, Quarterly: p 12-14.

Korea is developing can cover the whole territory of North Korea ballistic missiles.⁹⁰

From the DPRK side, despite the shortage of resources and equipment aging, but it is also taking measures to upgrade conventional weapons. Such as the strengthening of long-range artillery forces near the demilitarized zone, the deployment of a considerable number of mobile ballistic missiles capable of striking against Japan and South Korea's clever minds and targets in the Pacific region.

From the regional military competition situation, the DPRK nuclear threat has become an important starting point for the United States' "Pivot to Asia" strategy to shift its focus to Asia, Japan's re-militarization. Japan accelerate the militarization of the various moves is not so much against North Korea, it is better to say against China's strategic containment and military deterrence. Coupled with several factors is likely to become a security threat in Northeast Asia, so to coordinate the interests of Northeast Asian countries to improve the security environment in North Korea. Coupled with several factors is likely to become a security threat in Northeast Asia, so to coordinate the interests of Northeast Asian countries to improve the security environment in North Korea.

As the most important zero sum game to the DPRK nuclear issue and the peninsula affairs, the United States and the DPRK have never been able to establish the necessary political mutual trust. Even if this form like "six-party talks" did not coordinate the position of the two countries and failed to improve the interaction between the two countries, the North Korea and U.S. always have divisions on the humanitarian assistance, food energy exchange for nuclear, inspection and suspension of missile test and other issues.⁹¹

After a new round of nuclear test in North Korea, the relationship between China and North Korea appeared cold. China resolutely implements the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on the DPRK nuclear test, and punishes the nuclear inspection of the DPRK. Despite the recent high-level visits between the two countries, the strategic dialogue has been restored, but the DPRK has always insisted on talking about the economy, not to

⁹⁰ Li Shenming, Wang Yi Zhou, "Global Politics and Security", 李慎明, 王逸舟. "全球政治与安全," [B] Social science literature published, 2014, p 242

⁹¹ Zhang Huasheng, "The DPRK Nuclear Issue and China's Countermeasures," 张化生. "朝核问题与中国的对策," [M] International Security Studies, 2013 (5), p. 52-61

abandon nuclear weapons, the two countries on the nuclear issue still exist on the larger strategic differences. Compared with the Sino-ROK, China-U.S. relations on the DPRK nuclear issue are close, and the cooperation and coordination of the DPRK nuclear issue have been strengthened. China and the United States met to reach a consensus on maintaining the principle of denuclearization of the peninsula. At the same time, after the election of the Republic of Korea, South Korea's new president Moon benefited a friendly visit to China, during which the leaders of the two countries reached a consensus on promoting the denuclearization of the peninsula and maintaining regional peace and stability.

Developing nuclear weapons is at the expense of developing economies. North Korea insists on developing nuclear weapons, but it brings its national economy unsustainable challenges. The economic operation of unsustainable, sooner or later, will force the North to choose between economic prosperity and modernization and development of nuclear weapons. While the responsibility of the international community, especially direct military confrontation with North Korea, is South Korea's and America's responsibility, the question is how to make North Korea give up nuclear weapons safely to not harm the environment and conditions to help North Korea make the right choice as soon as possible.

C. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY UNDER XI JIN PING

China's foreign policy is based on the Assembly of Chinese NPC (Nation People Congress) and the CPPCC's (the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) proposed routes and the NPC's proposed laws.⁹² According to the international climate relative to the matter, Deng Xiaoping proposed peace and development, with significant, strategic, global relationships. Since the beginning of the eighties, China's largest goal was to develop the economy. China's economic development is still the primary focus of the Chinese government.

⁹² Law of the People's Republic of China on Legislation, “中华人民共和国宪法”[D] (Law) The Law of the People's Republic of China on Legislation, (Law) Article 7 states, “The National People's Congress and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercise national legislative power,”

After the reformation of the Chinese political economic system from the 1980s, China's economy became more powerful and rose as a potential opponent to the main countries and the main Union in the world.

Since the first year under Xi Jinping's leadership, China designed a huge project to make itself great again. The whole project, named the "Chinese Dream" is Xi Jinping's biggest agenda, not only for domestic policy, but also for foreign policy. Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream" means the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and its fundamental tasks by starting from an economic reconstruction. So, that all the Chinese strategies under Xi Jinping targets will be the Chinese economy development, not only for internal policy but also foreign policy, it's easy to find that Chinese attitude towards north Korea based on the "Do not obstructing development Chinese economy."

Under Xi Jinping's 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China the economy was put at the forefront, signifying China's internal and foreign policies are both based around economic development. Xi Jinping's 18th Party Congress of China People's Assembly has two main strategies for the foreign policy. In September and October of 2013, Xi Jinping proposed a joint construction of "One Belt, One Road" as the strategic concept with the strive to build a China—ASEAN community of common destiny, and with Asia as the fate of the community... ..With member States across Eurasia, South Asia, and West Asia, through the strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community cooperation, we can obtain greater development space."⁹³

On May 2013, during visiting North Korea's top leader Kim Jong-un envoy with the People's Military Commander Choi Ryong-hae in China, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and lasting peace and stability are the people's aspirations and great trends. China's position is very clear, no matter how the situation

⁹³ "Xi Jinping talking about the rule of the country", "习近平谈治国理政" [B] Beijing: foreign language press, 2014 edition, p. 289

changes, the parties should adhere to the denuclearization of the peninsula's goals, insist on maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula, and persistently solve the problem through dialogue and consultation."⁹⁴ This is not a message to the DPRK, but also to the international community. Demonstrating the principled position that the Chinese Communist Party and its government are responsible for history on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Xi Jinping's words were reflected in the diplomatic practice of China, which embodies the "three insistence:" insisting on denuclearization, persisting in peace and stability, and resolving the problem through dialogue and negotiation.

In the current world, we are faced with a wide variety of political, economic, cultural, scientific and technological, health, military, population, energy and environmental issues, among many others. He interpreted the "Chinese Dream" as the means to be a rich and powerful country, a dream of national revitalization, and a dream of the people's desire for happiness,"⁹⁵ Xi Jinping said, "China's dream is the dedication of the World of Dreams."⁹⁶ The Chinese ought to make a difference and contribute. In his speech, "China's Dream" is an important part of "Asia's dream" and of "Asia-Pacific's dream." So, neither the North Korean problem nor the economic and political cooperation with the countries of Northeast Asia occupy the main issues of Xi Jinping and the two sessions under his leadership. Because in his speech, he mentioned, "The Chinese dream with the Chinese people's pursuit of a better life dream is connected, but also with the people's pursuit of peace and development of the wonderful dream of communication."⁹⁷

⁹⁴ "Xi Jinping with Kim Jong-un Choi Ryong Hae," "习近平会见金正恩特使崔龙海," [N] People's Daily, 25.05.2013

⁹⁵ Wang Yi, "Exploring the Road with Chinese Characteristics Diplomacy," 王毅. "探索中国特色大国外交之路" [J]. *International Studies*, 2013 (4): 1-7

⁹⁶ "XI Jinping's speech In the Sino-French diplomatic relations, the fiftieth anniversary of the General Assembly," "习近平, 在“中法建交五十周年大会”上演讲 [N] People's daily, 28.03.2014

⁹⁷ "XI Jinping's Speech In a meeting with the twenty-first century Council Beijing Conference of foreign representatives," "习近平的讲话" [N] People's daily, 03.11.2013

CONCLUSION

North Korea's nuclear issue are serious troubles that have plagued Asia and the United States. The Korean Peninsula can be said as being in the center of East Asia, around China, Russia, and the United States' and its most faithful allies in the area - South Korea and Japan. After studying the first chapter, North Korea is a very uncertain and unpredictable country. Especially the when Kim Jong-un just came to power and the execution of Jang Seong-cheol, stunning all of China. And several times North Korea conducted nuclear tests missile launches to prove the strength of their own regime. China is very dissatisfied with the DPRK, and the nuclear problem seriously damaged the economic development of northeast China. It is due to the lack of political and military uncertainty aspects in northeastern region. The amount of investment is less than the South, economy is backward compared with southern region in China. A stable political background will make the northeastern region of China's economic development progress and grow. It can directly import products from bordering areas of North Korea, Russian, and the other regional trade exchanges.

Since North Korea 's third nuclear test on Feb 12, 2013, the North Korean-Chinese relationship has been sharply hampered by China' s opposition to North Korea. At that time, the new Chinese announcer, Xi Jinping, treated the DPRK coldly and did not hide his negative impression to the North Korean special envoy of Choi Ryong-hae, who visited Beijing after North Korea's nuclear test. Even if China is dissatisfied with North Korea's nuclear issue, North Korea and China are neighbors. The presence of North Korea has become China's strategic buffer, by using South Korea to spread its influence and act in negotiations in Northeast Asia and ensure that the Korean Peninsula force is effective.

In addition, the Chinese leaders seem to recognize the formation of the Korean Peninsula's North-South balance as the best way for China and other Asian countries to coexist. In some respects, it is also conducive to the rise of China. It can ease the political and economic

containment of the United States and Japan. So, the Chinese attitude on North Korea has been met with similar principles. The Chinese government in various occasions has said that China does not interfere in any other countries' internal affairs. However, it is clearly against North Korea using nuclear technology to threaten China. The "9.19 Joint Statement" is focused on China's comprehensive justice to solve the problem of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, China's position certainly does not want the collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime, nor does it want North Korea's energy and financial transactions to be affected by strong economic sanctions on the country.

The attitude of the United States towards North Korea is the same. North Korea declared the United States as an enemy and continued the research and development of its nuclear missiles. The United States is certainly not happy to see that. Obama's eight years of political policy on North Korea is "strategic patience," but his military policy is still very active. Because it is not the same as China, the Korean Peninsula for the United States is a strategic military point. North Korea's geographical location is important because of strong economies of China and Japan, with Russia also close by, it could improve its own economy. Also, North Korea is the United States "Pivot to Asia" strategy of a steppingstone.

South Korea's attitude towards North Korea has included love and hate, and from the splitting of the country, the result has been a tragedy for both sides. From Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun's "Sunshine" policy to Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye's THAAD deployment, and the impeachment of Park Geun-hye, South Korea's policy on North Korea mainly depends on which party seizes the power to enact foreign policy strategies. South Korea also hopes to resolve the DPRK situation peacefully, but also claims to unify the Korean Peninsula. But the different interests between the various countries do not want to change the status quo. China needs a military buffer zone, the United States needs a military steppingstone, Japan needs an external victory to ease the interior political contradictions in the country, and Russia's reduction in economic strength has lowered its status in the current world and wants to not be ignored as a big power. South Korea's THAAD deployment directly in South Korea

deepened the conflict in China, Russia, and North Korea. As a party involved, South Korea's policy on North Korea is the most unstable.

Japan, as the most determined federal state ally of the United States, has its military policy in the same position as the United States. By modifying the constitution, Japan wants to be a state which can start a war with other countries, which has growing contradictions with its neighboring countries in Asia. As well as the long-term authority of the Japanese rightists, plus the avoidance of historical problems and the distortion of another enemy of North Korea, Japan is very clever to use the North Korean nuclear issue to solve domestic problems.

Russia seems to have few connections to the interests of the DPRK. But once the reunification of the Korean Peninsula occurs, Russia is the country with the greatest prospects for economic exchanges with the Korean Peninsula. Although the current Russian economy is on the downturn, its economic and trade structure is very simple, with its domestic economy influenced by the international oil prices. However, there is a wealth of oil resources which China, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan did not know that it existed until recently. Once the Korean Peninsula can stabilize its geopolitics, then the next step is to carry out oil deals in Russia. So economically, Russia wants peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but the military also needs North Korea as a military buffer zone as with China.

Recently South Korea and Japan's alliance through its security law is to strengthen its ability to start a possible war with the country. While Japan and South Korea's ally, the United States, demanded that regional security be strengthened, the deployment of the THAAD system under the U.S. Missile Defense system on the Korean mainland poses a huge threat to China's security. So, China cannot finally give up on the DPRK.

In the economic aspects once Kim Jong-un took office, a great reform of the North Korean economy followed. Since then, North Korea tried various ways to strengthen economic development. The biggest difficulty for North Korea is that the United Nations Security Council implemented the economic sanctions against North Korea, because of the nuclear test. The sanctions have gradually been reinforced since that time, forcing Kim Jong-un to target his domestic economy. But the backward infrastructure and economic structure make its development very limited, and sometimes there will be failures (such as 70 days of struggle, etc.) but Kim Jong-un's economic measures do, in some ways, contribute to the Korean domestic economic development.

China's policy towards North Korea is divided into two categories: one is economic and the other is political. After the third chapter of the study, I compared the DPRK and China's economic and trade exchanges over the years with statistics. I easily found that the United Nations Security Council on North Korea's economic sanctions make China and the Korean Peninsula economic exchanges less profitable.

Since the end of 2012, the economic index between China and the DPRK has been on the rise, but China's implementation of the UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea began to decline significantly. China and North Korea's bilateral trade is the same, but though the border trade structure changes, I can find that the DPRK's domestic economic structure changes. As well as a special presence of the Chinese-Koreans engaged in economic exchanges with the DPRK to make the economic exchanges between the two countries more openly, China is more aware of the internal affairs of the DPRK to make timely correspondences.

On the political side, China has established mutual trust and military arrangements between itself and the DPRK. Second, through the establishment of mutual trust between the North and the South, the resumption of the "six-party talks" has continuously promoted the process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Despite the withdrawal of North Korea,

the “six-party talks” are now empty, but in the current era of political change, the neighboring countries of the DPRK are hoping for the resumption of the “six-party talks” to carry out a large reshuffle.

With an obvious increase in the uncertainty of instability, this unprecedented situation changes profoundly and indicates that its more than half a century security pattern is entering the eve of historic structural changes. The main driver of this change is how to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, whether to implement a policy, and how to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. What determines the outcome of this change is the establishment of a permanent peace system on the peninsula by ending the state of war and the status of the cold war between the two sides of the peninsula. North Korea is determined to become the so-called "nuclear nation." To make a peaceful solution on the nuclear issue of the “six-party talks” is a dilemma. On the one hand, through peaceful negotiations to persuade North Korea to completely abandon its nuclear activity is impossible. On the other hand, a non-peaceful military approach to the destruction of North Korea's nuclear arsenal cannot be done. This dilemma makes the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula much more distant and even premature. North Korea needs to solve their economic development of increasingly-strident sustainability challenges, realize economic modernization, guarantee the stability of the regime, and must improve relations with the international community. The first step is to have fundamental relations with China. This is for its own economic modernization to create necessary conditions, and it must thoroughly give up its nuclear weapons to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

On the one hand, China should continue to see North Korea with clear view that it is trying to get China's support on the nuclear issue of expectations. And on the other hand, China also wants to continue to adhere to the wrong position towards the blind sanctions, into the trap of America, Japan, and other countries, and to give North Korea the proper security. The aim is not to reduce North Korean insecurity, but to rely on the rationality of North Korea clinging to an increase in nuclear production against the internal and external resistance in the

process of developing nuclear weapons. The United States, through its previous analysis, can see that China and itself are working together to address the nuclear issue. The United States, in the swing of the important reasons, pursues an Asia-Pacific rebalancing of strategic deployment and worries about China's rise, so it continues to advocate building new power relations and strengthen bilateral strategic mutual trust. This should be the focus of China's efforts in the future. There is another possibility, with the continuous improvement of China's strength, that the international community power tilt could be wishful thinking to "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" and passively accept the idea of the United States. South Korea needs to realize that China is not like what they expected: that "China has absolute influence on North Korea." South Korea, because of this "expectation" caused by "disappointment," should not be a block of Chinese-Korean relations, but, at the same time, should be made known to South Korea. China's position on the Korean nuclear issue is consistent, and the peninsula can and will not change the view of war. South Korea realized this of the peninsula security efforts of China. In general, it is important to understand the relationship between North Korea's denuclearization and stability within the country. North Korea does not adopt strategic restraint under the condition of nuclear key resolve to external pressure. An external condition can improve and assist in its development, instead of the use of punishing sanctions. The dual-track strategy is the key for China to deal with the DPRK nuclear issue.

On the other hand, China has always felt the needs to strategically manage North Korea's armed provocations. China, which has the high status and influence in the international community, has yet to catch up to the United States' national power. Therefore, Chinese leaders were feeling the need to implement a strategy of maintaining diplomacy with the United States. Different from Deng Xiaoping, the strategies under Xi Jinping's leadership does not cover the core interests of China, but uses it as a part of the controversy and then to avoid unnecessary conflicts. This is a strategy that maintains a stable relationship with other communities during the strategy to realize "China's Dream." Eventually, time seems to be on the side of China, and if the Chinese rise is completed, the current controversial issues can be taken towards the direction China wants. However, development of North's nuclear testing provides increasingly worried attitudes about the long-term strategy of the Chinese government. As

mentioned earlier, the tensions between China and the US-Japan alliance have increased due to the strengthening of the U.S.-SOJ alliance, the passage of the new Japanese security law, North Korea's nuclear tests.

Developing nuclear weapons is at the expense of developing economies. North Korea insists on developing nuclear weapons, but it brings its national economy unsustainable challenges. The economic operations of unsustainability, sooner or later, will force North Korea to choose between economic prosperity and modernization and the development of nuclear weapons. While the responsibility of the international community, especially direct military confrontation with North Korea, is South Korea's and America's responsibility, the question is how to make North Korea give up nuclear weapons safely to not harm the environment and conditions to help North Korea make the right choice as soon as possible.

In order to achieve Xi Jinping's strategy after the introduction of "Chinese Dream", "One Belt One Road way" and other ideas and policies, China-DPRK relations are of vital importance. What China needs to do now to maintain the political and military balance of the Korean Peninsula. The first way is to step-by-step develop the domestic economy, strengthen the economic development of the Chinese and North Korean border, improve the international status, and strengthen the country's influence to get a higher voice. The second is to encourage North Korea to abandon the development of its nuclear weapons and, if the DPRK's adverse measures affect China's national interests, carry out strong measures, both soft and hard, to solve the problem of North Korea.

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