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THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC ORIENTATION IN TURKEY'S CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN POLICY

ПРОБЛЕМА СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЙ ОРИЕНТАЦИИ В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКЕ ТУРЦИИ

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Аннотация:

Дискуссия о направлении внешней политики Турции набрала силу в соответствии с укреплением ПСР во внутренних партиях в качестве центральной правящей партии. На данный момент большая часть литературы посвящена идеологическим особенностям ПСР, особенно в отношении ислама. Стремясь к расширению за пределами этого взгляда, этот тезис направлен на то, чтобы выделить ряд точек торможения между Турцией и Западом, которые анализируются как основные движущие силы переориентации во внешней политике Турции. Ориентация Турции на Запад основывалась на восприятии внешней угрозы, порожденном озабоченностью воспринимаемой советской угрозы. Говоря о сегодняшнем дне, проблемы безопасности остаются в качестве основного вопроса в направлении внешней политики Турции, поэтому новое позиционирование Турции нацелено на удовлетворение существующих проблем безопасности с гибким прогнозом на будущее.

Ключевые слова: *Внешняя политика Турции, Внешние Угрозы, Теория баланса угроз, Геополитическое Мышление, Формирование Альянсов*

Abstract:

Debate on the direction of Turkish foreign policy has gained momentum in line with the strengthening of the AKP in domestic parties as a central ruling party. At this point, most literature has focused on the AKP's ideological features, particularly with regards to Islam. In an attempt to expand outside of this view, this thesis aims to highlight a series of sticking points between Turkey and the West, which are analysed as the main drivers of the reorientation in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's orientation to the West was based on an external threat perception, born out of the concern of a perceived Soviet threat. Speaking of the present day, security concerns remain as the primary issue on Turkish foreign policy's direction, therefore Turkey's new positioning aims at meeting existing security concerns with a flexible outlook to the future.

Key Words: *Turkish Foreign Policy, External Threats, the Balance of Threat Theory, Geopolitical Thinking, Alliance Formation*

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Introduction:

Research Problem:

Debates on Turkey's foreign policy direction have accelerated especially as of the second electoral victory of AKP. Many scholars have taken AKP's Islamic identity as the driver of Turkey's reorientation in international relations. Therefore, most literature has stood on identity-based explanations while reasoning observed reorientation fact, other aspects such as national interests and security have been overlooked in most literature, these aspects of the issue, therefore, are needed to study comprehensively. Moreover, the existent literature falls short of explaining different directional shifts made under the rule of the same government as they mostly focus on the ideological basis of governments. For instance, they do not answer the following questions: while AKP and Gulen were previously referred to as the closest allies, then what made them turn against each other? Or while AKP pursued very soft policies against Kurdish groups until recent years, why has it radically revised its policy? The lack of existent literature to address these questions is based on their excessive focusing to identity-based issues.

Furthermore, most literature analysing the visible discrepancies between Turkey and West concentrate on the retrogressing parliamentarian-democracy of Turkey with laying emphasis on alleged authoritarianism tendency of the political leadership of Turkey. As a result, they put domestic political issues at the forefront to explain Turkey's deviation from the West. On the other hand, their consideration towards the West is also based on identity-based understandings. The analyses concerning the West in most literature are just like general perceptions of Turkey as it is defined mostly by its liberal-democratic identity. However, both Turkey and the West are also geopolitical bodies pursuing various geopolitical interests in international relations. It is very common in literature isolating two political actors from their geopolitical interests and defining them only with identity-based explanations.

However, regardless of their ideological features, there are geopolitical sticking points between the West and Turkey which have not been studied comprehensively. Identity-based differences on perceptions between the West and Turkey are mostly arisen from differentiating interests of two actors. For instance, while PKK-linked groups are considered terrorist organisations in Turkey, they are mostly regarded guerrilla groups or freedom fighters in the eyes of the West since the end of the Cold War but same groups were considered terrorist organisations in the conditions of the Cold War when they were

sponsored by the USSR and Syria. Therefore, geopolitical attitudes play a significant role also determining others' identity. In this thesis, I will analyse geopolitical factors such as security or strategic interests pushing Turkey to separate its foreign policy direction from the West.

Research Question and Objective:

My aim in this thesis is to address the following question "what are the strategic drivers of Turkish orientation moving Turkey away from the West?" In other words, this paper aims to explore strategic factors that set off the Turkey's reorientation efforts. To achieve this aim, I will analyse strategic sticking points between the West and Turkey, stimulating Turkey to reorient its foreign policy direction. This study is significant to comprehend underlying reasons of Turkey's deviation from the West. Moreover, since geopolitical and strategic interests of a state do not easily change depending on domestic politics, this thesis provides also insight about the future direction of Turkish foreign policy by analysing Turkey's strategic orientation while laying emphasis on these long-term strategic interests of Turkey.

In contrast to identity-based theories, that are prone to isolate international actors from their geopolitical interests, neorealist theory in a sense of its general understanding concerning international relations is essential for this work as interactions of international actors are taken based on geopolitical interests. The state of alignment and state of conflict mapped in neorealist theory are overlapping with understandings of strategic orientation concepts in general terms. Nevertheless, as an intra-neorealist discipline debate between the balance of threat and balance of power theories, we take the balance of threat theory since it is more capable of explaining Turkey's orientation problem. Differently from the balance of power theory, that argues states form alliances to balance hegemon states, the balance of threat theory argues that states form alliances to balance external threats. Speaking of Turkey's orientation process, this work argues that external threats that are not poised by Turkey's national capacities would only be balanced by correct alliance formation.

Speaking of correct alliance formation, determining external threats correctly has a vital importance since the primary objective of joining with others is to balance external threats. In this thesis, I will divide ways of the mentality of decision-makers into two groups in terms of method of external threat choosing: ideological and geopolitical thinking. While the former is holding identity-based concerns, the latter is based on strategic interests of a state such as

surveillance. Therefore, this distinction is also significant for this work in order to analyse which way of thinking is more intense in Turkish foreign policy decision-making process. This thesis takes geopolitical thinking as an important component of Turkish strategic orientation process since correct detection of threats is the only way that can enable Turkey to carry out its strategic orientation for the purpose of balancing external threats.

Literature Review:

Strategic orientation concept is based on the four main principles: its neorealist understanding of international relations, the classification of foreign policy change, the purpose of balancing external threats and the differentiation of geopolitical thinking from the ideological one.

The process of emergence of neorealist theory as a sceptical theory about liberal institutionalism is covered by Baldwin[1] and Forde[2]. Neorealist theory as an independent theory is conceptualised by Waltz.[3]

Gustavsson and Hermann analyse definition of foreign policy change and classification of foreign policy change. Hermann is discussing features of foreign policy change and makes a distinction between foreign policy change and redirection by classifying foreign policy outcomes by degree or by size.[4] Gustavsson in his article analyses the issues by referencing various scholar works.[5] Hermann's and Gustavsson's articles help this research to comprehend the definition of foreign policy change and redirection, since strategic orientation also refers to a major degree of foreign policy change to form balancing alliance.

Strategic dimensions of foreign policy orientation with the special emphasis on external threats and strategic alliance formations are studied by Walt.[6] Although he specifically focuses on the Middle Eastern alliances, general behaviours of states were also analysed in the theoretical framework when they confront external threats. Two distinct behaviours bandwagoning and balancing are compared in terms of their causes and outcomes for state's

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[1] Baldwin D.A. "Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics" in David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (1st ed.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 3-25
[2] Forde, Steven. International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 2, 1995, pp. 141–160.
[3] Waltz, Kenneth N. Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. Journal of International Affairs, vol. 44, no. 1, 1990, pp. 21–37.
[4] Hermann, Charles F. Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy//International Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 1, 1990, pp. 3–21.
[5] Gustavsson, Jakob How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change? //Cooperation And Conflict, Vol.34, no.1, 1999. pp. 73-95
[6] Walt, S. M. The Origins of Alliance, London: Cornell University Press, 1990.

foreign policy direction. Walt is depicting sources of threats as aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intention. In a sense this thesis also puts external threats at the forefront to carry out strategic orientation, Walt's study has made a major contribution to this research.

Distinctions between geopolitical and ideological thinking is studied by Polat and Yue. Polat analyses features of ideological and geopolitical thinking in a theoretical base very comprehensively and he argues the superiority of geopolitical thinking in a sense of foreign policy making.[7] Although Yue analyses alignment between China and Russia as the main subject of his article, his work covers a very significant theoretical infrastructure for this thesis.[8]

Evolution of Turkish strategic orientation is analysed in five phases: Ataturk era, Second World War period, post-WWII period, Cold War period and post-Cold War period. Gonlubol in his book analyses many treaties, conflicts and other important events for Turkish foreign policy direction very comprehensively from 1919 to 1995.[9] It also takes an holistic perspective that is not isolating issues from their international context. His book made a major contribution while analysing factors and outcomes of Turkish foreign policy's redirections.

Studies of Vanderlippe and Fox cover Ankara's balancing foreign policy attitudes during the Second World War. Since, WWII also refers to the neutrality term of Turkish foreign policy just before carrying out its orientation to the West, Varderlippe's work also provides insight into international factors pushing Turkey to the Western alliance post-WWII era.[10] Although the primary object of Fox's study is not Turkish foreign policy, it is substantial to analyse middle and small powers foreign policy behaviours in the international context of the given period.[11]

In this work, I focused on three aspects of Turkish strategic orientation during Cold War era: the factors moving Turkey into West, outcomes of Western orientated policy on relations with other states and first discrepancies between Turkey and West.

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[7] Polat, S. Turkiye icin Jeopolitik Rota, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015.
[8] Yue, Ren. New Geopolitical Thinking and the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership.//China Review, 1998, pp. 83–123.
[9] Gönlubol M. Olaylarla Turk Dıs Politikası. Ankara: Siyasal, 1996.
[10] VanderLippe, John M. A Cautious Balance: The Question of Turkey in World War II//The Historian, vol. 64, no. 1, 2001, pp. 63–80.
[11] Fox, A. The Power of Small States, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.

In the post-WWII period, factors pushing Turkey to join with West are studied by Roberts[12] and Leffler[13] in the framework of American financial aids, Soviet threats and Turkey's entry into NATO by abandoning its neutralist foreign policy that had been pursued since 1923. Their articles including analysis about factors pushing Turkey to join with West in the framework of American financial aids and Turkey's entry into NATO by abandoning its neutralist foreign policy that had been pursued since 1923. Their emphases on external threat perceptions of Turkey at that period of time together with new conditions of international politics are substantial to comprehend the evolution of Turkish strategic orientation.

In the aftermath of Turkey's entry into NATO, some structural changes were witnessed concerning Ankara's relations with West and also relations with the USSR. This phase of Turkey's foreign policy evolution was studied by Simpson, Turan and Barlas, Ulunian and Kunniholm. Simpson in his article with laying emphasis on domestic and economic outcomes of its new foreign policy direction analyses the initial NATO years of Turkey.[14] Turan and Barlas in their article examines changing patterns of relation between Turkey and Middle East countries and also the article successfully draws Turkey's new role in the Middle East taken in the framework of being a part of the Western alliance.[15] Kunniholm and Ulunian's studies include useful parts dedicated to analyse these changes. The comprehending developments of this era influencing Turkish foreign policy direction is substantial to analyse Turkey's external threat perceptions in the beginning of Cold War and also to examine impacts of bipolar system on evolution of Turkish strategic orientation.[16] [17]

Ankara's awareness showed up firstly with the Cyprus dispute about the boundaries of Western alliance on Turkey's geopolitical interests. Campbell analyses Mediterranean Crisis with paying special attention to Cyprus dispute comprehensively.[18] Cyprus dispute as the first source of discrepancies between Turkey and the West is vital for the evolution of Turkish foreign policy direction. This article is very helpful to comprehend Cyprus issue as a sticking

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[12] Roberts, G. Moscow's Cold War on the Periphery: Soviet Policy in Greece, Iran, and Turkey, 1943–8//Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 46, no. 1, 2011. pp. 58–81.
[13] Leffler, M. P. Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952.//The Journal of American History, vol. 71, no. 4, 1985. pp. 303–323.
[14] Simpson D.J. Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey// Middle East Journal Vol. 19, No. 2, 1965. pp. 141–152.
[15] Turan İ., Barlas.D, "Batı İttifakına Uye Olmanın Turk Dıs Politikası Uzerindeki Etkileri", Faruk Sönmezoğlu Turk Dıs Politikasının Analizi, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004. pp:425-439
[16] Kuniholm, B. Turkey and the West// Foreign Affairs, Vol:70, No.2, 1991. pp. 34–48
[17] Ulunian, A. Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945-58//Cold War History, Vol:3 No.2, 2003. pp. 35-52
[18] Campbell, J. The Mediterranean Crisis//Foreign Affairs, Vol.53, No.4, 1975. pp. 605–624.

point between Turkey and thr West. After the emergence of Cyprus dispute, Turkish domestic politics underwent also important changes. Anti-NATO movements in Turkey gained substantial strength. Doster's article analyses these changes.[19] The article examines the roots of anti-NATOism in Turkish politics.

In post-Cold War era major changes were witnessed in Turkish foreign policy thinking. Ozal and AKP terms refer to breaking points from traditional principals of Turkish foreign policy making. Uzgel analyses Ozal's era Turkish foreign policy direction comprehensively.[20] Understanding Ozal's era is very important in this thesis since it laid down the bases of identity-based attitudes in Turkish foreign policy.

Bertrand analyses in his article transformations on Turkish foreign policy thinking in the AKP era.[21] It is substantial for this research so as to classify AKP's foreign policy thinking if it is geopolitical or ideological. This article is also helpful to understand convergence points between AKP and Ozal's era foreign policy decision-makings. "Stratejik Derinlik" (Strategic Depth) is a conceptual book written by ex-foreign minister and ex-prime minister of Turkey Davutoglu.[22] Since this book is regarded as the conceptual basis of AKP's foreign policy aims and strategies, it made a contribution to this thesis to understand reasons of rising neo-Ottomanist motives in Turkish foreign policy.

Model country debates boosted after the first electoral victory of AKP in the framework of Greater Middle East Initiative. Steward and Fuller's articles cover analyses about the model country concept. Stewart's article is helpful to grasp the model country aim of AKP in the Middle East in accordance with goals of GMEI.[23] Fuller in his article is analysing political Islam and also some parts of his article are dedicated to examining the compatibility of model country role to Turkey by analysing Turkey's plusses and minuses in terms of model country role.[24] In order to understand the rise of political Islam in Turkey and American support to AKP, Fuller's article is substantial for this research.

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[19] Doster, B. Turkiye'de NATO Karsıtlığının Tarihsel ve Siyasal Kökenleri// Ortadoğu Analiz, Vol.4, No.40. 2012. pp. 31-41
[20] Uzgel İ. Ozal Dönemi (1983-91) "Turk Dıs Politikası" P.48-70
[21] Bertrand, G. Turkish Diplomacy since 2003: Transition from Realpolitik to a Liberal Foreign Policy?// Perspectives, Vol.21, No.2, 2013. pp. 63–82
[22] Davutoglu A. Stratejik Derinlik. İstanbul: Kure, 2001
[23] Stewart D.J. The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administration's Ideological Imagination// Geographical Review, Vol.95, No.3, 2015. pp. 400–424.
[24] Fuller, G. The Future of Political Islam// Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.2, 2002. pp. 48–60.

Another article is dedicated to challenges in Turkish domestic policy which was written by Abramowitz and Barkey.[25] This article is substantial for this research in a sense of analysing internal challenges for AKP to undertake the model country role. Schanzer and Tahiroglu also examine AKP's model country policy concerning Arab Spring.[26] It is very helpful to understand the role of identity-based thinking in AKP era foreign policy making.

Under the title of threats, four main subjects are studied in this thesis with special emphasis: Cyprus, Kurdish, Aegean and Gulen Organisation. Cyprus issue was studied with its various aspects under Crawshaw, Camp, Hakki and Gorvett. Crawshaw's article in the sense of containing many important turning points further led to the collapse of bi-communal Cyprus Republic is significant.[27] Camp analyses important developments in a long period of time from the 1950s to 1970s including first internal conflicts between two societies, involvement of external actors and the UN efforts concerning Cyprus together with the geopolitical significance of Cyprus.[28] Hakki analyses development of Cyprus issue from 1878 to 2006, his work is one of the most comprehensive resources and it also contains many primary sources including treaties, constitutions and letters concerning Cyprus issue.[29] Gorvett analyses in his article current situation in Cyprus and the energy aspect of issue.[30]

The Kurdish issue is covered by works of Perincek, Fuller and Stein and Ricciardone. Perincek in his book analyses the evolution of Kurdish issue since the foundation of PKK. The book especially lays emphasis on changing external links of PKK from the Cold War to the present time. Perincek also analyses the process that PKK turned to a sticking point between Turkey and West.[31] Fuller's article is an important material for my research since it takes the issue with its regional and international dimensions. Besides that, the article also informs about how the issue turned to be a human rights issue for the West.[32] Stein and Ricciardone in their articles focus on current discrepancies between the US and Turkey over PKK or PYD. The article demonstrates American concerns over Turkey's attitudes regarding

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[25] Abramowitz, M., & Barkey, H. J.. Turkey's Transformers// Foreign Affairs Vol.88, No.6, 2009. pp. 118–128.
[26] Schanzer and Tahiroglu. Ankara's Failure//Foreign Affairs. January 22, 2016. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-01-25/ankaras-failure (accessed 22.03.2017)
[27] Crawshaw, N. Cyprus: Collapse of the Zurich Agreement// The World Today Vol.20, No.8, 1964. pp. 338–347.
[28] Camp, G. Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus//Political Science Quarterly, Vol.95, No.1, 1980. pp. 43–70.
[29] Hakki, M. The Cyprus Issue London: I.B. Tauris, 2008.
[30] Gorvett, J. One Cyprus?//Foreign Affairs, October 27, 2016 URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cyprus/2016-10-27/one-cyprus (accessed:15.02.2017)
[31] Perincek D., Turkiye Solu ve PKK, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2014.
[32] Fuller, G. The Fate of the Kurds//Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.2, 1993. pp. 108–121.

PYD and also Ankara's concerns over America's close relations with PYD that is considered by Turkey as the Syrian wing of PKK. [33]

Gulen issue was studied with its various aspects under Perincek, Enghall and Karavelli. Perincek is paying special attention on Gulen-West relations and also deeply analyses reasons that allow Gulen's sympathisers to take strategic positions in Turkish bureaucracy. The book analyses Gulenist Organisation's activities from the 1960s to coup d'état. In order to comprehend deteriorating Turkey-West relations attempt and Turkey-Russia instant rapprochement after July 15th coup d'état attempt, the book also presents very comprehensive analyses. Enghall in his article is examining Gulenists' worldwide network. Karavelli in his article is analysing the relations between AKP and Gulen from coalition term to the confrontation. It is also significant to understand issues breaking cooperation between AKP and Gulen.

Empirical Basis:

This thesis besides various books and articles benefits from primary sources including a letter, an intelligence report, agreements and public speeches. These primary sources can be divided into four main groups: official international documents, legislative documents, executive documents and public statements by officials.

Official international documents are analysed in this thesis. This kind of documents helped this research to understand the position and effects of international bodies on specific issues. For this purpose, reactions of the UN regarding the Cyprus and Kurdish disputes are tracked by the official international documents. Several UN documents including Security Council reports and the resolutions are analysed to understand the official position of the UN. For instance, The Resolution 688 adopted April 5th, 1991 is an important document for this research since the resolution was taken as the pretext of a no-fly zone by the US-led coalition.[34]

Speaking of legislative documents, several treaties are also covered in this research. The treaties in the sense of demonstrating legal frameworks of issues made a contribution this

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[33] Ricciardone D. and Stein A. Mitigating US-Turkish Disagreement over the PYD// Atlantic Council, February 24, 2016. URL: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/mitigating-us-turkish-disagreement-over-the-pyd (accessed: 15.03.2017)

[34] UN Security Council Resolution 688, adopted: April 5, 1991 // Security Council Resolution. URL: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement (accessed: 20.02.2017)

research. "Treaty of Peace with Italy"[35] and "Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus"[36] are some of the treaties analysed for this purpose in this research. And also some points of a report of Turkish Parliamentary Investigation Committee on the Gulen Organisation dated January 2017 is used in order to understand Turkey's perspective towards the Gulen Organisation after the coup d'état attempt.[37]

Furthermore, a certain number of executive documents are analysed in this research to comprehend various international actors' position on specific issues. For instance, Helsinki Presidency Conclusions dated December 1999 demonstrates the attitudes of the EU towards Cyprus accession.[38] For the sake of another example, US Department of State Press Briefing dated March 8, 2017 made a contribution to this research in the sense of comprehending American position on armed Kurdish groups in Syria.[39]

Several public speeches are covered in this thesis so as to grasp the position of actors on specific issues and to back this research with the first-hand evidence. Concerning to analyse roots of the distinction between identity-based and geopolitical attitudes in Turkish foreign policy, Ataturk's Speech in Turkish Parliament dated December 1st, 1921 addresses directly this issue.[40] And also Bush's address dated January 29th, 1991 in the sense of showing new principles of American foreign policy in post-Cold War is another public statement made a contribution to this research.[41]

Besides the sources mentioned above, different types of primary sources were also analysed in this thesis including declassified intelligence reports, newspaper materials and so on.

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[35] Treaty of Peace with Italy, (1947), URL: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000004-0311.pdf (accessed: 01.04.2017)
[36] Treaty Concerning The Establishment Of The Republic Of Cyprus, 16.08.1969, URL: http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1961/TS0004.pdf (accessed:16.01.2017)
[37] FETÖ/PDY Darbe Girisimi Meclis Komisyonu Raporu// TBMM Parliamentary Investigation Committee Report, October 19, 2016.
[38] Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions//European Parliament Official Website, DECEMBER 10-11, 1999 URL:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm (accessed 10.01.2017)
[39] US Department of State Press Briefing by Mark C. Toner// US. Department of State, March 8, 2017. URL: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/03/268295.htm (accessed: 15.03.2017)
[40] Ataturk's Parliament Speech Dated December 1st, 1921//Ataturk'un Söylev ve Demecleri, Ankara:ADTYK, 2006. P.117
[41] Bush G. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 1991//The American Presidency Project, URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253. (accessed:14.03.2017)

Chronological Limit:

The drivers of major Turkish foreign policy shifts are examined in the timespan from 1919 - to the present day. This time span is set in this research because Turkish Independence War began in 1919 and it laid the foundation of contemporary Turkish foreign policy.

Methodology:

Two different research methods have been employed to this qualitative work. The conceptual and methodological bases are developed in the first section based on four main elements: neorealist theory, foreign policy change, balance-of-threat theory, and geopolitical thinking. The third chapter is devoted to the problem of the crisis of pro-Western strategic orientation by analysing a number of cases of perennial threats that are to be balanced through alliance formation. The cases are chosen as Cyprus dispute, Kurdish issue, Aegean disputes and Gulen organisation. Regarding the distinguishing feature of these cases from the others, they pose threats to Turkey's territorial integrity or its regime. For instance, Armenian genocide claims is also a challenge for Turkish diplomacy for a long time but it does not pose a direct threat to Turkey's territorial integrity or its regime.

While analysing the evolution of Turkish strategic orientation, the historical descriptive methodological approach is also frequently used in this research. The importance of comprehending issues in their historical retrospective is compulsory for this thesis to distinguish constant (strategic) issues from temporary (identity-based) issues.

Structure:

This thesis is organised as follows. The first chapter is devoted to generate the theoretical and conceptual framework of this research in order to examine the drivers of strategic orientation. The second chapter focuses on the evolution of Turkish strategic orientation for the purpose of analysing the impetuses of Turkey's foreign policy reorientations since the beginning of the Turkish Independence War in 1919. The third chapter analyses the external threats of Turkey and their connection with Turkey's inconsistent alliance formation. And at the conclusion, we will present the findings of this study and sum up the contribution of this study to literature.

Chapter 1: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

1.1: Neorealist Theory

Neorealism or structural realism emerged as a response of growing attractiveness of idealist approaches in international relations. Structural realism claims that state is a dominant actor in the international realm, and other actors such as NGOs are not as determinant as states in terms of their capabilities and power.[42] Structural realism is a sceptical theory about the liberal institutionalist claim of growing interdependence in IR, in which neorealist scholars emphasise the substance of a system and the importance of great powers by using relatively more scientific methods to avoid ethical evaluation such as evil or good.[43]

Waltz states that for understanding international politics, there is only one clear way, this is through setting up system theories. A theory has to be designated as the independent domain from other international realms examples being in the economic or social realms. In order to demonstrate this issue of how international and domestic political structures are formed and to show which characteristics affect these structures apart from international economic and international social domain, he suggests to mark off international political domain to distinguish it from other international domains and distinguishing system-level forces from unit level-forces.[44]

In contrast to classical realist arguments that rest on the discussions about human nature such as "struggle for power", Waltz apparently endeavours to avoid this discussion about human nature. In contrast to Morgenthau who put human nature on the core position of his analysis, he tends to pay more attention to positivist approaches. As he pays more attention to positivist approaches, these stimulate him to evaluate behaviours of states as predictable. Structural realism seeks accordance between its propositions and empirical evidences. It indicates the causal conditions under which certain political outcomes can be expected.[45]

Waltz highlights the structure of the international system by distinguishing internal from external realms. International structures are determined by ordering the principles of the system. The structure of the system is the best way to understand states' behaviour. The

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[42] Baldwin D.A Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics pp.4-11. URL: http://catchyworld.com/download/International%20Relations/Neoliberalism.pdf (accessed:12.04.2017)

[43] Forde, S. International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism// International Studies Quarterly, Vol:39, No.2, 1995. pp. 142,143

[44] Waltz, K. N. Theory of International Politics, Boston: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co,1979. P.79

[45] Monten, J. Thucydides and Modern Realism// International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, No.1, 2006. P. 3

political structures are defined by the ordering principles of the system also known as anarchy and by the distribution of capabilities across units. According to Waltz, there are two ordering principles hierarchy and anarchy. These respectively depict the domestic and international realms. In other words, two possibilities exist: units are either under authority (hierarchy), or not (anarchy). This is the main determiner in terms of structure and also there is a distinct difference between conducting policy in the realm of hierarchy and the conducting policy in the realm of anarchy in terms of their respective characteristics.[46]

Waltz recommends a three-part definition for domestic policy: the first, by ordering principle, secondly, by the character of units and third, distribution of capabilities. Firstly, the units of domestic political systems operate in a relation of superior-subordinate. While some actors give the order, others obey the order. Secondly, hierarchy makes units different, the specification of functions provide units different objectives. Thirdly, distribution of capabilities makes changes possible in the structure.[47]

In comparison, the core of international relations is the system that is anarchy rather than hierarchy. The characteristics of international interactions based on the fact that absence of superior authority in IR. The absence of any governments over states in the international realm is also known as international anarchy is part of the structure in international relations and it marks off states' behaviours to a large extent.[48] In contrast with this, actors whose act in domestic policy comprises of different units, in the international realm the functional differences among units were diminished by the system (anarchy), therefore states imitate each other.[49]

Even though every international structure is anarchy and this fact eradicates the difference to a large extent, political structures are distinguishable between each other only in a way of differences on the distribution of capabilities or distribution of power, even though every unit is equal formally. "*In an anarchic realm, structures are defined in terms of their major units. International structures vary with significant changes in the number of great powers. Great powers are marked off from others by the combined capabilities they command. When their*

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[46] Lake, D. A. The New Sovereignty in International Relations// International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2003. P. 306

[47] Waltz 1979, op. cit., pp.88-97

[48] Waltz K.N. Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory// Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No.1,1990 pp.21-24

[49] Hyde-Price A. European Security in the Twenty-First Century: the Challenge of Multipolarity. London: Routledge, 2007. P.31

numbers changed consequentially, the calculations and behaviours of states, and the outcomes their interactions produce vary."[50]

Great powers have the biggest role in the international domain. Robert Gilpin focuses on the distribution of power on the system. According to him, power is not distributed among actors equally. Great powers that desire to maximise their national interest determine changes in the system as a result of their interactions between each other. Therefore an essential step in the system is the desire of great powers that to construct, prevent and sustain political domination of whole system, also known as "hegemony". [51]

Great powers fear one another. There is always a possibility that states can betray each other. They worry about intentions of other states, the biggest fear originated from possibility to be subjected attack by other states. The features of international system stimulate these fears, as it is self-help system. There is no rescuer for any state in danger in the international system. As Mearsheimer states, "When a state dials the emergency services for help, there is nobody in the international system to answer the call."[52]

1.2: Defining Strategic Orientation

"Strategic orientation" is a concept originally used in the fields of economy and finance. Strategic orientation in general using refers to efforts for the best policy choosing for agents. This process needs to be backed up by a substantial analysis measuring agents' strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in current conditions. Strategies especially the ones holding long-term expectations are determined out of SWOT analysis.

Speaking of IR discipline, strategic orientation is not a very popular concept. Moreover, identical calculation of agents' SWOT in IR discipline is not as simple as economic sciences. Therefore it is necessary to revise the concept in accordance with the structure of international relations. Strategic orientation concept in international relations is a concept that determining countries' long-term foreign policy strategies in response to threats of a country.

Charles Hermann makes the distinction between foreign policy redirection and foreign policy change. While he identifies former as a result of transformations took place in regime or state, later is defined as a result of foreign policy makers' choices. He introduces four

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[50] Waltz 1990, op. cit., pp.21,22

[51] Theory of Hegemonic War // Policy Tensor, February 25, 2013. URL: https://policytensor.com/2013/02/25/theory-of-hegemonic-war/ (accessed 02.03.2017)

[52] Mearsheimer John "Structural Realism," in Dunne, Kurki, Smith (eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (3rd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. P.79

graduated levels of change categorising foreign policy change by means of the degree of change. First is *"adjustment changes"* which refer to qualitative changes in efforts and in the scope of interactions to achieve particular goals. Second-degree change is labelled as *"program changes"* and it refers to quantitative transformations in methods or by involving new methods. The third one is named *"problem/goal changes"*, it refers to the replacement of problem or goal which is targeted by foreign policy of a country. Finally, the last change is the most radical one of a country's foreign policy which is redrawing a country's foreign affairs across the world, which he labels *"international orientation change"*.[53]

Rosati concentrates on the phenomena of foreign policy change; just as Hermann, he divides foreign changes into different levels by scope. In his model, foreign policy changes may take place which are labelled as intensification, refinement, reform and restructuring and they refer to changes "little, minor, moderate and major changes place in the scope, goals and strategy".[54] Moreover, Kalevi Holsti focuses on major and radical changes in foreign policy which are explained by Hermann and Rosati. He distinguishes change and restructuring in foreign policy. He classifies restructuring in four types: isolation, self-reliance, dependence and diversification.[55]

Change in foreign policy direction is an interesting phenomenon since it may be derived from various reasons both external and internal. Foreign policy change is a constant issue just like Heraclitus observed that "*You could not step twice into the same rivers; for other waters are ever flowing on to you.*"[56] But the level of foreign policy change diversifies in parallel with the level of threat.

With respect to reasons for major shifts in a state's foreign policy direction, other factors have less importance than security issues. An actor should take into account conditions of international politics and it should develop foreign policy strategies according to security issues primarily. According to Walt, grand strategies themselves are seeking to provide security for a nation state. He defines strategy as "a set of hypotheses or predictions".[57] Therefore, on the bases of Walt's definition of strategy, it is true to argue that placing a state to a secured alliance system in IR taking into account alternative directions, various scenarios

[53] Hermann, C. Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy// International Studies Quarterly, Vol.34,No.1, 1990. pp.5,6.
[54] Gustavsson, J. How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?// Cooperation And Conflict, Vol.34, No.1, 1999. P.75
[55] Ibid., 76
[56] Hermann, op. cit., p.5
[57] Walt, S. M. The Origins of Alliance, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. pp.110-115

and so on is a strategy. On the other hand, this strategy aims to reorient a state to a different position to ensure its security.

Furthermore, in the anarchy, the primary objective of states is survival, because states are responsible for their fate, there is no superior authority concerning others' fate. When they confront external threats, there is no superior authority would help to a threatened state. States, therefore, have to ensure their security themselves in advance. It does not refer to a claim that forming alliances between sovereign units are not possible. On the other way around external threats that states faced are driving forces of forming alliances in the international realm.

The change in foreign policy concept of a nation state is continuous. But the volume of foreign policy change is not constant. It depends on capabilities of the nation state and threats that the nation state comes across in the international sphere.[58] By taking into account capabilities and threats, the deepness of foreign policy change is determined. When the nation states come across external threats, a need of foreign policy change becomes inevitable for them. In order to carry out necessary change, they are obliged to review their position in international sphere.

Nation states form alliances as long as their strategic interests are compatible to certain extend. At least an alliance must secure each side's national interests to some degree. The very fundamental issue for the nation states is the survival despite the perpetually changing international sphere. States are obliged to change their foreign policy direction, when they cannot balance external threats. This obligation is called strategic orientation.

1.3: Alliance Formation to Balance External Threats

Speaking of forming alliances, states' behaviours would be diversified in two different forms: balancing or bandwagoning, when they confront external threats. States may behave in a balancing way to defend themselves against superior threatening states by forming an alliance for the purpose of balancing threatening state. On the other hand, bandwagoning behaviour refers to form an alliance with the threatening actor in order to tolerate and appease it. Even though these two diverse behaviours may be pursued by states in case they face with external threats, in both scenarios place an external threat as the underlying reason for forming

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[58] Holsti K.J. The Problem of Change in International Relations Theory (Working Paper) 1998 pp.1-3
URL:https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46511/WP26.pdf (accessed: 10.01.2017)

alliances. Therefore, those states that place their security at risk follow bandwagoning or balancing strategies to deal with the external threat. [59]

In international politics, every nation state seeks to carry out its objectives and strives to preserve its security. In order to materialise these tasks, they have to avoid loneliness by forming alliances with other states. Constant and overlapping long-term interests primarily security issues and other life-sustaining issues play a primary role for nation states to take a position in the international political sphere. In this sense strategic orientation concept aims to place a country in a secured position.

With whom, states prefer to form an alliance to deal with external threats is another question of the strategic orientation concept. In this point, Walt suggests that states' behaviours are diversified in two different forms: balancing or bandwagoning, in case they confront external threats. States may behave in a balancing way to defend themselves against superior threatening states by forming an alliance for the purpose of balancing the threatening state. On the other hand, bandwagoning behaviour refers to forming an alliance with the threatening actor in order to tolerate and appease it. Even though these two diverse behaviours may be pursued by states in case they face with external threats, in both scenarios existence of external threats is the underlying reason for forming alliances. Therefore, those states that place their security at risk follow bandwagoning or balancing strategies to deal with the external threat. [60]

However, states very rarely prefer to bandwagoning. Only under certain conditions, states join with dominant external threats: firstly, if there is no balancing external power to form alliance against the external threat, states can join with threatening states. Secondly, if states believe that external threats could be appeased by bandwagoning, they may ally with threatening states. [61] Nevertheless, it is evident to say that great powers and regional powers are very unlikely to bandwagon, since strength itself is a feature making a state attractive to be selected as an ally by others. According to Walt, declining power of a state leads its allies to choose a neutral foreign policy or at the worst scenario to join with its enemies.[62]

States are prone to opt for balancing behaviour when they confront with external threats. In other words, states are likely to form alliance against external threats. Yet, another issue for

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[59] Walt, op. cit., pp.110-115
[60] Ibid., 110-115
[61] Ibid., 172,173
[62] Ibid., 21

states is choosing their allies. Since this work in accordance with neorealist theory argues that allies are chosen in order to balance external threats; the determination process of external threats is one of the primary tasks of this paper. Therefore alliance formation for states is a result of balancing efforts of states to cope with external threats.

Speaking of the balance of threat theory, a state is prone to form an alliance with the other international actors which are perceived as the least dangerous. In order to assess the level of threat, Walt suggests looking into four sources of threat: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions.[63]

First of all, aggregate power refers to a state's total resources (industrial, military and technologic capabilities). Moreover, a potential threat that constituted by a state for others is directly proportionate with the aggregate power of the state. Yet still, power at the same time can make a state more attractive to be allied with.[64] Thus, power by itself can be a source of threat and alignment.

Second, geographic proximity can be a source of threat. According to Walt, states which are located nearby pose a higher level of threat than those which are located far away. Yet still, geographic proximity is not enough to create a threat to other, it has to be taken into account with states' intention and their ability to project their power to others.

Third, "offensive power is the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost."[65] A state's offensive power can provoke others to bandwagon or balance. The level of offensive power can pose a potential threat; it can be used in order to deter others or to violate others' sovereignty but in any case, it poses a threat to others when it is combining with other sources of threat.

Finally, the intention is a complementary source of the threat. Those states that hold three mentioned sources of threat, without aggressive intentions cannot be taken as external threats for others. [66] Therefore, the perception of intention is a determiner of external threats combining with other three sources of threat. At this point, attitudes of foreign policy makers gain significance. In order to determine threats, this paper examines two distinct ways of thinking namely geopolitical and ideological one.

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[63] Ibid., 23
[64] Ibid., 23,24
[65] Ibid., 24,25
[66] Ibid., 25,26

1.4: Predicting Others' Foreign Policy

Geopolitics of a country draws framework of long-term interests, opportunities and the challenges of a country. Napoleon states that *"If you know country's geography, you can understand and predict its foreign policy".*[67] The governments acting in accordance with geopolitical facts manage to keep their countries away from security threats. The miscalculation of geopolitical opportunities drags countries to disaster. Therefore foreign policy makers should take major foreign policy issues as matters of geopolitics.

Ideological patterns may cover up bigger geopolitical confrontations but the underlying cause of major international confrontations is geopolitics. Therefore, if the political administration of a country is predominated by ideological concerns regarding international issues, this causes to develop unrealistic strategies which are not upholding needs of the country.[68] Speaking of settling the allies or enemies of a country, strategic factors such as security should be taken into account primarily.

Furthermore, the countries which have consultation mechanism and check and balance mechanisms in their foreign policy making process are bounded by a legal framework.[69] Domestic exploitation of strategic foreign policy issues by a political administration is very dangerous in a matter of strategic orientation of a country. If the policy makers make use of strategic foreign policy issues for domestic cyclical issues, this causes to miscalculation of one's own strength or capabilities. Mostly authoritarian administrations crow over their failures in international sphere to their publics as a success. For example, before the Saddam and Gaddafi administrations were overthrown in Iraq and in Libya, they had glorified their international activities for the purpose of attracting their nations. Even though it allowed them to stay in power till they died, both leaders' adventurism could not prevent foreign occupation and eventually, these two countries collapsed in terms of politics, economy and security. In this sense, it is evident to say that ideological feature of a country domestically in order to avoid countries from unrealistic adventures plays an important role. Therefore we may say that these countries in a sense of limiting foreign policy adventurisms domestically are more advantageous at carrying out their strategic orientation.

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[67] Polat, S. Turkiye icin Jeopolitik Rota, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015. P. 27
[68] Ibid., 27-34
[69] Richardson, E. L. Checks and Balances in Foreign Relations// The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83, No.4, 1989, pp. 736–739

1.5: Sources of Geopolitical Thinking

The international politics cannot be isolated from geopolitical space. All the foreign policy actions of the actors are staged in the international sphere. But every development in geopolitical space does not affect international politics to the same degree. When a major degree of changes takes place in geopolitical space, they have unavoidable impacts on international politics and nation states are obliged to take a position by reassessing the newly emergent geopolitical situation.

Defining geopolitics is a tough task and it is beyond the aim of this paper. Yet still, because of a major role of geopolitical thinking on predicting other's intentions, we need to draw a short framework of geopolitics. With a very basic way of thinking, it is concerning interactions between space and politics. Beyond this basic understanding, there are various interpretations of geopolitics.

According to traditional explanation of geopolitics, great powers strive to expand their sphere of interests in line with their capability of projecting power and it places great powers to the centre of geopolitical issues. On the other hand, new geopolitical thinking puts forward changeable feature by geopolitical analysis.[70] Nevertheless, both place a major importance the interactions between space and politics.[71]

According to Dugin, geopolitics is derived from a contrast between sea and land. Without taking into account that dualism, geopolitics cannot be comprehended. Geopolitics is neither one-dimensional nor fully-symmetrical discipline. Land and sea powers have different interests determined by their different geographic locations; therefore they inevitably pursue conflicting policies to overcome these different challenges in the same geopolitical space. Then there is a big difference between the perception of land power and sea-power.[72]

Besides the various interpretations of geopolitics, geopolitical thinking of foreign policy makers refers to the intensification of attention to realistic geopolitical indicators rather than unrealistic references.[73] Moreover, speaking of predicting others' intention, geopolitical thinking contributes formulation of states' foreign policy strategies as goals of actors despite the time are mostly constant. For example, Homer in the Illiad tells Trojan War. In the war,

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[70] Yue,R. New Geopolitical Thinking and the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership// China Review, 1998, P. 86,87
[71] Ibid., 87
[72] Dugin A. Rus Jeopolitiği, İstanbul: Kure Yayınları, 2010 pp.9-11
[73] Yue op. cit., 87

Greek side made an alliance led by Achilles against Trojans and they landed West Anatolia. On the other side states in Anatolia made an alliance led by Trojans and their greatest warrior was Hector. A war between two different civilisations took place and as a result, Greek gained a victory against Trojans. The famous phrase "We take the revenge of Hector by conquering Constantinople" attributes to Mehmed the Conqueror. The same phrase uttered by Ataturk after he won the battle against British-backed Greek occupiers in Turkish freedom war.[74] Although entities on the spatial structure change by time, views of actors locating in identical geographic places are more constant defining enemies and alliances.

Aron defines geopolitics as "geographical schematization of diplomatic-strategic relations with a geographic-economic analysis of resources, with an interpretation of diplomatic attitudes as a result of the way of life and of the environment."[75] Geopolitical thinking is basically situated in the common framework of realist theories. First of all, it puts forward national independence and territorial integrity in a defensive way as the main objective of decision makers.[76] Secondly, it seeks ways of cooperation regardless of the ideological structure of actors but taking into account threats and possibilities to balance the threats. Finally, geopolitical constrains directs decision makers to embrace geopolitical thinking and when a state comes across superior external threats, geopolitical thinking turns into an obligation for decision makers in the direction of carrying out the strategic orientation of the state.

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[74] Polat op. cit., 18,19
[75] Aron R. Peace and War: A Theory of International Relation, New Brunswick : Transactions Publishers, 2003.P.191
[76] Yue op. cit., 87

Chapter 2: Evolution of Turkey's Strategic Orientation Problem

2.1 Ataturk Era

For comprehending Turkish foreign policy during Ataturk era, we should take into account Ottoman's last term. Ottoman Empire reached its peak in the 15th century in terms of economy, politics and military, but Renaissance and Enlightenment in the framework of rising European civilisation could not be adopted sufficiently. Industry revolution and scientific developments could not be pursued. While European countries got wealthy thanks to expanding their colonies all over the World, Ottoman Empire weakened. As of French revolution, nation states began to rise against empires. The dissolution of empires by rising nation states boosted in Eurasia in the 19th century and similar developments were witnessed in the Ottoman Empire. The first uprising was carried out in 1804 by Serbians and it was followed by Greeks, Romanians, Bulgarians, Albanians and Armenians. The last century of Ottoman Empire, filled with fights including First World War to defend its territorial integrity. The aftermath of the World War, Turkish Independence War was masterminded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk against Western occupant states and Turkey was founded.

From the end of the First World War, Ankara government pursued realist foreign policy. The ideological concerns were separated from foreign policy making. Geopolitical thinking dominated Turkish foreign policy strategies. Turkish strategic orientation was carried out successfully. Ataturk states the realist essence of early term Turkish foreign policy: *"Gentlemen! Every one of our compatriots and coreligionists may nourish a high ideal in his mind; he is free to do so... But the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has a firm, positive, material policy, and that, gentlemen, is directed to the preservation of life and independence... within defined national frontiers. The Grand National Assembly and government of Turkey, in the name of the nation they represent, are very modest, very far from fantasies, and completely realistic.... Gentlemen, we are not men who run after great fantasies and present a fraudulent appearance of doing things which in fact we cannot do. Gentlemen, by looking as though we were doing great and fantastic things, without actually doing them, we have brought the hatred, rancour, and malice of the whole world on this country and this people. We did not serve pan-Islamism. We said that we had and we would, but we didn't, and our enemies said: "Let us kill them at once before they do!" We did not serve pan-Turanianism. We said that we could and we would, and again they said: "Let us kill them!" There you have the whole problem.... Rather than run after ideas, which we did not and could, not realise and thus increase number of our enemies and the pressure*

upon us, let us return to our natural, legitimate limits. And let us know our limits. Gentlemen, we are a nation desiring life and independence"[77]

Ankara government liberated Turkey by fighting against Western states and against the Istanbul government sponsored by Western states. The Turkish Independence War itself was a good example of strategic orientation. Ankara government and Bolsheviks formed an alliance at the strategic level which was not based on ideological convergence but taking into account geopolitical necessities of both sides. In this direction Lenin's statement to Aralov for Ataturk demonstrates unideological roots of the alliance: *"Of course Mustafa Kemal Pasha is not a socialist, but a good organiser and a national bourgeois revolutionary and we will support his movement in all manner."*[78]

Under favour of the strategic alliance, Kemalists and Bolsheviks put ideological concerns aside and formed a strategic cooperation also in the Caucasia. The Allies constituted a kind of wall in Transcaucasia to keep Baku oils, to block Iran and Iraq way. "The blockade" was relied on pro-British governments namely Tashnak government in Armenia, the Menshevik government in Georgia and Musavat government in Azerbaijan. The British envoy for Caucasia sent a telegraph to Lord Curzon on 3 January 1920 stating the British expectation from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan by "the blockade" to constitute strong block and to prevent Bolshevik and Kemalist interaction. Churchill, in his diary, states the British expectation from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan by "the blockade" to constitute strong block and to prevent Bolshevik and Kemalist interaction. Against the blockade the Eastern Front operation launched by Kemalists under command of Kazım Karabekir with the support of Bolsheviks in September of 1920 and Turkey ensured the Eastern support. According to the Kars Treaty, Ardahan were given to Turkey and Batumi was remained with Soviet Georgia. After that, Kars Treaty was signed between TBMM, Soviet Armenia, Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Georgia on 13 October 1921. With Bolsheviks came to power in Trans-Caucasia most of the Turkish troops settled in the Eastern part of Turkey were shifted to the Western fronts. This laid down the basis of Turkish Independence War strategy to liberate Western part of Turkey, which was under invasion, was establishing a secured zone in the Eastern Turkey and launching a war against occupiers settling in the Western part. [79]

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[77] Ataturk's Parliament Speech Dated December 1st, 1921//Ataturk'un Söylev ve Demecleri, Ankara:ADTYK, 2006. P.117

[78] Starodubcev Rossija – Turcija: 500 let bespokojnogo sosedstva, Moscow: Eksmo, 2017. P.112

[79] Perinçek, M. Türk-Rus diplomasisinden gizli sayfalar. Galatasaray, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011. P.37-50

While Lenin era Soviet aids were vital for Turkey, the Turkish defence of the Straits and the Eastern Front Operation held vital importance for the Bolsheviks. This was important for halting Western influence in the region. In this sense, the alliance was formed on the basis of geopolitical facts. Geopolitics surpassed ideological differences existing between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Despite the strategic alliance with the Soviet Union during the Independence War, Turkey fought against Western states.

In the aftermath of the Independence War of Turkey, Turkey sought to develop relations also with the West. With the Lausanne Treaty, Ankara gained international recognition and turned the only representative of the country. Ankara government adopted a non-involvement policy for issues that are not directly concerning Turkey.[80] Moreover, Turkey became a member of the League of Nation in 1932.[81]

Generally speaking, with the exception of the issues directly linked with Turkey's territorial integrity, Turkey avoided direct confrontations with the West. However, some critical issues inherited from Ottoman Empire remained alive between Turkey and the West. The Ankara government made good use of Turkey's geopolitical position by forming well-balanced relations between the Soviet and Western governments. Turkish government strived to orient its foreign policy direction between West and the Soviet Union. Turkey's foreign policy in this era could be depicted as the realist and modest. Turkey sought to develop relations with the West but at the same time, Ankara strived to solve disputes with other states in the region to hinder involvement of the Western States to regional and domestic politics.

One of them was a dispute over the status of the Straits as they remained under international supervision. While Turkey sought to demilitarise the straits, it could not be accepted at the Lausanne Conference. Afterward, when Italian and German expansionisms began to rise, Ankara by making use of its geopolitical importance brought the issue back to the League of Nations and the dispute was solved in favour of Turkey by signing on to Montreux Straits Convention with Bulgaria, France, Britain, Japan, Romania, the USSR, Yugoslavia and Greece in 1936.[82]

Secondly, the biggest unsolved problem remaining between Turkey and the British Empire as a sticking point was the Mosul issue. Mosul was a part of Turkey according to the Turkish

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[80] Gönlubol M. Olaylarla Turk Dıs Politikası. Ankara: Siyasal, 1996. pp.59-62
[81] Ibid 98
[82] Ibid 120-126

National Pact but Britain invaded this energy-rich region out of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Even though the Ankara government risked in an armed conflict for Mosul, British-backed uprising blew up in the east of Turkey and Mosul was remained with Britain as a result of League of Nations decision.[83]

Thirdly, Hatay was an Ottoman province but with the dissolution of Ottoman, it remained to French Mandate of Syria. Under favour of long efforts of the Ankara in League of Nations combining with tensioning relations in the Europe, international conditions turned out to Ankara's favour. Regarding Hatay and Syria, France had to pursue more passive policy. Hatay became independent in 1938 and then it was attached to Turkey in 1939. [84]

In the aftermath of the Turkish Independence War, Ankara's foreign policy could be defined as minimalist. Turkey concentrated on ensuring its territorial integrity not pursued any expansionist policy. Ankara's efforts to get back Mosul and Hatay were originated from Turkish National Pact, indicating these territories parts of Turkey.[85] Although Ankara did not pursue an expansionist policy, Turkey strived to fill geopolitical void arising from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire to a certain degree. These regionalism efforts were taken as a matter of Turkey's security in the early post-Ottoman era. For this purpose, the Balkan Pact was founded on Ankara's initiation among Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia in 1934. While the Balkan Pact ensured peace in the Balkans, it also aimed at contributing to the status-quo against rising fascism in Europe.[86] Moreover, the Saidabad Pact was established between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan on Turkey's initiation in 1937. The Pact aimed at ensuring regional security and sorting out problems within the region, in an attempt to minimise external powers' influence on regional issues. Moreover, rising Italian expansionism stimulated the regionalism efforts in the region. [87]

2.2 Turkish Foreign Policy during Second World War

Even in the beginning of the 1930s, European politics had already begun to be strained again. German and Italian dissatisfaction with the status-quo was becoming increasingly visible.[88] In spite of the tense environment in international politics, Turkey strived to pursue a non-

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[83] Ibid 70-76
[84] Ibid 126-132
[85] Turkmen İ., Turkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Ortadoğu Politikası// Bilgesam, 2010. pp.2-4
URL:http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-22-20140717111.pdf (accessed:12.02.2017)
[86] Gönlubol op.cit. p.99-105
[87] Ibid 106-108
[88] Sander O. Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994, Ankara: İmge, 2011. pp.43-46, 51,52

involvement policy and to preserve its relations with all parties in any disputes unless the dispute was concerning Turkey's security directly. The annexation of Czechoslovakia by Germany and of Albania by Italy prompted security-related concerns in Turkey. Turkey had to review its neutral attitude in international politics in accordance with new threat perception. Firstly, in spite of the Ankara attempted to extend nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union but it was abolished due to the fact that Russia signed a nonaggression treaty with Germany. The revealing doubts about expansionist goals of Soviet Russia pushed Turkey to seek to develop relations with the West.[89]

Turkey signed a mutual assistance agreement with Britain and France. This agreement stipulated French and British aid to Turkey in the event of German aggression targeting Turkey. In return, the agreement stipulated that Turkey would support French and British naval forces in case of extending the war to Mediterranean Sea. Yet still, under the terms of this special contract, Turkey did not have to fulfil the commitments in case they led to a war with the Soviet Union. As a result of this rapprochement between Turkey and the West, France renounced all of the claims on Hatay province and left its control to Turkish government on June 23, 1939.[90]

Britain twice called Turkey to engage in the war by resting on the mutual assistance agreement signed in May 1940 and in 1941. The first time Turkey was called on to join the war when Germany attacked France on account of the fact that the war extended to the Mediterranean Sea by German aggression to France. In response, Turkey rejected to take part in the war on the pretext of the special contract with regards to the Soviet Union. In 1941, the British called on Turkey to get in the war against Germany but once again Turkey denied it on the pretext of delay of British arms transfers to Turkey.[91]

Furthermore, Germany also wanted to draw Turkey to its side. Germany was a significant economy for the newly developing Turkish economy and trade between Turkey and Germany increased during 1930's. In 1938, 44 percent of Turkish supplies went to Germany and 11 percent of Turkish imports came from Germany. While Turkey imported industrial products, manufactured goods and munitions from Germany, Germany's imports consisted of mostly agricultural products. Therefore, Turkey had rational reasons to avoid deterioration of its

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[89] Gönlubol, op.cit. pp.137-140
[90] Vanderlippe, J. A Cautious Balance: The Question of Turkey in World War II// The Historian, Vol.64 No.1,2001 P.65
[91] Ibid 66

relations with Germany.[92] On 18 June 1941, Turkey and Germany signed a friendship agreement. According to this agreement, Turkey and Germany guaranteed each other to not involve any actions which could endanger one another directly or indirectly. Although Turkey halted all relations with Germany on 2 August 1944, Turkey managed to continue its policy of neutrality till very last stage of the war. Turkey declared war against the Axis states in the final stage of the war; this declaration even though formality, contributed Turkey's following relations with the West.[93]

During World War II Turkey managed to preserve its neutrality inherited from Ataturk era to a certain extent. Moreover, Turkish foreign policy was not fully oriented to any sides. As the Axis and Allied states willed to draw small states to their side, their policy towards to small states also aimed at preventing these states from engagement with the other side. Therefore, Turkey managed to maintain autonomy in foreign policy by making relatively unsubstantial concessions and avoiding firm commitments. Turkey neither fully integrated to one side nor made the others enemy, even though it announced a symbolic war against Germany in the end of the war.[94]

2.3 NATO membership process (1947-1952)

Ending World War II with the defeat of Axis powers brought international politics new institutions, new perceptions and new principles. Besides that, most European states weakened by the war. This led them to be more dependent on the US and the USSR. In the bipolar feature of the post-war era, the world was divided into two camps under two superpowers.[95]

The one-party system came to an end in Turkey and with the following elections; the Democrat Party (DP) came to power. However, any major breakages were not witnessed in the sense of Turkish foreign policy direction. DP managed to accomplish the NATO participation goal of Turkey that was applied in CHP term. Nevertheless, DP's open-market economy view combined with the revealing bipolar international system pushed Turkey to become dependent on the Western states in terms of security and economy.

The implicit reason of Turkish wishes of being a NATO member was due to increasing Soviet aggressiveness over the Straits. On 21 March 1945, the Soviet Union announced not to

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[92] Ibid 66
[93] Fox, A. The Power of Small States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. pp.16-37
[94] Ibid, 21
[95] Sander op.cit. pp:201-205

prolong the pact of non-aggression which was signed between Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1925. In addition, the Soviet Union claimed some concessions on Turkish Straits in spite of the Montreux Convention which solved the Straits issue favouring Turkey and other Black Sea states. Since the Straits were the only route to access Mediterranean Sea for the Soviet Union, the Soviets proposed that the straits should have operated by a commission composing of both Soviet and Turkish representatives.[96]

Soviet wish of revising Montreux Regime expressed by Stalin to Churchill at the Tehran Conference in 1943 on the pretext of Turkish unwillingness to take part in World War II against the Axis States: *"If now there were no objections it was necessary to reexamine the regime of the Turkish Straits. A big country such as Russia found itself locked in the Black Sea, with no means of exit. The Straits regime was first regulated by the Sevres agreement [of 1920], then the Lausanne agreement [of 1923], and finally the convention concluded in Montreux All this time the English wanted to strangle Russia and if now the English did not want to strangle Russia any more then it was necessary to alleviate the Straits regime"*[97]

Turkey was not the only country which was concerned with Soviet aggression, including on the issues of post-war Berlin and aggressive Soviet attitudes towards the Greek civil war prompted the US to develop more cautious strategies against the Soviet Union. Harry S. Truman -the president of US- made one of the most crucial speeches in the beginning of the cold war and announced his doctrine stipulating to provide financial aid for Turkey and Greece. Under the Truman Doctrine, countries which were threatened by militarist, authoritarian or other external powers would be supported by the US government. The Truman Doctrine mainly aimed to enhance the military power of Turkey to make it capable of confronting possible aggression from the Soviet Union.[98]

Turkish foreign policy regardless of domestic policy changes aimed at intensifying relations with the US in the aftermath of World War II. With the foundation of NATO Ankara strived to be a member of the NATO. Despite, the US's relatively positive attitude through Turkish entry into the NATO, Britain and other European states were relatively reluctant about the same issue. Turkey sought a way for entering the Atlantic Council and Turkish wishes of

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[96]Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State// The Office of the Historian, 501.BC/12, December 19, 1945. URL: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v07/d622 (accessed:10.02.2017)

[97] Roberts, G. Moscow's Cold War on the Periphery: Soviet Policy in Greece, Iran, and Turkey// Journal Of Contemporary History, Vol.46, No.1,2011 pp. 77-79.

[98] Leffler, M.P. Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952// The Journal Of American History, Vol.71, No.4, 1985. P.808

taking part in the Korean War served this purpose. The telegram which was sent to the Secretary of State by Wadsworth – the US ambassador in Turkey indicated quotes of Bayar showing Turkish concerns over the emergent reluctance considering Turkey's entry into the NATO: *"Does your Government not realize that we Turks will consider further deferment of favorable action on our request by the Atlantic Pact powers as a refusal and as unwillingness to accept us as equal partners in meeting jointly any threat of aggression? We have shown our good faith by forthright action towards meeting the Korean crisis. I fear frankly that, if Atlantic Pact Council of Foreign Ministers turns down our request, our morale will be seriously affected. We are not a people readily influenced by propaganda. In this matter, however, there is widespread concern and uncertainty. We feel our very future is at stake."* [99]

In return of Turkish participation of Korean campaign, the US fully supported Turkish membership of the NATO. However, France and Britain abstained about Turkish membership of the NATO. In 1951, Morrison sent a letter to the Turkish government laying down a condition to support the membership of Turkey. Britain could support Turkish membership if Turkey guaranteed that it would act together with Britain, France and the US in case of any conflict coming to existence in the Middle East. As a result, Greece and Turkey joined the NATO and the CENTO was founded. [100]

As a result of Turkish membership of NATO, Turkey has abandoned its non-belligerent and neutral foreign policy which was inherited from Ataturk's term. Young Turkish Republic for the first time pledged to orient one side deeply. Even though Turkey relieved regarding its security concerns arising from Soviet threat over the straits and Kars and Erzurum provinces, NATO membership brought different outcomes to Turkish foreign policy apart from security. Firstly, it deeply changed the relations between West and Turkey and Ankara became more dependent on the West. Secondly, the good relations deriving from Bolshevik-Kemalist solidarity during Turkish Freedom War completely disappeared and Turkey turned into a front base of NATO due to its geopolitical importance sharing frontiers with the Soviet Union.

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[99] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State//Office Of The Historian, 740.5/9–1250: Telegram, September 12, 1950. URL: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05/d732 (accessed:10.02.2017)
[100] Polat V. Derin Yalnızlık. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015. P.156

2.4 Turkish Foreign Policy Orientation during Cold War:

2.4.1 Western-Oriented Years (1952-1974)

Turkey's geopolitical location, that spans two continents and two struggle zones of Cold War, was the primary reason to be enrolled in NATO. Associating with its geopolitical significance, Turkey became long-standing and active member of NATO and made a certain level of contribution through the defence of the Middle East and Europe in favour of the Western alliance.[101]

The Turkish government regarded NATO membership as the only way of ensuring its territorial integrity against the Soviet Union. Turkey by locating herself in the Western bloc through NATO membership managed to diminish security concerns deriving from the Soviet Union that was considered threatening to Turkey's security and newly developing democratic system.

Speaking of international political conditions at the beginning of the cold war, the US came up as the super-power, by replacing Britain that weakened out of the World War II, and on the other hand Soviet Union referred to the opposite pole. The rivalry between the two super powers had already launched even in the World War II about serious issues such as administrating Berlin. In fact, sharp polarisation between the superpowers starting with Berlin spilled over in an international scale. Turkey could not isolate herself these developments, and it chose to orient in Western concert against the Soviet Union at the expense of abandoning its independent foreign policy concept and its newly developing national economy.

Inside the NATO, Turkey undertook many delicate tasks against "Soviet expansionism". First, Turkey by its membership of NATO made a great contribution to containment policy of the US during Cold War against the Soviet Union. Second, Turkey, besides having land frontiers, shared the Black Sea with Soviet Union, Turkey's main strategic role was bottling up Soviet navy in the Black Sea.[102] Third, Turkey by using ethnical ties could influence Turkic societies endeavoured to damage Soviet central authority to spill over.[103]

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[101] Kuniholm, B. Turkey and the West// Foreign Affairs, Vol:70, No.2, 1991. P.34.
[102] Ibid, 34
[103] Ulunian, A. Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945-58//Cold War History, Vol:3 No.2, 2003. P.43

Turkish foreign policy with its membership of NATO radically changed. In fact, the Turkish foreign policy shift was based on the principle of reciprocity. In return of Western support diminishing Turkey's security concerns stemming from the aggressive image of Soviet Union, Turkey located herself in the Atlantic system. Turkey played a pivotal role in the defence of the West from the Soviet Union, while the West made a contribution to modernising Turkish military equipment and facilities and the army.[104]

However, Ankara with the membership of NATO immediately began to pursue and to instrument NATO policies by renouncing Ataturk's foreign policy principle that not to interfere neighbours' internal affairs. Moreover, Ataturk's multi-dimensional foreign policy concept placing a particular significance on establishing regional solidarity was abandoned by entering NATO. Turkey regarded the interests of West as its national interests and it strived for getting more oriented in the Western concert.[105]

Furthermore, Turkey's deepening integration into Western concert led to a huge disturbance in the region. States which were gained their independence recently began to see Turkey as a threat to their independence. These newly independent states had become independent due to decreasing power of Britain and France aftermath of the World War II. Their priority was to preserve their independence against any external threats. When Turkey renounced its foreign policy framework giving precedence to regional relations based on a principal of mutual respect to others' territorial integrity, most of the states in the region radically revised the attitudes on Turkish government.

Bandung Conference (1955) was a significant event in the sense of demonstrating changing Turkish government's perceptions on foreign policy issues. The participants of the conference mostly consisted of recently decolonised states and developing states. At the conference Turkish foreign minister, Fatih Rustu Zorlu used the platform criticising sharply non-alignment policy of the attendees by highlighting "communist threat". Turkish representatives at the conference took a pro-Western stance against the idea of neutrality.[106]

As of Turkey's entry into NATO, Turkey began to pursue one-dimensional and Western-oriented foreign policy. Besides that, the US perceptions over the USSR and other neighbour states of Turkey started to dominate Turkish foreign policy framework. Since Turkey entered

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[104] Kuniholm, op.cit. P.34
[105] Gönlübol, op.cit.. P.312
[106] Ibid, 314

the NATO, Turkey and the US have signed reciprocal agreements including allowing the US to open military bases including the one in Incirlik, to use Turkish air space and to use Turkish harbours.

New foreign policy aspired to supervise the interests of alliance states over the Middle East. Thus, Baghdad Pact (1955) was formed by Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The Pact aimed at encircling periphery of the Soviet Union by anti-communist bloc and regenerating the UK activeness over the Middle East. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan did not join the pact. Turkey's efforts to drag these states into anti-communist block cause deterioration relations between Turkey and these states which endeavour to pursue neural policy.[107]

Turkey took a pro-Western stance on issues in the Middle East. When Israel together with the UK attacked to Suez Canal, Turkey stood by the action. However, as the attempt was carried out without the US, it was halted by American pressure and then Turkey barely condemned the action of the UK at the Baghdad Pact meeting which Britain did not attend.[108]

Beside these, Turkey supported other actions of allies in Middle East. In 1958, in accordance with Eisenhower doctrine, Operation Blue Bat as the first application of Eisenhower doctrine was carried out by American marine troops with the support of Ankara by allowing the US to use Incirlik base. When Britain sent paratroops to Jordan, Turkey stood by this intervention. Moreover, with regards to Algerian War, Turkey took a stance favouring France in the UN.[109]

A major transformation took place in the stance of Soviet administration through Turkey as of mid-1950. In the aftermath of Turkey's neutrality in World War II, Soviet claims on Straits' regime and on two Turkish provinces played a pivotal role to push Turkey to Western alliance eagerly. However, when Khrushchev came to power, discourses of Soviet Union through Turkey started to be softened. In December 1955, Khrushchev at the sessions of the Supreme Soviet stated that "*It is known when Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inönu were as the top of the Turkish leadership we had very good relations but later on they deteriorated. We*

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[107] Turan İ., Barlas.D, "Batı İttifakına Uye Olmanın Turk Dıs Politikası Uzerindeki Etkileri",
Faruk Sönmezoğlu Turk Dıs Politikasının Analizi, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004, P.431
[108] Ibid, 431
[109] Ibid, 431

cannot say that this happened only because of Turkey; there were inappropriate statement made on our side which weakened these relations." [110]

The aftermath of World War II, Ankara strived to integrate its national economy to international market. Therefore, import substitution policy was replaced by open-market strategy. This strategy remained low-developed Turkish industry needy for foreign investments. When American economic support in the framework of Marshall Plan was halted, Turkish economy came to a standstill. Therefore, DP government sought to ways of providing economic assistance from the USSR. Before Prime Minister Menderes visit to Moscow, DP government was toppled down by a military intervention on 27 May 1961. [111]

2.4.2 Relative Autonomy (1974-1978)

By mid-1960s Turkey like Greece was very loyal to NATO policies. Yet, Cold War came into relatively détente period between the US and the Soviet Union as of the mid-1960s, the US relatively decreased its pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean. [112] This new environment gave an opportunity to Ankara to reform its foreign policy concept by making American influence rare, in other words reforming it in along with its national interests more intensively, Post-War Turkish foreign policy formed according to NATO's priorities, mostly under the conditions of strained relations between the Soviet Union and America and the threat of the Soviet Union as a regional aggressor.

In the sense of being part of the Western alliance against Stalin's threats, Turkey had enjoyed the advantages whenever the Straits regime was questioned by Stalin and when Soviet claims were made on Turkish provinces: Kars and Ardahan. However, its strategic orientation to the Atlantic system brought also substantial problems. First serious problems between Turkey and Western countries arose from opposite viewpoints over the Cyprus issue. When Turkish compatriots in Cyprus came under harassment, Turkish government planned to intervene in Cyprus even in the 1960s, but the US stood strongly against any Turkish actions in Cyprus. The US president Lyndon Baines Johnson letter to Inönu, dated 5 June 1963, threatened Turkey with halting on-going American financial assistance to prevent an intervention. In the letter also Johnson stated that in case of a Soviet aggression to Turkey, the NATO countries would not help Turkey: *"Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could*

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[110] Ulunian op.cit. p.44
[111] Simpson D.J. Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey// Middle East Journal Vol. 19, No. 2, 1965 pp.148-152
[112] Campbell, J. The Mediterranean Crisis//Foreign Affairs, Vol.53, No.4, 1975. P.613

lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies..."[113]

When Turkey saw that it could not carry out all national goals by resting on NATO and Western allies in the wake of Johnson's letter, its extensive Western-oriented foreign policy framework was subject to criticism substantially for the first time at the official level.[114] The developing democratic rights and enlarging freedoms under the favour of the 1961 constitution played a pivotal role to emerge public opposition combining with decreasing international pressure on Turkey thanks to the relatively softening environment of Cold War in the 1960s. This democratic environment enabled Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) to get in Turkish Parliament for the first time. TIP was a political party objecting Turkey's NATO membership fundamentally and defending moving away from the NATO. Especially, critical views in public towards pro-Western policies reached the peak with the 1968 movements. During this period, pro-Western orientation strongly defended by right-wing movements, including those of political Islamists.[115] The emerging political divisions in the political spectrum in this era was substantial in the sense of further political developments on Turkish foreign policy orientation many current actors who have made substantial effects on determining Turkish foreign policy orientation emerged in this era.

 In 1963, Fetullah Gulen showed up in Turkish politics for the first time as the founder of Erzurum Anti-Communist Association[116]. He will be further regarded the leader of a terrorist organisation. He and the linked association have been regarded as a champion of pro-Western political orientation in Turkey as they launched a campaign against socialists, Kemalists and nationalists basically who stood against pro-Western thinking in Turkey.

In 1974, when Turkish government decided to intervene in Cyprus, the contradictions between Turkish national interests and the Western prospects came to ground for the first time since the end of the World War II. The US laid arms embargo on Turkey. Turkish

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[113]Letter to Prime Minister Inonu from President Johnson, June 5, 1964// Cyprus-Dispute.org URL:http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html (accessed: 09.03.2017)
[114] CIA Intelligence Report 1964 CIA"Turkish Reaction to President Johnson's Letter" 1964//CIA Official Website https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000615268.pdf (accessed: 10.03.2017)
[115] Doster, B. Turkiye'de NATO Karsıtlığının Tarihsel ve Siyasal Kökenleri// Ortadoğu Analiz, Vol.4, No.40. 2012. P.39
[116] FETÖ/PDY Darbe Girisimi Meclis Komisyonu Raporu// TBMM Parliamentary Investigation Committee, October 19, 2016. P.41

excessive Western-oriented foreign policy viewpoint subjected to discuss at the state level for the first time. Turkish cold-war foreign policy framework was drawn against a perception of Soviet threat and it was needed to be revised in accordance with Turkey's non-overlapping interests in Cyprus.

Turkey and Greece put their national interests ahead of NATO's ones for the first time since they joined NATO and it led to an inevitable conflict between their compatriots in Cyprus and the conflict reached to the international level with the Turkish intervention. Besides the US failure to diminish tension between the two NATO allies, its relations with both sides deteriorated. While Greece left the military command of NATO, Turkey remained in order to monitor and maintain NATO's activities, in case of any attitudes objecting to Turkey.

The rising tension in the east Mediterranean between Turkey and Greece was undermining NATO's containment policy targeting the Soviet Union. In addition to the frailty sprung in NATO with the departure of Greece from the military command, Turkish military strength was reduced due to the cut-of American aid by the Congress. Then, it is evident to say that in the wake of Cyprus crises, the US's power in the Eastern Mediterranean weakened, while the US politicians saw boundaries of the American power on melting their allies' national interests under the NATO security framework.[117]

Following the Cyprus-related confrontation with the US, Turkey began to seek ways for diluting its tight dependencies on the West. In doing this, the Ecevit government launched a policy for developing relations with non-Western states including the member states of Warsaw Pact and Arab States.[118] Moreover, Ecevit, in the wake of Cyprus intervention, asserted that Turkey had to completely revise its security concept indicating the contradictions with NATO and the US as Turkey could not trust the US anymore.[119] His words would be regarded as the milestones for the direction of Turkish foreign policy:

Cyprus question which began to come up as of 1960 had a great impact on changes in Turkish foreign policy concept. Oil crises that came up in the 1970s, rising public opposition objecting to pro-US foreign policy concept and eventually Cyprus crises stimulated the foreign policy revision. The government endeavoured to formulate a more neutral foreign

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[117] Campbell, op.cit. p.613
[118] Ibid, 613,614
[119] Ecevit: "Artık Amerika'ya Guvenemeyiz"//Milliyet Newspaper, February 09, 1975, " Available at: http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/dhdTRLsT6QVRqcUkm2oGSg_x3D__x3D_ (accessed 7 Jan. 2017)

policy despite its NATO membership. When Turkey did not receive support from its allies on the Cyprus issue, unidirectional and Western-oriented foreign policy concept of Turkey adopted in the 1950s was to be replaced by a balanced and multi-directional one.

In this context, Turkey took an attitude supporting Palestine in the Palestine-Israel conflict in contrast to its previous viewpoint, perceiving the issue through the lenses of Western states. In the fourth Arab-Israeli War, Turkey did not allow the US to deploy NATO bases in the south of Turkey, while Turkish airspace was opened to the Soviet Union who aided the Arabs. Moreover, in 1975, in response to the American arms embargo on Turkey, Turkey terminated mutual security treaties with the US and retrieved military bases assigned to the American military. Again despite NATO membership, Turkey sought to adopt a more balanced foreign policy between the US and the Soviet Union especially in the wake of the Cyprus intervention. In June 1978, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's Moscow visit, he stated that *"the embargo certainly affects our thinking in many ways and encourages us to be more imaginative regarding solutions to our economic problems and to our defense problems."*[120]

Ankara's new foreign policy concept was subjected to debate inside NATO and this caused the emergence of new crisis when Greece left the military command of the NATO. Turkey's veto on the re-entry of Greece into the military command increased the tension between Turkey and the allies. With the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the US lost one of the closest allies in the region and at the same time, Ankara's approach towards the Soviet Union was continuing. Simultaneously, Ankara sought for solutions to dilute its security dependencies on the Atlantic system.

Besides the failure of the American efforts to diminish tension in the East, it would have been expected from European diplomacy to make a contribution towards to settle the issue. Both Turkey and Greece became the member of European Council in pursuit of World War II and European integration issue held a great prominence in their foreign policy frameworks. Nevertheless, the Western European diplomacy could not soften the tension deriving from the Cyprus disagreement.[121]

To sum up, Turkey by uttering lessening influence of the US through a relatively softening Cold-War in the second half of the 1960s managed to form lesser dependent and strengthen other directions of its foreign policy including Warsaw Pact countries and the Third World

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[120] Mathias, C. Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy// Foreign Affairs, Vol.59, No.5, 1981. P. 989
[121] Campbell, op.cit. pp.613,614

States. Ankara got a great success with the Cyprus intervention. Cyprus besides its geopolitical prominence for Turkey's security, it also has become more prominent in time in terms of energy. Under favour of the Cyprus intervention, Turkey obtained the major authority in the Eastern Mediterranean and laid the foundations of the TRNC.

2.4.3 Reconciliation (1978-1983)

Strained relations between Turkey and the US started to be normalising, as of American arms embargo on Turkey being lifted in October 1978. In March 1980, the U.S.-Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed, and with the agreement, the convergence between Turkey and the US was boosted. There were two primary reasons for this rapprochement.

First was Iran Humeyni Revolution. With the revolution, the diplomatic ties between the US and Iran completely halted. After, the revolution the US took more sensitive foreign policy attitudes on Turkey as a balancing actor not only against the Soviet Union but also Iran. Iran revolution played a great role rapprochement between Turkey and the US. In the wake of Iran Revolution in 1979, Turkey's geopolitical location got more prominence for the US. Apart from Turkey, the US did not have any allies left in the region.

The second was, with the September military coup that was mostly regarded as a pro-American junta took a pro-American attitude and wiped out critics in the army, universities, the media and politics. While the US influence on Turkey was decreasing, since the Cyprus intervention in 1974 in general terms in conjunction with the international developments, the US-backed military coup took place in Turkey. Greece's re-entry into the NATO's military command was carried out with the Turkish junta's support. The strong public opposition objecting to the Western-oriented foreign policy was completely overwhelmed by the putschists. Critical views over pro-American foreign policy framework were eliminated. As a result of the coup, political Islam stood out in Turkish politics by the elimination of other political actors by the putschists. The 1980 coup gave an impetus to empower political Islam in Turkey in this sense. In this respect the AKP –ruling party since 2001- represents political Islamic ideology, the coup d'état, therefore, is also very significant to comprehend the AKP era foreign policy attitudes.

Moreover, Greece's return to NATO military command took place with the admission of junta government. Turkey lost its prestige internationally. Kurdish issue because of junta's stern policies turned into a terror problem and it internationalised with the migration of huge

numbers of Kurds to European countries. Turkey's parliamentary tradition was hugely damaged and instead of parliament, presidents or prime ministers started to become more influential in terms of foreign policy making.

2.4.4 Back to Western-Oriented Foreign Policy: (1983-1989)

Turgut Ozal, who was the deputy prime minister of junta government, won the first elections after the military rule lasting 3 years. During Ozal era, Turkish government gave the biggest portion of its attention on deregulation of Turkish national economy. It was not a surprise as Ozal is regarded the champion of neoliberalism in Turkey in accordance with the economic framework of Thatcher and Reagan. Before the military coup d'état, he prepared a new economic framework for the Demirel government in 1979 so called "the 24 January Decisions" which was undermining the principle of the social state, mixed economy views and workers' rights. The decisions stipulated mostly to open Turkey's economy to the World and to make deregulations but the new economy policy came across huge public critics.

At this point, Perincek argues that 24 January decisions and the coup d'état were two sides of the same coin and the new economic policy could come into force barely with the military rule which was actually a stick for imposing the new economic rule upon the Turkish society.[122] Contradictorily, Ozal was often regarded as a hero for Turkish democracy; indeed he was the deputy minister of military rule. Turkish foreign policy making for the first time turned into a one-man show. Before Ozal era regarding the critical foreign policy issues, collective decision making and consultation had been followed to settle foreign policy strategies between presidents, military, foreign ministry, government and parliament. The centralisation of foreign policy authority made Ankara's foreign policy more dependent on domestic political changes. The intensity of ideological thinking in terms of foreign policy making increased and this, in turn, made Turkish foreign policy to very sensitive to domestic government changes.

Turkish foreign policy during this term was preoccupied with economic relation with its neighbours. In addition to that, because of Iran-Iraq war, Kurdish groups enhanced their power by exploiting an emergent lack of authority in the region. PKK and Kurdish question came up as a serious national security problem. Following years, PKK and the Kurdish issue played an extensive role in means of Turkey's foreign policy directions.

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[122] Perincek D. 24 Ocak'ın Komisyoncu Kulturu// Aydınlık Newspaper, January 23, 2011
URL:https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/arsiv/dou-perincek-24-ocakn-komisyoncu-kueltuerue-ve-24-ocakta-vurulan-fedai-kueltuerue (accessed 05.01.2017)

Furthermore, the relations with oil-rich Gulf States boosted in these years, during cold-war Turkey did not give attention to relations with the Gulf States but with Ozal government, Turkey's foreign policy acquire a new direction towards the Gulf States. The economy policy began to become the more significant determiner of Turkish foreign policy.

By the 1970s, relations between Europe and Turkey were formed on mutual security and economic needs. Yet, due to several crises, the relations were deteriorated. Turkey's intervention on Cyprus and the world oil crisis strained the relations. Following 1980, the military coup d'état brought relations to a halting point. Therefore, one of the main foreign policy concentrations of Ozal government was integrating Turkey into Europe. Through this direction, Turkey endeavoured to enter the European Economic Union (ECU) but its attempts did not come to end.

2.5 Post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy:

2.5.1 New World Order

World order refers to the outcome of power distribution in international relations among major states. Therefore, while examining when the new world order revealed, we should look into that when the major change took place in power distribution among major states. In contrast to the liberal view that pointed the Gulf War as the starting point of New World order, a major change took place with the decline of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1989. The dissolution of the Soviet Union changed the power distribution among major powers fundamentally and the bipolar international system evaporated.[123]

The shift from a bipolar international system to a unipolar one took place with the collapse of Soviet Union. The systemic change and emergence of American supremacy led to rising in liberal theories in international relations such as "the End of History". The main argument was that the essence of the American domestic system, namely democracy, was going to dominate the world and the rest of ideological structures could not avoid being obsoleted. However, fundamental changes in the international system did not abolish geopolitical laws of international politics. Despite the boosted expectations over the new world order stemming from liberal values after the decline of Soviet Union, the continuity of geopolitical disputes was witnessed in international relations.

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[123] Nye, J. What New World Order? //Foreign Affairs, Vol.71, No.2, 1992. P.84

At this point, we should look into what the new world order brought for strategic orientation problem of nation states by putting aside ideological thought from the new world order phenomena. First of all, the dissolution of Eastern Bloc unpacked ethnical and religious confrontations which had been thought to be melted under socialist rule. Ethnic identities and religion came to the centre of international politics. Second, combining with globalisation phenomena in the new world order, national boundaries were destroyed by globalisation. Third, the alliances of the Cold War inevitably were begun to be questioned since they had formed against the opposite pole in the world. The continuation of the NATO's expansion despite the absence of Soviet threat launched new discussions over the role of the NATO.

Political globalisation refers to spread out democratic regimes and to develop international law and international organisations. As a matter of things, nation states could not have isolated themselves from strengthening globalisation. In the new international order, the main challenges became ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism for the nation states. The nation states faced up a threat of geographic disintegration through ethnic and religious conflicts. Therefore, it is clear to say that the ideological appearance of geopolitical disputes was replaced by the cultural ones.

Furthermore, the claim of this new world order was to spread out democracy, human rights and free-market all over the world.[124] While the new world order destroyed national boundaries, the central authority of countries was undermined and this led to the rising of terrorism mainly based on ethnical and religious identities. The function of NATO was settled especially after 9/11 as fighting against terrorism.

2.5.2 Post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkey's orientation into the Atlantic system was taken place under the conditions of the Cold War based on its security concerns. Turkey's threat perception was so much influenced by fear of Soviet Union. But when the cold war ended with the decline of Eastern Bloc, Turkey needed to revise its foreign policy orientation through newly emergent geopolitical factors.

Since Turkey is located in the centre of Middle Asia, the Balkans and Caucasus regions, it had a direct influence on geopolitical changes in these regions. In Middle Asia, as a result of the dissolution of Soviet Union, Turkey, through its ethnic ties, with newly independent states

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[124] Bush G. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 1991//The American Presidency Project, URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253. (accessed:14.03.2017)

sought ways of pursuing more active foreign policy strategies in the region. Speaking of Balkans, in the eve of dispatching Yugoslavia, Turkey started to intensify Ottoman motives in its foreign policy. Therefore, in pursuit of Cold War neo-Ottomanist and Turanist elements obtained more interest than ever before.

Turkey had played a strategic role for the security of NATO and Europe during the Cold War in the sense of containment policy against the Soviet Union but when Soviet threat disappeared, Turkey's role in the Atlantic system was subject to debate. The national interests of Turkey sharply diverged from Atlantic system and it became more visible as of the Gulf War. Iraqi territorial integrity turned into a target of Atlantic system with the American led intervention to Iraq. Although the preserving Iraqi territorial integrity held huge importance regarding Turkey's territorial integrity through Kurdish question, Ankara supported the attempts of the US in Iraq threatening Iraq's territorial integrity, especially in the Ozal era. Neo-Ottomanist dreams of Ozal government substituted for realist thinking and eventually, the Kurdish question was boosted by dreamy policies of Ankara.

Furthermore, ethnical motives gained weight in Turkish foreign policy making. With the dissolution of Soviet Union, ethic identities were unveiled. This allowed Ankara for developing cultural and political ties with post-Soviet communities. Through common roots with Turkic communities, Turkey strived to play a big brother role over Turkic communities in post-Soviet space without taking into account its own strength. Moreover, Islamic elements gained intensity in Turkish foreign policy making to develop ties with other Islamic communities such as Chechens. Turkey's policy through newly independent states in the Balkans was also influenced by cultural motives. Turkey through Islamic and Ottoman ties tried to form a sphere of interest over post-Yugoslavia communities. Therefore neo-Ottomanist rhetoric turned into a predominant element in Turkish foreign policy making towards Balkans.[125]

With the end of Ozal era, the relative return to relatively more realist approach was witnessed in Turkish foreign policy making. Turkey's integration efforts to the EU continued in this term. The most outstanding developments in this term concerning Ankara's efforts for entry into EU were Turkey's entrance in European Customs Union in 1995 and signing Helsinki Declaration in 1999. The Helsinki Presidency Conclusions dated December 1999, shows the EU's stance to Turkish accession process. While Turkey was asked to settle its disputes with

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[125] Oran B. Turk Dıs Politikası-II. İstanbul: İletisim, 2013. pp.48-70.

candidate or member countries, for Cyprus accession this precondition was not asked as it is stated in paragraph 9b: *"The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors."*[126] By signing the declaration, Turkey gained a candidate status but at the same time it admitted to settle its disputes including the Cyprus issue in the framework of EU accession.

On the other hand, the bureaucracy and army gained weight in foreign policy decision making processes after Ozal era one-man show. In contrast to Ozal era foreign policy strategies towards Iraq, post-Ozal era Ankara pursued a more realistic and security oriented foreign policy. In this framework, Ankara carried out several cross-border operations in Iraq to eliminate PKK despite the Western countries' negative reactions. By 2000s, the PKK as a military part of Kurdish issue had been wiped out by anti-terrorist campaign.

Neo-Ottomanist rhetoric was diluted by more realistic foreign policy concept. Especially through the end of 1990s with the recurrence of Russia, Ankara comprehended new challenges in the post-Soviet space in more realistic way. Turkey while strived to pursue an active policy in Turkic countries, it at the same time faced up with the fact that Russia was the most powerful country in post-Soviet space. This led to revise its foreign policy strategies that were formed with the support of the US for the purpose of undermining Moscow's authority in the post-Soviet space.

2.5.3 AKP era: Western-Oriented Years (2002-2011)

Since AKP came to power, Turkish foreign policy has had substantial changes in terms of methodology and a way of thinking. First of all, AKP foreign policy attitude can be defined as a continuation of Ozal term foreign policy thinking.[127] The early years of AKP government, the Western-oriented policies were practiced in the framework of EU membership process and Greater Middle East Initiative. AKP sought to make Turkey the model country in the Greater Middle East by making a mixture of political Islam and democratic tradition. Besides these, foreign policy making with the lenses of values turned

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[126] Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions//European Parliament Official Website, DECEMBER 10-11, 1999 URL:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm (Accessed 10.01.2017)

[127] Bertrand, G. Turkish Diplomacy since 2003: Transition from Realpolitik to a Liberal Foreign Policy?// Perspectives, Vol.21, No.2, 2013. P.68-71

back to Turkish foreign policy making in the form of neo-Ottomanism and moderate Islam. Red lines of Turkish foreign policy based on the geopolitical consideration have been stretched with ideological adventurism of AKP.

To understand AKP term foreign policy, we should look into the American foreign policy towards Greater Middle East after the 9/11. Wright defines the scope of Greater Middle East 22 Arab countries, plus Turkey, Israel, Pakistan and Afghanistan.[128] The US designed a pre-emptive policy against terrorism and fundamentalist Islam; it is called Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI).[129] Wright states regarding the GMEI: *"the most ambitious U.S. democracy effort since the end of the Cold War, encompasses a wide range of diplomatic, cultural and economic measures, according to a draft of the plan"*[130]

GMEI officially stipulates to democratise Islamic regimes in and to dilute fundamentalist thinking in the Greater Middle East. Turkey's significance considering the GMEI is stated by former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz: *"To win the war against terrorism, and, in so doing, to shape a more peaceful world, we must reach out to the hundreds of millions of moderate and tolerant people in the Muslim world. We must speak to those people around the world who aspire to enjoy the blessings of freedom and free enterprise. Turkey offers a compelling demonstration that these values are compatible with modern society — that religious beliefs need not be sacrificed to build modern democratic institutions."*[131]

The meaning of AKP's coming to power with huge US support gained more significance as AKP's moderate Islamist identity.[132] In the framework of the GMEI, Turkey under AKP rule tried to undertake a model country role in the region. At President Bush's visit in 2004, he also highlighted Turkey's democratic Islamic feature: *"Turkey is a strong, secular democracy, a majority Muslim society, and a close ally of all free nations. Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's bridge to the wider world. Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe*

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[128] Wright R. U.S. Readies Push for Mideast Democracy Plan//Washington Post, February 28, 2004 URL:https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/02/28/us-readies-push-for-mideast-democracy-plan/afdb58a3-4647-46b4-be68-684caed84813/?utm_term=.70079d336fb2 (accessed 15.01.2017)
[129] Stewart D.J. The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administration's Ideological Imagination// Geographical Review, Vol.95, No.3, 2015. P.400
[130] Wright op.cit.
[131] A separate Kurdish state in Northern Iraq would be destabilizing to Turkey// Hurriyet Daily News, July 17, 2002. URL: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/a-separate-kurdish-state-in-northern-iraq-would-be-destabilizing-to-turkey.aspx?pageID=438&n=a-separate-kurdish-state-in-northern-iraq-would-be-destabilizing-to-turkey-2002-07-17 (accessed: 10.01.2017)
[132] Fuller, G. The Future of Political Islam// Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.2, 2002. P.59

and in the broader Middle East-and the Republic of Turkey can depend on the support and friendship of the United States"[133]

At this point, the Strategic Deepness Concept of Davutoglu gains extra prominence since the theoretical framework of AKP foreign policy was drawn by Davutoglu. He suggests a more active foreign policy beyond Turkey's geographical frontiers by uttering Ottoman legacy and common Islamic ties in the Greater Middle East. The aim of his concept is making Turkey a leader and model country in its geopolitical frontiers.[134] In this sense, it is evident to say that the Strategic Deepness Concept is very compatible with GMEI.

However, the Kemalist infrastructure of Turkey constituted an impediment to actualise this concept in Turkish foreign policy. The early years of AKP period, Kemalist principals of Turkey were undermined by AKP in order to adopt Turkey a model country for GMEI. The solid laicism associated with other Kemalist principles were seen as the biggest obstacles which are needed to be smoothed and to be brought in compliance with new foreign policy concept that was formed in accordance with GMEI. Turkey's domestic political shift from laicism to moderate Islam under AKP government was carried out under this framework. Therefore, the shift cannot be defined as an issue of Strategic Orientation, the opposite way around that ideological shift refers to the efforts in order to adopt Turkey's politics for new American strategies so-called GMEI. While AKP made efforts to dilute laicism at home for the purpose of making Turkey as a model country, it had to challenge with Turkey's constitution. In 2008, the Constitutional Court announced a verdict that AKP became a focus of anti-laicist activities at the closure case of AKP but AKP barely got off from being closed down.[135]

Neo-Ottomanism discussions came to the forefront in the literature in the framework of AKP's foreign policy concept. Neo-Ottomanist discourse functioned effectively to cover up Turkey's role in the GMEI. On the one hand, AKP has made use of vital foreign policy issues for propaganda at home, on the other hand, it endeavoured to actualise "zero-problem foreign policy" mostly overlooking geopolitical facts. For the first time, Turkish foreign policy has become an issue of the domestic politics more than ever before. Neo-Ottomanism allowed making necessary transformations to adopt Turkey for a model country. And Gulenist organisation members were placed at critical positions instead of Kemalist officers in the

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[133] Steward op.cit. p.404
[134] Davutoglu A. Stratejik Derinlik. İstanbul: Kure Yayınları, 2001. pp.40-42
[135] Abramowitz, M., & Barkey, H. J.. Turkey's Transformers// Foreign Affairs Vol.88, No.6, 2009. p.120

army through Ergenekon and Balyoz political cases targeting the Kemalist members of Turkish army as of 2008.

The ideological thinking filled up AKP foreign policy conception; Ankara supported Muslim Brothers during the Arab Spring in the hope of establishment of ideologically close governments in the Greater Middle East. Muslim Brotherhood movement was inspired from AKP's Turkey as a model to be turned into compatible with American aspiration after the 9/11 towards the Greater Middle East that stipulated to put forward moderate Islamic movements against non-democratic regimes.[136] As of the beginning of the protests against authoritarian leaders, AKP government has actively supported the protests. The Arab Spring, in general terms, was taken as an opportunity to open doors for Turkey's geopolitical expansionism in the framework of Neo-Ottomanism by Ankara.[137]

In Iraq, AKP government plays an active role developing an independent de facto Kurdistan by having interaction bypassing the central government of Iraq. Speaking of Iraqi Kurdistan, AKP went beyond the traditional red-lines of Turkish conventional stance that requires standing strictly against the foundation of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq. AKP government pursued Western-oriented policies for a long time in Iraq and in Syria without taking into account possible results for Turkey in the dream of being the big brother for post-Ottoman countries. Regarding Syria, Ankara had a part in projecting Western-oriented policies by sponsoring activities of various opposition groups which were seeking to weaken the central authority of Syria.

Considering PKK issue, Henri Barkey prepared a report in 2009 for Obama administration regarding the Kurdish issue. The report indicates several recommendations in order to solve the issue: the one regarding the PKK was that the US government should press Turkey for a peaceful solution with the PKK.[138] Simultaneously, the breaking taboos of Turkish foreign policy came to prominent as a popular discourse of AKP government. The government policy towards the Kurdish issue was very far away from the traditional approach of Ankara's approach to the Kurdish issue. With regards to PKK, AKP government launched a "democratic opening process"; the Oslo Talks were made between the government and PKK

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[136] Bertrand op. cit. p.78
[137] Schanzer and Tahiroglu. Ankara's Failure//Foreign Affairs. January 22, 2016. URL:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-01-25/ankaras-failure (accessed 22.03.2017)
[138] Barkey H.J. Preventing Conflict Over Kurdistan// Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009. p.27
URL:http://www.aina.org/reports/pcok.pdf (accessed:16.12.2016)

aiming at settling the problem by negotiations.[139] Of course, we still do not know if the US administration put the pressure of Ankara regarding the process yet still it is clear to say that "the democratic opening process" overlaps with American expectations from Ankara concerning PKK. AKP government policies till 2014 regarding the Kurdish issue referred to a breaking point from the traditional position of Turkey which was praised by the EU and the US.

In Central Asia, AKP government continued Ozal era active foreign policy conception in accordance with Western countries. The emerged power gap led to a new struggle in the post-Soviet region, Turkey became one of the most active states by trying to form good relations with post-Soviet states especially with Turkic states. These relations developed also during AKP term. For the West, Turkey's presence in the post-Soviet areas is significant as this creates a balance against sphere of Russian influence and also it is breaking factor possible Iran's impact on the region.[140] Economic activities of Turkish companies have increased in the region during AKP era.

On the pretext of breaking taboos of Turkish foreign policy, AKP opened up red-lines of Turkish foreign policy for discussion. In AKP era, Cyprus, Armenia, Kurdish and Aegean islands issues were approached in the framework of breaking the taboos of Turkish foreign policy. With regards to Cyprus issue, Ankara started negotiating the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island for the first time in the hope of accessing the EU. Concerning Armenian issue, Turkey admitted to open frontiers at any expense. With regards to the Kurdish issue, due to "democratic opening process" Kurdish armed separatism rose from the grave and Turkey's east and south frontiers surrounded by de facto Syrian Kurdistan and Iraqi de facto Kurdistan. Regarding Aegean Islands, 18 Turkish islands have been captured as of 2004.[141]

2.5.4 AKP's Partial Face Off with Geopolitical Facts
Speaking of the PKK issue, AKP government abolished its 'taboo breaking strategies' and partially turned back to traditional realistic view of Turkey in time. The AKP gave up negotiating with the chiefs of PKK and launched a huge anti-terrorist campaign in July

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[139] Hess J. Turkey's PKK Talks//Foreign Policy, January 8, 2013 URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/08/turkeys-pkk-talks/ (accessed: 15.12.2016)
[140] Maynes, C. W. America Discovers Central Asia//Foreign Affairs Vol.82,No.2,2003. P.131
[141] Ege'de isgal edilen ada sayısı 18'e cıktı// Yenicağ Newspaper, November 14, 2016, URL: http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/egede-isgal-edilen-ada-sayisi-18e-cikti-150381h.htm (accessed: 05.12.2016)

2015.[142] Against Syrian de facto Kurdistan, Ankara took serious measures by launching Euphrates Shield cross-border operation that is contradicting also the American policies regarding Syria and Kurds. The operation officially has two goals officially: the first one is wiping out the Kurdish corridor; the second is making contribution to fight against the ISIS in the framework of re-providing the unity of Syria. The primary goal of the operation has huge contradictions with the US policy in Syria as the US is making a deep cooperation with YPG that is regarded as PKK's attached terrorist organisation by Turkey.

Regarding the EU, President Erdogan and other Turkish officials have accused the EU several times of supporting and winking at PKK activities in the Europe. The several countries of the EU still host the PKK offices allegedly. Turkey position with the exception of the AKP's détente period with the Kurdish armed group is solid towards the PKK taking the issue as a matter of its territorial integrity.

Nevertheless, ideological attitudes of AKP government do not allow setting a strategy fully overlapping with Turkish national interests. With regards to Turkey, Syria issue is a part of Turkish territorial integrity problem. AKP government due to its ideological antagonism towards the Assad government and Iran cannot instrument a fully coherent strategy with Turkey's main interests regarding Syria. As a result, it is evident to say that the insecure Syria turned out a vital threat to Turkey's security. Moreover, alike what happened in Iraq out of the failed central authority, the Kurdish forces found a gap to develop their power, therefore disintegrated Syria refers to a great threat to Turkey's territorial integrity. None of the Turkey's Western allies has same concerns to the same degree with Turkey over Syrian territorial integrity on the way around Syria, Iran and Iraq hold same concerns with Turkey thus Turkey to make its action coherent with its primary goal has to get rid of ideological attitudes on Syrian central government.

Furthermore, the military coup d'état attempt and the status of Gulenist organisation strained relations between Turkey and the US. The leader of Gulenist organisation, Fetullah Gulen resides in the US and the CIA is accused of backing the coup attempt in Turkey. Ankara's attempts to extradite Gulen and other members have remained inconclusive so far. Besides, the other conflicting issue has come to ground between Turkey and the EU over the Gulenist organisation and the military coup attempt in Turkey. After the coup attempt, a certain

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[142] Tol G. and Taspinar Ö. Erdogan's Turn to the Kemalists//Foreign Affairs. October 27, 2016. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-10-27/erdogans-turn-kemalists (accessed 15.02.2017)

number of army officers allegedly involved in the attempt fled to Greece and claimed asylum. Despite the Turkey's official extradition requests from Greece, these requests have been rejected so far.

Chapter 3: The Crisis of Pro-Western Orientation

3.1 Perennial Threats

3.1.1 Cyprus Issue

3.1.1.1 Geopolitical Significance of Cyprus

Cyprus with its geopolitical location remains a centrepoint of long-standing disagreements between Turkey and the West. Cyprus is irreplaceable for any powers seeking to expand their influence in the Mediterranean Sea, Middle East and North Africa since it is strategically located between three geopolitically important regions. It is on the sea lane of the great maritime highway connecting the Mediterranean Sea through two sea gates–the Suez and Bab al-Mandab–with the Indian Ocean. From there, it links to two other sea gates. These are the Strait of Hormuz, leading to the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca, connecting to the Pacific. Due to its geostrategic location, throughout its history, external powers have attempted to project their influence over the island.

For Turkey, due to its association with Turkish compatriots living in Cyprus, the island holds significant geopolitical importance. Cyprus's northern point is just 71 km from Turkey.[143] Cyprus was a part of the Ottoman Empire and from 1571 and this gave it geopolitical significance for centuries in the Mediterranean by means of controlling sea routes, trade and security. Out of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), the Ottomans had to rent out the island to Great Britain with the Cyprus Convention of June 4, 1878. Through the convention, Great Britain's administration was recognised in return for the British promise of assistance against any possible Russian attacks on the Ottomans. At the outbreak of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain entered the First World War on opposite sides, causing the convention to be abrogated by Great Britain in November 1914. With the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, Turkey recognised Great Britain's annexation of Cyprus. The first major controversies arose between Turkey and its allies during Turkey's intervention on Cyprus in 1974, creating the environment for future tensions.

With regards to European energy security, Cyprus would become a major energy hub for the EU. Russia traditionally is the main supplier of the Western energy market and with the Ukraine crisis, Turkey promoted its geopolitical significance as a transit country. Moreover, Azerbaijani gas supply is also delivered to Europe via Turkey which in tandem with a project

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[143]Cyprus in the period 1571 – 1959// Turkey MFA. URL: www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-in-the-period-1571---1959.en.mfa   (accessed: 17.02.2017)

underway in Israel to supply gas to Europe via Turkey gives Turkey a strategic edge on European energy security. Cyprus's recently explored offshore resources have the potential to dilute European dependency on Russia. Moreover, Cyprus would replace Turkey's role by turning into a transit country between newly explored energy resources including fields in the South Mediterranean, Israel, North Africa or the Middle East.

Britain is another influential actor in Cyprus. Beside the 1960 Guarantee Treaties making Britain privileged together with Turkey and Greece, Great Britain has a military base on the island. With materialization of US superiority post-World War-II, Great Britain lost a majority of its hegemony over these strategic regions. However, its military base combined with a privileged status in Cyprus provides Britain an advantaged position to involve itself in strategic issues in the Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa.

3.1.1.2 Collapse of London-Zurich Agreements

In 1955, Greek Cypriot nationalists under the EOKA launched an emergency campaign against British rule through their desire to be part of Greece through "enosis". In response, "taksim" was demanded by Turkish Cypriots to unify with Turkey.[144] In 1960, in the wake of the London and Zurich Agreements, the United Kingdom recognised the independence of Cyprus and Republic of Cyprus was founded. During the same year the Treaty-of-Guarantee was signed by Turkey, Cyprus and Great Britain establishing the rights of guarantor states. Through the London-Zurich Agreements together with the Treaty of Guarantee, the constitution of Cyprus was drafted and came into force.[145] Even though the draft fell short of Turkish and Greek demands, both Turkish and Greek communities gained certain privileges. Under favour of the agreement, Turkish Cypriots gained strong constitutional safeguards which were disproportionate to their numbers in the population. Article 129, stipulated that an army of two-thousand was required to be %60 Greek and %40 Turkish While Greek resentments were based on asymmetric allocation, Turks wished for forming separate units. Dr. Kucuk - vice-president of Cyprus- vetoed the proposal. [146]

In 1963, Akritas Plan was formulated by the interior minister of Cyprus, Polycarpos Georgadjis. In this direction, Makarios proposed major amendments, one of his 13

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[144] UN Security Council Report Of The UN Mediator On Cyprus To the Secretary-General, S6253. Adopted. 26.03.1965 URL:http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S6253.pdf (accessed:16.01.2017)
[145] Treaty Concerning The Establishment Of The Republic Of Cyprus, 16.08.1969, URL: http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1961/TS0004.pdf (accessed:16.01.2017)
[146] Crawshaw, N. Cyprus: Collapse of the Zurich Agreement// The World Today Vol.20, No.8, 1964. P.338,339

amendments was to abandon the right of veto of the President and the Vice-President. The proposal aims at undermining Turks' rights. Beside Turkish Cypriots, the government of Turkey opposed the proposal. As a result, a large number of Turkish officers resigned including Vice-President Kucuk, Turkish population began to move out from mixed populated provinces. Due to the attempts to impose the Makarios amendments upon Turks by force, the hopes for peace under the Republic of Cyprus mostly fell through. With the Bloody Christmas in 1963, many Turks were murdered. On Christmas day Turkish jets taking off from the mainland flew low over Nicosia and the Turkish army units left their usual military posts and took up strategic positions in the Turkish villages of Orakeuy and Guenyeli north of the capital.[147]

Fears of possible Turkish intervention in Cyprus pushed Makarios to agree with a Joint Truce Force composing of British, Turkish and Greek soldier set up under a British Major-General. Cease-fire lines also known as Green Lines were drawn in Lefkosa so as to set up a buffer zone between the Turkish and Greek population.[148] Ankara sent a diplomatic note with highlighting its legitimate right of intervention in Cyprus on March 12, 1964[149]; and, on March 17, 1964, Turkey carried out a military exercise to warn the Greek Cypriot and Greek governments in the Mediterranean Sea.[150] Since British forces did not manage to decrease the tension in the island, a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established operationally on March 27, 1964. Just like British forces, UNFICYP remained ineffective to halt tension.[151] In August 1964, Turkey launched a military action bombing Greek targets in the Mediterranean Sea.[152]

The Cyprus issue became a turning point in American-Turkish relations, and in 1964 when Turkey's intention to intervene militarily on Cyprus issue came to light; the Johnson letter came off as threatening to Turkey.[153] Prime Minister Inonu's replied to the letter was: "A new

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[147] Ibid 340,341

[148] Ibid, 341

[149] Makarios'a Kat'I İhtarda Bulunduk// Milliyet Daily Newspaper, March 13, 1964. URL: http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/RFKslq59R0BGYLGOwCUrGg_x3D__x3D_ (accessed: 12.01.2017)

[150] Buyuk Cıkartma Tatbikatı Yapıldı// Milliyet Daily Newspaper, March 18,1964. URL:http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/RFKslq59R0BGYLGOwCUrGg_x3D__x3D_ accessed:12.01.2017)

[151] UN Security Council Report by the Secretary General to the Security Council the UN Operation In Cyprus, for the Period 26 APRIL To 8 JUNE 1964 , S/5764. URL: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf//%7B6 5BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S5764.pdf (accessed:16.01.2017)

[152] Guns fall silent in Cyprus//BBC News, 10.08.1964 URL: http://news.bbc. co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/10/newsid_3037000/3037898.stm (accessed:17.01.2017)

[153] Letter to Prime Minister Inonu from President Johnson June 5, 1964, op.cit.

world will be established, and Turkey will take part in that world".[154] With Johnson's letter, Turkish government fully comprehended the impossibility of carrying out all objectives under the NATO umbrella, if they are not overlapping with American ones. Due to insufficient resources to carry out a military landing combined with the American threat, the Turkish government had to abandon or postpone its military landing decision.

In 1967 a military coup d'état had taken place in Greece. In September 1973, Makarios was overthrown by a military coup which was sponsored by the junta government in Greece. Nikos Sampson came to power on 15 July 1974. Speaking of differences between Makarios and Sampson, there was no sharp difference over enosis idea, but the differences arose from the methodology. While Makarios was striving to carry out a union with Greece step by step, the junta sought to actualise enosis at once.[155]

3.1.1.3 Turkey's Intervention

Turkish government assessed the coup d'etat as a part of enosis plan. Ankara had already become dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of international forces in the matter of halting military support from Greece to the Greek Cypriot government, therefore Turkey called international actors for taking effective measures to halt Greece's military transfer to Cyprus.[156] When the coup d'état took place in Cyprus, an opportunity for Turkey revealed to carry out a military intervention with minimised international reaction.[157] In fact after the coup d'état including the US and Britain international actor estimated oncoming Turkish intervention, thus they strived to appease Turkey.[158] The coup showed international actors that Turkish action may have had justification.[159] Turkey launched a military action in Cyprus on 20 July 1974 on the basis of the Treaty of Guarantee.[160] The intervention laid the foundations of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). For the first time since NATO membership, Turkey set out a plan about its national interests independently of Western allies.

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[154] Manisalı E. Eksen kayması İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi. 2011. P.74
[155] Papadakis, Y. Echoes from the Dead Zone, London: I.B. Tauris & Co. 2005. pp.104-106
[156] Danopoulos C.P. The Greek Military Regime (1967-1974) // Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol.10(Fall), 1982 pp.261,262
URL:http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=pols_pub (accessed:14.02.2017)
[157] Camp, G. Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus//Political Science Quarterly, Vol.95, No.1, 1980. P.48
[158] Rotberg, R. The Cyprus Crucible: The Importance of Good Timing.//Harvard International Review, Vol.25, No.3, 2003. P.71
[159] Mallinson, W. Cyprus, Britain, the USA, Turkey and Greece in 1977: Critical Submission or Submissive Criticism?//Journal Of Contemporary History, Vol.44, No.4, 2009. P.740
[160] Camp, op. cit. p.55

The Western allies of Turkey opposed Turkey's intervention. The UN Security Council issued a resolution calling for immediate ceasefire and negotiations between the parties of the conflict.[161] Turkey halted the military operation due to enhancing international pressure and attended Geneva talks together with Greece and Britain on July 25, 1974. The Geneva declaration dated July 30th was announced. According to the declaration, Turkey should stop military advancement and Turkish enclaves occupied by Greeks and Greek Cypriots should be evacuated, and the UNFICYP was charged with the defence of Turkish enclaves located outside of the areas occupied by Turkish Army.[162]

The Second Geneva talks started on August 8, 1974. Turkey proposed a federation in Cyprus, but Greek party did not acknowledge Turkey's proposal. Turkey's growing suspicions of Greece's possible military action arose from the observed mobility in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Cyprus, and this pushed Turkey to launch a second operation to preserve the emerging status-quo of its first intervention on August 14, 1974. Turkish troops secured Northern part of Cyprus by forming Magosa-Lefke line running east-west. This part refers to 38 per cent of Cyprus.[163]

3.1.1.4 Results of Turkey's Intervention

Makarios gave a speech before the Security Council on 19 July 1974 and he accused the junta government in Greece as the organiser of the coup d'etat in Cyprus. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 573 dated on July 29, 1974 indicated there was legitimacy for Turkey's intervention.[164] The Greek Supreme Court of Appeal in its decision no. 2658/79 dated 21.03.1974 underlines that Turkey exercised its legal right by intervening in Cyprus. The decision also stated that Greek generals and officers plotted a coup d'etat against Cyprus government on 15 July 1974. Moreover, the Court convicted them of organising a failed assassination on Makarios.[165]

For American interests, the conflict was weakening NATO's southern flank that held strategic importance to prevent a possible Soviet expansion.[166] The Turkish intervention in

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[161] UN Resolution 353, S/RES/353, adopted:20 July 1974// Security Council Resolution. URL: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/353(1974) ,(accessed:20.01.2017)
[162] Text of Declaration on Cyprus by Britain, Greece and Turkey. July 31, 1974 // NY Times Archive. URL:http://www.nytimes.com/1974/07/31/archives/text-of-declaration-on-cyprus-by-britain-greece-and-turkey.html?_r=0 (accessed:4.02.2017)
[163] ROTBERG, op. cit. p.72
[164] Hakki, M. The Cyprus Issue London: I.B. Tauris, 2008. p.187
[165] Ibid, 369
[166] Adams, T. The American Concern in Cyprus//The Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science, Vol.401, No.1, 1972. P.102

Cyprus harshly deteriorated the relations between West and Turkey. In 1974, the US began to impose an arms embargo on Turkey.[167] By way of response, Ankara closed down all but one American base.[168] Moreover, Turkey initiated a policy to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union, adapting its policy to the situation. Although before the military coup, the Soviet Union declared that it would back Cyprus territorial integrity in case of a foreign intervention. After the pro-American coup in Greece, the Soviet Union adopted a more neutral policy towards Cyprus. Turkey, due to a softening Soviet threat perception and in the aim of forming international support on the issue of Cyprus in the UN, sought ways of shift its foreign policy. The Turkish-Soviet rapprochement boosted apprehensions in the West of losing Turkey to the other camp of the Cold War.[169]

Combining with the Soviet-Turkey rapprochement, Iran revolution played a major role in easing US attitude towards Turkey because of the fears of losing Turkey to another camp after Iran. After the US embargo, Turkey came across a harsh economic crisis and turned to depend on American aids. Therefore, the appropriate ground for Turkish-Western reconciliation was formed and the US government lifted the embargo on Turkey in 1978.[170]

In 1975, the foundation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) was proclaimed by President Rauf Denktas. The Turkish side consisting of Turkey and TFSC supported a federative solution based on self-governing Greek and Turkish parts but Greek side claimed itself as the only sovereign of Cyprus. The UN efforts for a solution in the island could not change the status quo established with Turkey's military intervention. In response to the Greek Cypriot side ignoring the TFSC, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was established as an independent state by a unanimous of vote at the TRNC Parliament in 1983. Security Council declared that foundation of TRNC was a contravention of the 1960 treaties and this would deteriorate the situation on island. The Security Council also called upon all states not to recognise the TRNC as a sovereign state.[171]

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[167] Karagoz M. US Arms Embargo against Turkey after 30 Years// SAM Perceptions (Winter 2004–2005): pp.113-115

[168] Ibid, 115

[169] Rustow, D. Turkey's Travails. Foreign Affairs, Vol.58, No.1, 1979. P.84

[170] Lewis, F. Alarm Bells in the West//Foreign Affairs, Vol.60, No.3, 1981. P.566

[171] UN Security Council Resolution 541, S/RES/541, 1983 //Security Council Resolution URL:http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20SRES541.pdf (accessed: 20.01.2017)

3.1.1.5 Negotiations

Turkey and Greece have been confronting each other over the Cyprus issue. While Ankara favours inter-communal negotiations for the settlement of the issue, Greece has sought to internationalise the issue.[172] On the other hand, the Turkish side favours a federative solution, which rests on equality between the Turkish and Greek parts of Cyprus. The other prominent demands by Turkish side are re-establishment of veto power for the vice-president as was the case in the 1960 Constitution, preserving certain numbers of Turkish troops and autonomy. Turkey focuses on preserving its existence in the island. Turkey has, traditionally regardless of government changes at home, has taken Cyprus issue as a national cause. Under favour of the status quo, Turkey gained a geopolitical supremacy in the Mediterranean and ensured its position to involve energy issue besides ensuring rights of Turkish Cypriots.

However, through the UN efforts and the US involvement, the Turkish side had to admit to reduce territory, drop the idea of a rotating presidency and soften its demand for a solid veto. In 1985 at the UN talks, the Turkish side agreed to make concessions for the first time on territory and withdrawals of Turkish troops in return for constitutional guarantees pursuant to the UN draft agreement. While the Turkish side fully accepted the draft, the Greek side took the draft as a precondition for further negotiations. In response, Denktas remarked: *"I have made enough concessions… If everything is to be renegotiated, then I have to withdraw my concessions and start from square one."*[173]

While Turkey and the West confronted each other directly, it had seemed as more of a problem between Greece and Turkey. With the Greek Cypriot accession to EU, it added another element to the issue which directly challenged Turkey. The most controversial issue in the membership process was that Brussels regarded the Greek Cyprus as a full member and as a representative of the whole island rather than as a portion. EU had not enlarged through problematic areas before the settlement.[174] However, with the enrolment of Southern Cyprus, the EU has taken a position related to Cyprus favouring the Greek side and demanding from the Turkish side to make unilateral concessions.

The Annan referendum in the sense of showing the Western solid attitude towards the TRNC was very important. The Annan Plan, with official support from the EU, stipulated a

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[172] Karaosmanoğlu, A. Turkey's Security and the Middle East//Foreign Affairs, Vol.62, No.1, 1983. P.162
[173] Cypriot Leaders' Talks End In Failure At The U.N.// Nytimes, January 21,1985
URL:http://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/21/world/cypriot-leaders-talks-end-in-failure-at-the-un.html
(accessed:05.02. 2017)
[174] Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions op. cit.

federated solution in Cyprus composing of two constituent states. Here, the Greek Cypriot party stood against the re-unification with 75%, while on the other hand 3:4 ratio of Turkish Cypriot voters said 'yes'.[175] Paradoxically, just after the referendum, Greek Cyprus was enrolled in the EU as the single representative of the whole island. While the side making positive approaches for re-unification and a solution was penalised with isolations, the other side had an overwhelmingly negative attitude to re-unification under a federation was gifted with EU membership. Thus the question arises of whether EU's efforts related to Cyprus issue serve to solve the problem, or European states are just pursuing their strategic interests regarding Cyprus dispute.

3.1.1.6 Cyprus: Turkey-West Confrontation since 2004

With the accession of Greek Cyprus into the EU, Turkey's membership of the EU turned to impossible just as Helmut Kohl stated "if some people now are already promising membership knowing full well they will not have to keep their promises and that their nations will not approve accession in the end."[176] With regards to the EU's decision, claiming that the Greek Cypriot administration was representative of the entirety of Cyprus, this changed the balances in the East Mediterranean. Greek Cyprus under the shield of the EU, launched a more active energy policy, while most Greek Cyprus activities have proven to be pointed violations of TRNC's and Turkey's EEZ by Turkey and TRNC.[177]

The EU's interests on the Cyprus issue solidly conflicts with Turkish interests. The recent negotiations which are explicitly supported by the US and EU aim at settling the Cyprus issue in favour of Western interests. Turkey is asked to open its customs and airspace to Greek Cyprus unilaterally by the EU.[178] Mustafa Akinci, since he was elected as the president of TRNC in 2015, has been supporting negotiations at any expense for the purpose of unification of Cyprus. At this point, for the first time since 1974, Turkey has stood alone on issues pertaining to the island nation.[179] Turkey's position in the region has been severely disadvantaged since the Greek Cypriots acceded to the EU in 2004. Turkey's confrontation

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[175] Sachs S. Greek Cypriots Reject a U.N. Peace Plan// Nytimes, April 25, 2004.
URL:http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/world/greek-cypriots-reject-a-un-peace-plan.html ,(accessed 6.03.2017),
[176] Ex-Chancellor Helmut Kohl Weighs In on Turkey//Spiegel Online, December 15, 2004
URL:http://www.spiegel.de/international/german-papers-ex-chancellor-helmut-kohl-weighs-in-on-turkey-a-332953.html (accessed:06.03.2017)
[177] Gorvett, J. One Cyprus?//Foreign Affairs, October 27, 2016 URL:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cyprus/2016-10-27/one-cyprus (accessed:15.02.2017)
[178] Turkey Report 2016, SWD(2016) 366, November 9, 2016// European Commission Report, P.11 URL:
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pdf (accessed: 16.02.2017)
[179]Gorvett, op. cit.

with Europe on Cyprus got intensified in recent years. So far, the EU seeks to decrease Turkey's power in the East Mediterranean and implements its policy by taking account into this goal. For instance, the EU imposed of withdrawal the troops from the TRNC remains as a perpetual condition for Turkish accession to the EU.

The Eastern Mediterranean Sea is very rich in terms of offshore resources and these resources are very promising for major powers since they are still undeveloped. In this aspect, Cyprus's significance combined with developments in North Africa and the Middle East was boosted with recent offshore energy explorations.[180] The offshore energy capacity has allegedly upheld most of the EU's energy needs for a long term. Therefore, the EU takes an active stance in the region through Greek Cyprus as a part of the energy policy.[181]

Moreover, Greek Cyprus has made mutual agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Israel and Syria so far in order to determine its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). Under this agreement, it licenced the American Nobel Energy Company to drill natural gas in the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey objected Greek Cypriot actions declaring that their actions as a violation of International Law, and called for European leaders to take actions to abandon unilateral energy operations in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.[182] But Turkey did not get any noteworthy contributions from the West on the issue. In return, Turkey sent its fleets by signing a bilateral contract with TRNC for energy exploration.

3.1.2 Kurdish issue

3.1.2.1 The Issue as an International Card
The Kurdish issue is a hole of Turkish Foreign policy since the collapse of Ottoman Empire. The Sevres Treaty that was signed between the Ottoman and the Allied delegations stipulated to carve up Turkey in terms of religious and ethnic differences, including the Kurds. Under the conditions of occupation, the Turkish Independence War was launched so as to make the Treaty invalid by objecting Ottoman Sultan. The treaty also promised an independent Kurdistan spanning in the south-east of Turkey. Because of this background, the Kurdish issue in Turkey has been regarded as a matter of security, and more accurately, as a matter of territorial integrity.

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[180] Geopolitical Ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean // Stratfor, April 4, 2013
URL:https://www.stratfor.com/article/geopolitical-ambitions-eastern-mediterranean (accessed:17.02.2017)
[181] Gramer R. Cyprus: The New Key to European Energy Security?// The National Interest, March 25, 2014
URL:http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/cyprus-the-new-key-european-energy-security-10109 (accessed: 20.02.2017)
[182] Statement by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at 66th UN General Assembly, September 22, 2011// voltairenet.org
URL: http://www.voltairenet.org/article171548.html (accessed:10.01.2017)

Great Britain was the primary defender of the Sevres Treaty due to this projection. However, the Independence War of Turkey invalidated Sevres Treaty. Nevertheless, Kurdish issue through contradictive status of Mosul remained as the primary topic of Lausanne Conference. According to the Turkish National Pact (Misak-ı Milli), Mosul was intended to be a part of Turkey and the most agitating discussion took place on the Mosul issue during the Lausanne Conference. When the Mosul question between Turkey and Britain could not be solved in Lausanne, these two states agreed to bring the issue to the League of Nations. Simultaneously, an uprising sponsored by Britain was launched in the Southeast of Turkey. The uprising led to lapse in Turkey's focus on the Mosul issue, through the southeast of Turkey.[183] Even though the Ankara government managed to repress the British-funded uprising, Turkey had to abandon Mosul in accordance with the League of Nations decisions.

The existence of separatist Kurdish groups enabled external interventions throughout the region. Graham Fuller defined the Kurdish separatist groups as a handy tool for external powers to weaken the authority of national governments.[184] Speaking of Turkey also, Kurdish separatism has always been a trump against Turkey by any political actors who have an issue with Turkey. Therefore, the issue could be defined as a frailty of Turkish foreign policy in the international arena.

Since armed Kurdish separatism was swept out by the Kemalist government in the early years of Turkish Republic, the external states had been devoid of this Kurdish card against Turkey for a long time until the PKK came to existence in the end of 1970s. Under conditions of the Cold War, the PKK was mostly sponsored by the Soviet Union and it was under the wing of Syrian government, on the other hand, the US supported Muslim Brotherhood via Turkey to overthrow Hafız Assad.[185] Until 1991, the attitude of the West towards PKK was generally compatible with Ankara, because of Turkey's irreplaceable geopolitical role for NATO and also since PKK actions were directed by Syria and the USSR targeting Turkey, Turkey needed to deepen its orientation in Western concert for its own security.

3.1.2.2 The American Involvement
The First Gulf War and Operation Provide Comfort brought a new dimension to the issue. The UN Security Council issued a decision adopted April 5th, 1991 to use of force to protect

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[183] Mumcu U. Kurt İslam Ayaklanması, İstanbul: Tekin, 1993.
[184] Fuller, G. The Fate of the Kurds//Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.2, 1993. P.108.
[185] Perincek D. Turkiye Solu ve PKK, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2014. pp.28-29

civilians from Iraqi central government's violence.[186] Even though the decision explicitly did not state, no-fly zone was announced by the US-led coalition on April 17th, 1991 in the north of the 36th parallel on the basis of the resolution on the pretext of securing humanitarian aids.[187]

The PKK, before the security zone had been squeezed between Turkish and Iraq security forces. But with the foundation of the security zone, the PKK gained huge benefits. Northern Iraq became a safe haven for the PKK.[188] A de-facto Kurdistan was gradually founded in Northern Iraq.[189] The operation was launched by an international alliance led by the US with the involvement of Ankara in March 1991 so as to defend Kurdish political presence in Northern Iraq against Saddam, and with the operation, Turkey's new role became as a protector of de-facto Kurdistan in Iraq.[190]

Besides the PKK, Northern Iraq hosted other Kurdish elements. While Ankara set up limited cooperation with them due to the fear of an independent Kurdistan, in the 1990s both Barzani and Talabani declared support for an autonomous solution under the Iraqi central government. Moreover, they aimed at forming good relations with the neighbours, especially with Turkey. To do so, they seemed negative against PKK and Ocalan and they looked into enhancing economic ties with Turkey. The supply routes of Northern Iraq did not allow for a de facto Kurdistan, with the exception of forming trade relations with Turkey. The other reason was the US administration pressure on Iraqi Kurds to develop relations with Turkey. The former secretary of State James Baker allegedly laid down good relations with Turkey as a condition to maintain support from the US to Iraqi Kurds.[191]

Moreover, with the establishment of the security zone, a number of PKK activities began to increase and expand. Turkey, in order to undermine the PKK's existence in Northern Iraq, launched an extensive operation in October 1992 cooperating with Barzani's forces

[186] UN Security Council Resolution 688, adopted: April 5, 1991 // Security Council Resolution. URL: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement (accessed: 20.02.2017)
[187] Demirel N. Birlesmis Milletler Guvenlik Bölge Uygulaması// FSM Scholarly Studies Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol.8, 2008 Autumn. P.116 URL:http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/263403 (accessed:14.03.2017)
[188] CIA Intelligence Report "The Kurdish Insurgency In Turkey", (August 26, 1985) // CIA Official Website. URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T01058R000303280001-0.pdf
[189] Gunter M. A de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq// Third World Quarterly, Vol.14, No.2, 1993. P.295.
[190] Ibid, 313
[191] Hedges C. An Odd Alliance Subdues Turkey's Kurdish Rebels// Nytimes, November 24, 1992 URL: http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/24/world/an-odd-alliance-subdues-turkey-s-kurdish-rebels.html (accessed: 16.02.2017)

officially.[192]Neither the US nor European states had objected to the Turkey's cross-border operation directly. There were two reasons for the silence; firstly, Turkey laid it as a condition in return of opening its territory to the coalition countries' troops. Secondly, Turkey's geopolitically privileged position left de facto Kurdistan dependent on Turkey for economic development as well as access to a viable market.[193]

However, claims suggesting Turkey to make concessions on its unitary feature of constitution began to be heard more frequently. For instance, according to Fuller, Ankara had to allow at least the establishment of Kurdish autonomous state in southeast of Turkey to preserve its own territorial integrity. *"At a minimum Turkey will need to establish some kind of federal system that permits the Kurds broad cultural autonomy."[194]*

3.1.2.3 Kurdish Diaspora

The issue between Turkey and the PKK in the Western eyes as of the First Gulf War started to become a democracy and human rights problem between Ankara and the Kurds. In Turkish public opinion, with the acceptance of the democratic aspect of the problem to a certain degree, the security dimension of the issue has been placed at the first rank.

Kurdish diaspora played an extensive role to soften general Western attitudes towards the PKK. Many Kurdish people sought refuge in European countries when the 1980 military coup d'état in Turkey destroyed many democratic rights, and the Kurdish language was banned.[195] This process boosted Kurdish radicalism, and it led to a bloody war.[196] As a result, many Kurdish people, mostly Kurdish intelligentsia, migrated into European countries. It changed the characteristic of Kurdish diaspora from workers intensity to politicised people.

Through the Kurdish diaspora residing in European countries, the Kurdish movement was able to construct good relationships with several European political organisations. Kurdish diaspora in Europe founded the first Kurdish satellite TV channel (Med TV, and its successors).[197] The Kurdish diaspora worked as an agent by building diplomatic relations

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[192] Keskin F. Turkey's Trans-Border Operations in Northern Iraq: Before and after the Invasion of Iraq// Research Journal of Internatıonal Studıes – Issue 8 November, 2008. P.61
URL:https://ais.ku.edu.tr/course/18873/OPTIONAL%20READING-%20cross-border%20operations.pdf (accessed: 15.02.2017)
[193] Hedges, op. cit.
[194] Fuller 1993, op. cit. p.113
[195] Eccarius-Kelly V. Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora//Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2002. P.91
[196] Ibid 91-95
[197] Gulsen V. Europeanization and Transformation of the Kurdish Movement//Leeds: UACES Annual Conference, 2015. pp:6-9 URL: http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1301/gulsen.pdf (accessed:15.01.2016)

between the PKK leaders, and European authorities. Many effective organizations were founded by Kurdish diaspora in Europe such as the Kurdish Human Rights Project[198], which has been very influential at EU institutions. There have been Kurdish parliamentarians in the European Union Parliament since the 1990s, and also the Kurdish National Congress[199] which is known as an active lobbyist in Europe since it was established in 1995.[200]

3.1.2.4 PKK's Strategic Orientation

Turkey's policy towards Kurdish issue during Ozal era underwent a substantial change. Turkey's non-involvement principle on the overseas conflict was switched with active foreign policy. Ozal, from the outset of the Northern Iraq crisis, sought to overlap Turkish foreign policy with American interests. Turkey's no-concession policy regarding the foundation of Kurdistan bordering on Turkey remained in the discourse.

After the Ozal presidency, Turkish policy towards the Kurds turned to a more security oriented and more realistic one, and therefore Ankara sought to pursue cooperation to resolve the issue with other central governments which were discontented with the existence of a de facto Kurdistan. Turkey took de facto Kurdistan in Northern Iraq as a threat to its territorial integrity and carried out a policy by taking into account this acknowledgment. Therefore, post-Ozal term Ankara seemed to be more cooperative with Syria and Iran.[201]

With regards to Turkey's national interests, the re-unification of Iraq was the best option regardless of the leader or the domestic system. In this sense, any actions for weakening Iraqi Kurdistan from anybody were welcomed by Turkey. The fight between Barzani and Talabani was evaluated in this direction as a progress in the sense of undermining de facto autonomous state in Northern Iraq. Besides Ankara, other central governments also took advantage from the intra-fight in the de facto Kurdistan.[202]

With Turkish cross-border operation that was launched in March 1995, Ankara spoiled American plans in Northern Iraq. Speaking of the Western reaction, there already existed dissatisfaction over Turkey's policy regarding Northern Iraq which came to the surface when

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[198] Kurdish Human Rights Project//The Kurdish Project, URL: http://thekurdishproject.org/kurdish-nonprofits/kurdish-human-rights-project-khrp/ (accessed 19.01.2016.)
[199] The Kurdistan National Congress//Knc.org.uk URL: http://www.knc.org.uk/?page_id=7 (accessed 19.11.2015)
[200] Gulsen op. cit. p:8
[201] Barkey, H., & Fuller, G. Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities//Middle East Journal, Vol.51, No.1 1997. P.74
[202] Ibid, 75,76

calls were made by Western countries demanding the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Northern Iraq.[203] [204]

In parallel with this, rising American and Western activity in Northern Iraq, the PKK's axis was shifted sharply, the organisation slipped from the hands of Syrian to American control. Nevertheless, since Ocalan resided in Syria, a wing close to Ocalan remained under Syria control while the other wing the one that referred to main strategic forces of PKK fell under American influence and direction. The reason why the reactions to Ankara's Western-oriented policies was objected firstly by the Turkish army was due to PKK-American convergence in Northern Iraq observed by Turkish officers. With regards to the extradition of Ocalan from Syria, Turkey and the US cooperated. He was transferred to Turkey by the CIA in February, 1999. With the operation, the US managed to abolish dicephaly in PKK administration. On the other hand, Turkey arrested wanted a terrorist leader in the hope of wiping out PKK completely. [205]

During the four years between the arrest of Ocalan and the second US intervention in Iraq launched in May 2003, many PKK members abandoned Turkey; many laid down their arms and surrendered to Turkey. Ocalan's discourse radically shifted: he suggested a joint solution with Turkey on the issue by isolating the US from the Kurdish issue: *"If given the opportunity, I am ready to serve Turkey."[206]*

3.1.2.5 Second Iraq War

As of first American intervention, the number of PKK's activities had increased, thus Ecevit government was reluctant to give support for the US in Iraq occupation. But in 2001, the AKP won the election and replaced the previous government. AKP government, during its early years, supported the US policies across the Middle East. Nevertheless, the memorandum dated March 1st, 2003 stipulating Turkish troops to fight together with the US army against Iraq, despite Erdogan's major support for the draft, did not get through the Turkish Parliament.

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[203] U.S. Again Urges Turkey to Pull Out of Iraq// Nytimes.com. April 20, 1995
URL:http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/20/world/us-again-urges-turkey-to-pull-out-of-iraq.html
(accessed:10.03.2017)
[204] Turkey Crosses a Line// Nytimes.com. March 23, 1995,
URL:http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/23/opinion/turkey-crosses-a-line.html (accessed:10.03.2017)
[205] Perincek 2014 op.cit. pp.31, 32.
[206] Ocalan: "I am Ready to serve Turkey"// Milliyet Newpaper February 02, 1999. URL:
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/e/1999/02/17/politics/siy01.html (accessed: 12.01.2017)

The unexpected rejection of the memorandum strained the relations between Ankara and Washington. Despite the dominance of pro-American thinking towards the Iraq issue among government members, the Turkish Parliament did not allow the deployment of American soldiers in the southeast of Turkey. Kurdish Issue played a major role for this refutation. The tension arising from the rejection of the memorandum reached its peak in the aftermath of the hood event on July 3, 2003. Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq were captured by a joint ambush carried out by Kurdish peshmerga militants and the US Special Forces soldiers in Sulaimaniya on the pretext of preventing the assassination plotting by the Turkish officers. The hood event laid a basis of anti-Atlanticist view in the 21st century in Turkey.

American second occupation in Iraq made a greater effect than the first one in terms of the Kurdish issue. The established geopolitical void with the First Gulf War was reinforced by the second one. Turkey's control on Northern Iraq was greatly reduced. Turkey's cross-border operations against Kurdish secessionists were blocked by American existence in Iraq. PKK also in corresponding with the American intervention turned back to field. The militants came back to Turkey to resume the fight against Turkey. Ocalan's discourse radically turned to a direction favouring American policies. PKK with the second American Intervention in Iraq oriented itself to pro-American policies. Ocalan and the PKK administration analysed that American policies that weaken central authorities and nation-states overlap with free Kurdistan goal. Thus, Iraqi Kurdish separatists and PKK came to the same point in terms of their perspectives on the US policies. The PKK took shape according to new conditions; it got rid of the ideological norms of the Cold War. A convergence took place de facto between the PKK and the US since the US recognised PKK as a terrorist organisation.[207]

Speaking of the American policy shift in the region after the Cold War, America formed a strategy to dissolute nation-states in the region on the pretext of democratisation. Condoleezza Rice -former head of the US State Department,- explained the American projection for the Middle East, it stated that 22 countries' borders would be changed in the region.[208] On the one hand Turkey as a nation state stands against any secessionist policies; on the other hand, PKK itself is a secessionist organisation. Therefore geopolitical necessities for establishment of a Kurdistan left the PKK fully American control in Iraq and later on in Syria. The muted PKK terrorism in Turkey with the capture of Ocalan boosted aftermath of

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[207] Perincek,2014, op. cit. pp.31-37
[208] Nazemroaya M.D. Plans for Redrawing the Middle East: The Project for a "New Middle East"// Global Research, (November 18, 2016) URL: http://www.globalresearch.ca/plans-for-redrawing-the-middle-east-the-project-for-a-new-middle-east/3882 (accessed:25.02.2016)

the American occupation of Iraq in 2003. Turkey would not rise to challenge the US directly due to its deep integration in security and the economy with the West. Therefore it is evident to say that even policies for defending its territorial integrity became a confrontation point between the "two strategic allies."

Even though Turkey made limited cross-border operations in Iraq several times, none of them became as effective as the ones before the second American intervention. Turkey, because of identity-based concern of the AKP government and its heavy dependencies on the West, did not form cooperation adequately with other regional powers such as Iran and Syria against the increasingly autonomous region of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq.

3.1.2.6 Syria and the Spreading Kurdish Corridor

A similar process experienced in Syria, as of 2011, was when the authority of the Syrian central government has challenged with the mass opposition. During the period from Ocalan's arrest to Arab spring, Ankara and Damascus had formed close relations. The Arab Spring became a turning point of well-going relations between Ankara and Damascus. Ankara's perspective backing the Muslim Brotherhood with ideological concerns by ignoring geopolitical needs of Turkey cost Turkey in terms of its security regarding the PKK issue.

Turkey from the beginning of the Syrian Civil War took a position together with Western countries seeking to overthrow Assad. The coalition supplied arms to opposition groups, trained them and provided huge economic aid. Turkey played a transit role in the process of passing armed groups to Syria so as to fight against the central government. The foreign militants were mostly consisted of Islamists but also sympathisers of Kurdish groups. In the early years of the conflict, Erdogan government sought ways of forming a dialogue with opposition groups including Kurdish and Islamist groups. For this purpose, the Erdogan government launched Oslo talks with PKK in 2009.

Kurdish groups under favour of détente relations with Ankara expanded their powers in the southeast of Turkey, Northern Iraq and Syria. At this point, Ankara government contributed a policy undermining the territorial integrity of Syria, did not take a precaution to the modernising arsenal of Kurdish groups.[209] Ankara's short term indulgent policy overlooking expanding Kurdish power on its borders turned with an air operation targeting both PYD and

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[209] Gurcan M. Ankara concerned by PKK's modernized Arsenal//Almonitor, January 27, 2017 URL: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/turkey-pkk-diversifies-and-modernizes-arsenal.html (accessed:02.02.2017)

ISIS in Syria dated 22 July 2015. Turkish-Western alliance on Syria issue regarding Kurdish groups completely rifted as a result of the operation hitting Western-sponsored PYD in Syria.

There are huge contradictions considering the status of PYD between Turkey and Western countries. While Turkey recognises the PYD as a wing of the PKK Western countries do not consider PYD a terrorist organisation.[210] The other way around the Western public perceived PYD as a resistance army of Kurds. Certainly, PYD's anti-ISIS fight contributed to forming this good image in Western countries. The US sees PYD as the closest and most effective ally in Syria against ISIS[211]; moreover, the relations are not limited with anti-ISIS campaign: the US since the beginning of the civil war has been supporting efforts for emerging de facto Kurdistan surrounding Turkey.

The conflict between Turkey and the PYD has evolved into a point of contention between Turkey and the West inevitably. PYD controlled region is the home of American bases and in order to prevent a possible Turkish intervention on Kurdish zone in the Syria, these bases play a significant role. PYD has economic and military support from Western governments, with the leading support coming from the US. Speaking of Ankara's position, Ankara recently remarked the convergence between Kurdish fighters and the Western government in Syria as the sponsoring of terrorism by the West.[212]

3.1.3 Aegean Dispute

3.1.3.1 The Dispute as a Geopolitical Confrontation Area
The Aegean dispute is predominantly regarded as an issue between Turkey and Greece over territories located between Turkey and Greece. Despite undetermined sovereignty areas in the legal framework, the constant geopolitical facts lay down the basis of the dispute in such a way that whenever the Aegean Sea refers to sovereignty area of more than one power, the conflict becomes inevitable in contrast with terms which one state has ruled the Aegean Sea.

The Aegean dispute firstly came up with the foundation of an independent Greece in 1832 or in the dissolution process of Ottoman Empire. The existence of two states in the Aegean Sea led to a long-run conflict. Turkey fought against Greece to liberate the Western part of

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[210] US Department of State Press Briefing by Mark C. Toner// US. Department of State, March 8, 2017. URL: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/03/268295.htm (accessed: 15.03.2017)

[211] Ricciardone D. and Stein A. Mitigating US-Turkish Disagreement over the PYD// Atlantic Council, February 24, 2016. URL: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/mitigating-us-turkish-disagreement-over-the-pyd (accessed: 15.03.2017)

[212] Erdogan says U.S.-led coalition gives support to terrorist groups in Syria// Reuters, Dec 27, 2016. URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-idUSKBN14G1EU (accessed: 04.05.2017)

Turkey in its independence war. In the last century of Ottoman Empire, it lost its sovereignty over islands and islets to Greece and Italy. Turkish victory against the Western states in the Turkish-Independence War made it possible to revise the Aegean issues at the Lausanne Conference.

In 1923, Lausanne Treaty was signed and Turkey was recognised internationally as an independent state for the first time. But at the same time, the Treaty determined the sovereign areas of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. It was during the Lausanne Conference that one of the harshest debates was made over the sovereignty issues of the Aegean Sea. With Great Britain's supports for Greece, Athens generally managed to preserve its advantageous status which emerged with the dissolution of Ottoman Empire. Although Ankara was not fully satisfied with new status quo, Turkey also managed to compensate some losses made in the last term of Ottoman Empire. According to the Article 6, the islets which were three nautical miles far from the coast remained within frontiers of the coastal state. And also with the Article 14, Gökceada and Bozcaada (Imroz and Tenedos) remained with Turkey.[213] However, the Treaty does not have provisions for all islets in the Aegean Sea. Those islets and island which were not specifically given to any sides turned to the source of conflict between Turkey and Greece in time.

The demilitarisation issue also has been a sticking point between Turkey and Greece. Speaking of the legal rights of Greece over the islands and islets, Ankara with the Lausanne Treaty admitted Greek islands on the condition of keeping the islands demilitarised since their position offers a direct threat for the sovereignty of Turkey. However, Greek party argues that the status of these islands since the Lausanne Treaty has been changed many times with international treaties and the mentioned article about the demilitarisation has become invalid. Beside these islands and islets remained with Greece with the Lausanne Treaty, the Twelve Islands (Dodecanese) remained with Greece with the 1947 Treaty of Peace signed between Italy and victorious states of WWII. The Article 14 of this treaty also decreed Greece to preserve them as demilitarised regions.[214]

Through the Lausanne Treaty together with the Treaty of Peace, militarisation of islands and islets which are located very close to Turkey is forbidden, Greece allegedly has been

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[213] Treaty of Peace with Turkey Article 6, (1923), URL: http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1923/ts0016-1.pdf (accessed: 01.04.2017)
[214] Treaty of Peace with Italy Article 14, (1947), URL: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000004-0311.pdf accessed: 01.04.2017)

militarising these islands since the 1960s.[215] According to Turkey, following the Cyprus crises in 1974, Athens has speeded up militarisation of these islands on the pretext of its self-defence right. Turkey, as a response to the militarisation efforts of Athens, established its only unassigned army to NATO, namely the Aegean Army.[216]

3.1.3.2 The Western Involvement to the Dispute

The Aegean Sea is very important for European security in a sense that it locates between Anatolia and Europe. Today, regarding the migration crisis the EU strives to prevent migrants to pass Aegean Sea by making financial aid to Turkey for the purpose of keeping these migrants out of the EU, as Aegean Sea is regarded as a sort of boundary of the EU. In this sense, as a geopolitical reason of Turkey's failure to participate to the EU gains prominence: if the EU embraced Turkey as a member state, this would be disposal of European security strategy. Moreover, as of the Greek entry into the EC in 1981, the EU's activeness on the Aegean dispute has been increased gradually. Therefore taking the dispute as an issue only between Turkey and Greece would cause to degrade the Aegean dispute.

Furthermore, major Western states object to the demilitarised status of these islands, on the other hand, Turkey insists on the preservation of the demilitarised status of the islands. The latest Western effort to invalidate the demilitarised status of the island was witnessed during the refugee crisis. NATO vessels have been patrolling in the Aegean Sea on the pretext of reinforcing Turkey's, Greece's and the EU's security[217] despite Turkey's calls for halting NATO deployment in the Aegean Sea.[218] Turkey sees NATO efforts in the Aegean Sea in accordance with Greece's anticipations as attempts for de facto cancellation of the demilitarised status. Tsipras also states this discrepancy between Turkey and the NATO's strategy. *"Turkish demands are posing obstacles to a NATO mission in the Aegean Sea aimed at countering the smuggling of migrants and refugees into Europe…"* [219]

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[215] Baslıca Ege Denizi Sorunları// Turkish Ministry Of Foreign Affairs' Official Webpage. URL: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/baslica-ege-denizi-sorunlari.tr.mfa (accessed:02.04.2017)

[216] Defence and Security Policy of the Turkish Republic, CIDOB International Yearbook 2011 // Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, 2011. URL: https://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/30264/359449/file/241-248_ANEXO_POLITICA+DEFENSA+DE+TURQUIA_ANG.pdf. (accessed: 15.04.2017)

[217] NATO's Deployment in the Aegean Sea// NATO Official Webpage, July 2016. URL: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-aegean-sea-eng.pdf (accessed: 23.03.2017)

[218] Herszenhorn, D. Turkey seeks end to NATO patrols in Aegean Sea// POLITICO, October 27, 2016. URL:http://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-seeks-end-to-nato-patrols-in-aegean-sea-migration-crisis-refugees/ (accessed 30.03.2017)

[219] Greece says Turkish demands obstructing NATO mission in Aegean// Reuters, April 22, 2016. URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece-nato-idUSKCN0XJ15V (accessed: 25.03.2017)

Before Greece's entry into the EU, Western countries' position towards the dispute was relatively neutral. However, since the EU membership of Greece, the dispute has turned to an internal issue of EU. For European security, the Aegean Sea is essential in a sense that it establishes and maintains EU frontier in south-east. While Turkey is regarded as an external component of European security strategy, with the membership of Greece the islands and islets turned into an internal security issue of EU.

According to 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, every state is allowed to extend its territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles.[220] While the Convention is advantageous for Greece, it clearly poses threats for Turkish sovereignty in the Aegean Sea on a large scale. Therefore, Ankara has not signed the Convention. But based on the Convention, the Greek government issued a bill stipulating to extend Greece's territorial sea to 12 nautical miles in 1995; in return, Turkey declared casus belli in case of actualising the bill for the Aegean Sea. Today, Greece territorial sea makes up 40% of the Aegean Sea. In case of application 12 nautical miles territorial sea bill, Greece territorial waters rise to 70% of the Sea but Turkey's territorial sea remains less than 10% of the Aegean Sea.[221] Former Secretary of National Defence Ministry Umit Yalim claims that Greece already began to actualise the bill. According to him, 17 islands and 1 islet have been allegedly occupied by Greece since 2004.[222]

3.1.4 Gulen Organisation

3.1.4.1 Network of the Organisation

The existent opposite interests between the West and Turkey came to ground lastly in the context of the July 15th Military Coup d'état attempt. The coup d'état unfolded another discrepancy between Turkey and the West since the attempt mostly is regarded as a CIA-linked by Ankara because of well-known ties between Gulen organisation and the US.[223] The leader of the Gulen organisation, Fethullah Gulen has been living in the US in exile since 1997 despite extradition demands by Turkey. Beside the US, the Europe is also seemed very

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[220] UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 , Article 3 // UN Official Website, URL: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (accessed:10.03.2017)
[221] The Outstanding Aegean Issues// Turkish Ministry Of Foreign Affairs' Official Webpage. URL: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/maritime-issues---aegean-sea---the-outstanding-aegean-issues.en.mfa (accessed: 12.03.2017)
[222] Adalardaki Madenler Yunanistan'a Tasınıyor// Sözcu Newspaper, August 10, 2014. URL: http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2014/gundem/adalardaki-madenler-yunanistana-tasiniyor-574387/ (accessed: 12.03.2017)
[223] "Darbenin arkasında ABD var" // Odatv, July 17, 2016 URL: http://odatv.com/darbenin-arkasinda-abd-var-1707161200.html (accessed: 15.01.2017)

reluctant to extradite the Gulenist members who are supposed to be on trial regarding the 2016 coup d'etat attempt.

The first appearance of Gulen in Turkish politicas dates back to 1960s. Gulen was the founder of Anti-Communist Association in Erzurum in 1964.[224] This is very meaningful, as the US supported some liberals or nationalists in other NATO countries, it supported political Islam as the antidote of Communism in the framework of American green belt project. Turkish Anti-Communist Association was founded under the World Anti-Communist League which was developed by the US.

Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union offered an opportunity to the US to spread its power over the former Soviet space. In this context, the Gulen organisation primarily aimed at attracting Turkic and Muslim population living in the post-Soviet space. Therefore, post-Soviet space which is home of major Muslim or Turkic populations turned into a major influence area of the organisation. The Gulenist organisation opened many schools in post-Soviet territory with the support of Turkish politicians, during the 1990s. Ankara's will to form an area of influence over post-Soviet region caused Turkish governments to support Gulen movement, although these schools were mostly operated in English language and most of the teachers held American diplomatic passports.[225]

The US strategy towards the post-Soviet region, aimed at putting ethnical and religious identities forward. The Gulen network was developed in the post-Soviet areas rapidly as a part of this strategy. Gulen organisation thanks to English-taught programs took attention of upper classes. Gulen schools aimed at bringing up pro-American students for the purpose of filling strategic positions in these countries' administrations. Therefore, Russia under Putin administration started to take measures against spreading Gulenist network as of dissolution of Soviet Union. In 2004, many Gulen-linked schools were closed down all over Russia. Besides that, Gulen-linked business transactions were stopped by the government and those businessmen linked with Gulen were deported. The Gulen-linked activities in Russia had also intensified in Turkic-languages spoken areas. On December 17, 2002, the head of FSB stated espionage activities of the teachers working in Gulen schools.[226]

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[224] FETÖ/PDY Darbe Girisimi Meclis Komisyonu Raporu// TBMM Parliamentary Investigation Committee Report, October 19, 2016. P.41
[225] Perincek D. Fetö Darbesi, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2016. pp. 61-63
[226] Ibid 62

3.1.4.2 Gulen and the GMEI:

For the first time, Gulen organisation was mentioned as a threat with its international links extensively at the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) report dated 17 December 1996. The report warned the government against the Gulen organisation. It also indicated some sources of Gulen Organisation had acquired extraordinary financial power including through its money laundering network. Moreover, The National Security Council decisions, dated 28 February 1997, is also regarded a military memorandum, indicated Gulen Organisation as a threat to Kemalist principles of Turkey by showing its developing settlement intrastate. Due to the rising awareness about Gulen settlement composed of the MIT report and enhancing military influence on politics, Fetullah Gulen had to flee to the US in March 1999. Gulen was sued on August 31, 2001 for being head of the terrorist organisation that he established for the purpose of demolishing the secular state. Gulen applied for a Green Card in 2002 and claimed it in 2008. The interesting issue in the process of claiming Green Card was that his 29 guarantors consisted of well-known statesmen and businessmen including American diplomat Morton Abramowitz, and ex-CIA officers George Fidas and Graham Fuller.[227]

However, when AKP came to power in 2001, Gulenist organisation was the major ally of AKP. The Gulen Organisation functioned to design Turkish politics and the Army in accordance with the model country strategy in the framework of the GMEI. Regarding the GMEI, Turkey was too secular to be a model country for the others, therefore Turkey's Kemalist principles had to be blunt. Gulen organisation had already reached bureaucratic power intrastate. *"Our friends, who have positions in legislative and administrative bodies, should learn its details and be vigilant all the time so they can transform it and be more fruitful on behalf of Islam in order to carry out a nationwide restoration."[228]* Ergenekon and Balyoz cases were launched on the pretext of plotting a coup d'état and facing up with Turkish deep state-mafia relations by Gulenist prosecutors and police chefs. The plot cases mainly objected at Kemalist officers in the army, journalists, scholars and politicians standing against moderate Islamic transformations. When AKP rose to power, the discharge of detected Gulenist sympathisers by the National Security Council began to be hindered by the

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[227] Tanıs T. Fethullah Gulen'in ABD macerasının mihenk tasları// Hurriyet Newspaper, August 6, 2016 URL: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/tolga-tanis/fethullah-gulenin-abd-macerasinin-mihenk-taslari-40183777 (accessed: 19.12.2017)

[228] US Embassy Ankara "Gulen – Turkey's Invisible Man Casts Long Shadow"//Wikileaks, December 4, 2009 URL: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ANKARA1722_a.html accessed: 12.04.2017

AKP. Indeed, until the relations between Gulen Organisation and Erdogan turned sour, nobody from the Army was discharged of being a sympathiser of Gulen organisation.

The positive attitude of the AKP government to the Gulen Organisation began to change as of 2012. Gulen-linked prosecutors summoned Hakan Fidan -the head of MIT- for testimony as a suspect of KCK operations. When Fidan refuses to give testimony, the prosecutor issued a warrant for Fidan's arrest. In response, the AKP introduced a bill preventing the prosecution of MİT personals without confirmation of Prime Minister.[229] The MİT crisis is regarded the first confrontation between Gulen Organisation and the AKP government. The fight between Gulen Organisation and Erdogan was deepened in December 2013 with the operations taken out by Gulenist prosecutors and polices accusing Prime Minister Erdogan, then several ministers, Erdogan-linked businessmen and Erdogan's family of corruption. In the wake of the operations, three ministers of the AKP government had to resign. As of 2012, AKP government has taken serious measures against the Gulen Organisation. Gulen-linked schools, companies, media outlets and so on have been closed down in Turkey.

As a result of the breakdown of the coalition between Gulen and Erdogan, Ergenekon and Balyoz prisoners have been released as of 2014 and the plot cases collapsed. Thus, Gulen Organisation was described as a 'parallel state' due to the extensive power within state it has held. The prosecutions were launched against the Gulen members for the purpose of wiping out the Gulen Organisation. Those operations undermining Gulen's intrastate power were supported by the opposition despite some critics objecting to how these operations were undertaken. However, its cloak-and-dagger strategy let them remain powerful within the state.

3.1.4.3 Outcomes of the Mutiny on Turkish Foreign Policy Direction:
In the aftermath of the coup d'état attempt, anti-Americanism has enhanced due to widespread suspicion over American support for the putschists. The status of the American Incirlik military base has been subjected to dispute based on claims that the US helped putschists by using the Incirlik base, that has prompted Turkish security forces to surround the Incirlik base the day after the coup d'état. Beside this, ex-Pentagon officer's article dated 24 March 2016 encouraging and predicting the coup d'etat reinforced the claims of American involvement to the mutiny. *"So if the Turkish military moves to oust Erdogan and place his*

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[229] Karaveli H. The Coalition Crumbles: Erdogan, the Gulenists, and Turkish Democracy// The Turkey Analyst, February 20, 2012. URL: https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/395-the-coalition-crumbles-erdogan-the-g%C3%BClenists-and-turkish-democracy.html (accessed: 25.03.2017)

inner circle behind bars, could they get away with it? ... In the realm of analysis rather than advocacy, the answer is yes. At this point in election season, it is doubtful that the Obama administration would do more than castigate any coup leaders, especially if they immediately laid out a clear path to the restoration of democracy.” [230] [231]

The alleged Gulenist, who managed to flee from Turkey's trial, preferred to seek asylum in Western countries. Many officers on duty abroad also called to testify as suspects of being members of Gulen Organisation have also applied for asylum in Western countries. The campaign against Gulenists turned into a national case, and thus it has been supported by various political groups from different parts of the political spectrum. President Erdogan defined the campaign as the second war of independence.[232] Among Western countries, prevalent view on the coup d'état is that it was plotted by Erdogan to solidify his power to gain full authority. Therefore, neither Gulenist asylums in America nor the ones in the EU countries have been extradited to Turkey.

With regards to Gulen Organisation, considering it as a domestic challenge for Turkey is not true. Its activities concentrate on many countries worldwide, but apart from Turkey two regions have critical importance for the Organisation: first is Muslim populated areas in Russia and second is the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in China. Common features of these two regions are that both host major Turkic-Muslim populations. In this sense, Fuller's statement in 1999 is remarkable: *"The policy of guiding the evolution of Islam and of helping them against our adversaries worked marvelously well in Afghanistan against the Russians. The same doctrines can still be used to destabilize what remains of Russian power, and especially to counter the Chinese influence in Central Asia.”* [233] Russia began to close down Gulen-linked schools from the early 2000s, while on the other hand, China also for a long

[230] Barkey H.J. Why Is Turkey Accusing Me of Plotting a Coup?// The NY Times, September 1, 2016. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/opinion/why-is-turkey-accusing-me-of-plotting-a-coup.html?_r=0 (accessed: 25.03.2017)
[231] Rubin M. Will There be a Coup Against Erdogan in Turkey?// Newsweek, March 24, 2016. URL: http://www.newsweek.com/will-there-be-coup-against-erdogan-turkey-439181 (accessed: 25.03.2017)
[232] Erdoğan: "Turkiye yeni bir kurtulus savası veriyor"// Yenicağ Newspaper, November 26, 2016. URL: http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/erdogan-turkiye-yeni-bir-kurtulus-savasi-veriyor-151526h.htm (accessed: 23.03.2017)
[233] Engdahl W. What is Fethullah Gulen? //New Eastern Outlook, July 25th, 2016. URL: http://journal-neo.org/2016/07/25/what-is-fethullah-gulen/ (accessed:19.05.2017)

time struggled with Gulen-linked World Uighur Congress, in this framework, WUC's leader Rebiya Kadeer is considered a terrorist organisation in China.[234] [235] [236]

The Gulen Organisation in the most of the post-Soviet countries lost a substantial level of its power especially in the Turkic ones while it managed to preserve its presence in Western countries. Turkic countries had been regarded even up to the recent years as countries wherein Gulen Organisation was the most powerful more than anywhere else in the world. Moreover, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) declared Gulen Organisation a terrorist organisation in October.[237] Beside the OIC and the GCC, various countries where Gulen Organisation was powerful at one time including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria closed down or nationalised Gulen-linked schools in consequence of Turkey's diplomatic efforts in the wake of the failed coup d'état.

3.2 Insight for Balancing Strategies

In previous part of this chapter, strategic and geopolitical threats were analysed to detect source of threats which cannot be balanced by Turkey's national capacities. Therefore these threats are called threats pushing strategic orientation. In order to make an alliance sustainable for a state, the state is supposed to meet its vital interests to a certain degree under favour of being part of the alliance. With regards to Turkey's strategic interests, preservation of its territorial integrity is the primary task. Turkey located itself in Western alliance against external threats expected from the Soviet Union. Speaking of Turkey's integration to the West, since the outbreak of Cyprus dispute, Turkey has come across with boundaries of being part of the Atlantic system. Moreover, the Kurdish issue and Gulen Organisations have evolved into such great threats that Turkey, regardless of ruling parties, cannot avoid engagement in the context of surveillance of the state. For example, the Gulen Organisation from 2010s on had been regarded the biggest partner of the AKP government, but the same government had to launch a large campaign against the Gulen Organisation. For Turkey, changing alliance formations are possible today to balance the above mentioned threats.

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[234] Rusya, FETÖ'nun husrana uğradığı ilk ulkelerden biriydi //TRT HABER, August 15, 2016 URL: http://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/rusya-fetonun-husrana-ugradigi-ilk-ulkelerden-biriydi-266346.html (accessed:15.04.2017)

[235] Mah B. China and the World: Global Crisis of Capitalism, Bloomington: Iuniverse 2011. P.254-259

[236] Beijing accuses Nobel peace candidate Rebiya Kadeer of terrorism September 09, 2006 URL: http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Beijing-accuses-Nobel-peace-candidate-Rebiya-Kadeer-of-terrorism-7196.html (accessed: 15.04.2017)

[237] The Organization of Islamic Cooperation Organisation Resolution, No:47/43-POL, adopted October 19, 2016. URL: http://www.oic-oci.org/subweb/cfm/43/en/docs/fin/43cfm_res_pol_en.pdf (accessed: 05.04.2017)

With regards to Aegean and Cyprus disputes, Turkey's rival is the EU. TRNC is regarded as EU territory that is not under authority of the EU for now. In other words, from the viewpoint of the EU, Turkey is regarded as occupant in the EU territory. Speaking of Aegean dispute, the EU perspective is similar. Therefore, Turkey's official EU membership goal is not realistic and even if it was plausible, Turkish accession to EU is itself an external threat. Turkey needs to balance the threats originating from the EU by joining with other states which holding similar concerns with regards to the EU expansion strategies. At this point, Russia's concerns regarding the EU expansion come into prominence regardless of Russia's relations with Greek Cypriot and Greece. Although Russia has strong relations with them, these relations as long as they are members of EU are not likely to expand on a strategic level. Also from the perspective of Turkish interests, the threat which cannot be balanced by Turkish national capacities is EU, not the Greek Cypriots or Greece. Moreover, Turkey is not an EU member and also it is a sufferer from the EU expansion strategies just like Russia, thus developing cooperation against a common threat between Turkey and Russia will be a strategic response to EU expansion strategies. In addition, Turkey's NATO membership is an advantage concerning its veto power of the perception that Turkey can pursue a disincentive policy in case of any NATO-related actions including membership of Greek Cypriots to NATO.[238]

Furthermore, another major source of conflict between Turkey and the West is Kurdish issue. Turkey today is surrounded by a Kurdish corridor that is backed by the West. Regardless of identity-based adventurist policies of Ankara governments time to time, Iran, Iraq and Syria concern Turkish territorial integrity directly. Regarding PKK or PYD, the threat that cannot be balanced by Turkey is based on the Western support of Kurdish groups and geopolitical voids that emerged out of undermining policies objecting to central governments' authority. Therefore, Turkey needs to form cooperation with central governments that hold similar concerns with Turkey namely Iran, Iraq and Syria and as a precondition of this strategy; Ankara should abandon its identity-based policies such as supporting Free Syrian Army, Northern Iraqi Kurdistan or other Sunni groups in Syria and in Iraq since they undermine territorial integrity of central governments. And also Turkey needs to form strategies for the purpose of hindering Western involvement in regional issues. The Astana Talks together with Russia and Iran is a positive attempt in this direction. Although strategic alliance together

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[238]In Cyprus' Disunity, Russia Sees Opportunity// Stratfor, October 31, 2016
URL:https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/cyprus-disunity-russia-sees-opportunity (accessed:12.04.2017)

with Russia against PKK or PYD is not possible for now, Western states' influence in the region concerns both countries. Therefore, the appropriate infrastructure exists for a strategic cooperation between Turkey and Russia for the purpose of isolating Western states from regional issues. Decreasing Western involvement will inevitably undermine Western support to PKK. Moreover, China's strategy concerning PKK is still unknown but in terms of balancing Western influence in the region, Turkey may develop relations with China so as to decrease its dependencies to the West.

Speaking of Gulen Organisation, Turkey is not the only target of the Gulenist network. Russia began to close down Gulenist schools in the beginning of the 2000s on the other hand WUC's Gulen-linked leader Rebiya Kadeer a proponent of separation for the Xinjiang Uighur Region in China, is considered a terrorist by China.[239] Analysing the capabilities of Gulen Organisation without its deep ties with the US is meaningless; therefore Turkey needs to cooperate with Russia and China to struggle with Gulen's international network. In this direction, a positive outcome of the failed coup d'état for Turkey has come through the rapid reconciliation between Turkey and Russia. Although it is not precise what level of help Moscow made towards preventing the coup d'état, Russia's warning to Turkish government members about the oncoming coup d'état via Aleksandr Dugin has been verified both by Turkish government and Dugin.[240] In contrast to Western states, Moscow's stance concerning Gulen Organisation is overlapping with Turkey's.

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[239] Cengiz D. İste Taraf ile Rabia Kadir'in Bağlantısı//Odatv, July 15, 2009 http://odatv.com/iste-taraf-ile-rabiya-kadirin-baglantisi-1507091200.html (accessed:12.04.2017)
[240] Putin'in Özel Temsilcisi: 14 Temmuz'da uyardık // Huriyet Newspaper, October 03, 2017. URL:http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/putinin-ozel-temsilcisi-14-temmuzda-uyardik-40238167 (accessed: 15.04.2017)

Conclusion

This study aims to fill the gap in literature on the strategic aspects of Turkish foreign policy orientation. Most literature, devoted to the Turkish foreign policy redirection problem, have analysed the problem by putting ideological transformations in Turkey's forefront. Debates on Turkey's departure from the Western world have continued since the AKP's electoral victory in 2002; however, they mostly fall short of demonstrating strategic aspects of the issue. Therefore, this research attempted to address the following question: "What are the strategic drivers of Turkish orientation moving Turkey away from the West?"

In contrast to most literature, ideologies have a very limited effect on strategic level reorientation efforts of states. The effect of ideologies is limited with that democratic states since they have strong check-and-balance mechanisms are prone to carefully develop their strategies by avoiding adventurist attitudes. Regarding states' behaviours, states make changes on their foreign policy strategies continuously but a volume of this change is proportional to a level of external threat. Changes at a high volume are subject to strategic orientation concept. The primary factors which direct states to alter their foreign policy directions are composed of security concerns. States are stimulated to formulate alliance formations mainly for the purpose of balancing external threats. In order to determine external threats, foreign policy makers put to the forefront two types of concern in general terms: geopolitical and identity-based. States turn to be more inclined to embrace geopolitical thinking as a level of perceived external threat increases. On the other hand, ideological concerns of foreign policy makers stimulate states to pursue adventurist and unrealistic policies mostly.

In Ataturk era, Turkey and Russia despite the ideological differences formed an alliance to balance common threat perceptions. Ankara government during the Turkish Independence War beside received economic supports from Soviet Russia also formed a strategic alliance with Soviet Russia to secure the Eastern part of Turkey. In addition, Turkey and Soviet Russia formed a strategic alliance to overthrow the British-backed government in Caucasus. Turkey played an extensive role especially in the Sovietisation process of Azerbaijan. On the other hand, with the Sovietisation of Armenia, threatening situations disappeared in the eastern part of Turkey so that Turkish troops were directed to the parts of Turkey which under occupation of Western states.

Turkey's orientation to Western alliance is also directly related with the external threat perceptions of Ankara. When Soviet Russia turned to external threats for Ankara government, Ankara had to abandon its neutral foreign policy to balance Soviet threat by taking part in NATO. Especially in Stalin era, Soviet demands from Turkey asking changes about the status of Turkish straits and Stalin's threats Turkey with occupying its Eastern provinces drove Turkey to Western alliance.

However, the first discrepancies boomed between Turkey and the West, when Turkey comprehended boundaries of as being part of Western alliance within the Cyprus dispute. In 1974, when Turkey carried out a military intervention to Cyprus, Turkey's relations with the West worsened sharply. The US imposed embargo on Turkey. Turkey strived to develop its relations with Soviet Russia to decrease the intensity of its orientation to the West. Western fears of Turkey's possible move to another camp, weakening NATO's southern flank and undermining Western influence in the region together with Iran Islamic Revolution led the West to fix relations with Turkey.

Speaking of Ozal era, identity-based thinking dominated Turkish foreign policy making process to a major extent for the first time. In this context, neo-Ottomanist and Islamic elements came into prominence and they pushed Turkey's traditional red-lines about its security to the background. As a result of adventurist perceptions, Ankara sponsored attempts undermining central authority of Iraq and willingly or unwillingly contributed establishment of de facto Kurdistan in Iraq. After Ozal era, Turkey relatively strived to readopt realist thinking in foreign policy making. The most remarkable issues in this term were escalating confrontations with Greece over Aegean Islands and the EU accession process. Turkey by signing Helsinki Declaration turned Cyprus and Aegean disputes to the matters of its accession process.

Furthermore, AKP is the successor of Ozal's foreign policy thinking in terms of high intensity of ideological perceptions of foreign policy issues in this term. In AKP era just like Ozal term, neo-Ottomanist and Islamic elements came into prominence in Turkish foreign policy again. But in contrast to most literature marking these elements as the beginning point of Turkey's disengagement from West, the prominence of neo-Ottomanism stemmed from Turkey's model country role undertaken in accordance with GMEI. Rather than ideological controversies, the disputes between Turkey and the West were arisen from strategic sticking points regardless of ideological attitudes of AKP. There are two events straining Turkish-

American relation in the 2000s. The first one is that Memorandum of March 1st, 2003 stipulating deployment of American troops in Turkey was refused by Turkish Parliament despite the AKP's support. Another one is the hood event: Turkish officers were captured by a joint operation of American Special Forces and Kurdistan Peshmerga. Indeed, AKP's partial face off with strategic challenges of Turkey began with Gulen-AKP conflict in 2013 and the collapse of solution process with Kurdish forces. In this context, AKP began to take a cautious stance against the West.

The major external threats that Turkey faces today originated from a failure of Turkey's strategic orientation, particularly in the wake of the Cold War. The major reason of this failure is that ideological thinking has been replaced by the geopolitical one in the foreign policy decision making process especially when analysing events from the Ozal presidency onward. The dominance of ideological thinking led to two major outcomes in Turkish politics: the failure of predicting external threats, and the rising tendency of using major external issues in domestic politics. Since orientation strategies are founded for the purpose of balancing external threats primarily, the mispredictions of sources or volumes of threats have hindered Turkey from forming alliances in order to balance external threats to certain degrees. Therefore, embracing geopolitical thinking is sine qua non of predicting external threats correctly. Today, as a result of Turkish poor alliance formations, the four areas of strategic threats that are to be balanced through alliance formation; sources of these threats are the Cyprus dispute, Kurdish issue, Aegean Sea disputes, and Gulen Organisation.

Speaking of the Cyprus dispute, it is mostly considered a long-run challenge between Greece and Turkey in Mediterranean Sea. However, the dispute in time went beyond its traditional meaning. The expansion of the EU through Cyprus itself has turned out Turkey to be weaker side in the Cyprus dispute and the meaning of EU's de facto enlargement to Northern Cyprus would be the decline of Turkish power in the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, while forming a strategy in order to balance threats concerning Cyprus, Ankara today has to consider the EU as the main opponent. Turkey firstly has to form a strategy aiming to excluding the EU from the dispute in order to balance threats. At this point, Turkey is not the only country holding concerns on the EU enlargement. Regardless of Russia's attitude specifically towards single European countries such as Greece or Greek Cyprus, Turkey may seek ways of developing cooperation with Russia on the bases of opposing the European enlargement. Russia, just like Turkey, as it was witnessed in Ukraine crises, opposed to the EU enlargement policies.

With regards to Kurdish issues, in the aftermath of Cold War, PKK itself carried out a reorientation process. While it was sponsored by Syria and the USSR in the conditions of the Cold War, it slightly turned to the West with the First Gulf War. Under favour of Western states' general favouring position on Kurdish groups, the PKK has increased its power in the region and a Kurdish corridor that surrounding Turkey established. As like Turkey, other central governments have similar concerns. The possible foundation of Kurdistan sponsored by the US will inevitably have effects on Iran's territorial integrity as much as Turkey's, Iraq's and Syria's. Therefore, Turkey needs to pursue strategies for the purpose of reinforcing the power of central authorities in the region since their territorial integrity directly concerns Turkish security. At this point, Turkey's support for Free Syrian Army in Syria as it serves to weaken Syrian central authority does not overlap with Turkey's long-term geopolitical interests. Beside an alliance with regional states against the PKK, the US involvement in the regional issues strengthens the Kurdish corridor, as it is primarily supported by the US. Therefore, the isolation of the US from the regional issues is also a very important step to halt the Kurdish corridor. At this point, the Astana Talks is an important attempt for the purpose of isolating the US from the regional issues. In addition to Astana Talks, although there is no appropriate ground for forming a strategic alliance between Turkey and Russia against the PKK, Turkey's cooperation with Russia may strengthen Ankara's hand in terms of halting the Kurdish corridor.

The Aegean Sea dispute is mostly considered a set of territorial disagreements between Turkey and Greece since the Lausanne Treaty. However, the dispute combined with Greece's accession to the EC in 1981 and recent developments related to the refugee crisis in the Aegean Sea has turned to a potential confrontation area between Turkey and the West. AKP since the 2000s pursued soft policies regarding Aegean Sea disputes. An announcement made in 1995 against Greece's nautical mile claims was not practiced by the AKP in the context of the EU accession process. According to former Secretary of National Defence Ministry Umit Yalim, Greece has gradually settled 17 islands and 1 islet, since 2004. Beside this, Ankara's recent calls on the NATO to halt its patrol in the Aegean Sea stemmed from Turkey's doubts about NATO's intentions in the Aegean Sea. Turkey perceives the existence of NATO vessels as a part of rising militarisation efforts on islands that are to be demilitarised.

Furthermore, western countries' perception of Gulen Organisation is sharply different from Turkey. Gulen Organisation is predominantly considered pro-American as its leader and other important members settle in the US. Especially regarding the coup d'état attempt, the

American involvement is subject to debate due to the strong historical links between the Gulen Organisation and the US. Beside the US, European countries also have positive attitudes towards the Gulen Organisation. A certain number of Gulenist officers managed to flee Turkey to European countries. The requests for extradition of alleged Gulenist members and Gulen have been rejected so far by Western governments. In contrast to the US and Europe, Russia and China have similar attitudes with Turkey. Russia began closing down Gulen-linked schools as of the beginning of the 2000s. In addition, the leader of Gulen-linked WUC is considered as a terrorist organisation by China.

To sum up, although existent literature on the Turkish foreign policy direction covers the ideological aspects of it comprehensively, strategic aspects of it have been overlooked. We observed that the security concerns of Turkey have played a major role on Turkey's foreign policy evolution and Turkey's current deviation from the West is based on these security concerns. Turkey's creation of alliances is inconsistent with the existent external threats. Therefore, Turkish strategic orientation has turned into an obligation for decision makers regarding external threats for the purpose of balancing these threats. Then, an alliance formation, balancing these external threats, will lay down the basis for a new route of Turkish foreign policy. At this point, hopefully this thesis provides insights and raises questions for future studies.

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Appendix

Glossary of Terms and Persons:

Atlantic System: It is a term referring an international political concert tying other nations economically, militarily etc. to Western European countries or the US.

CHP (Republican People's Party): It is a Turkish political party founded by Ataturk. It was the ruling party in Turkey till 1950.

DP (Democratic Party): It was a Turkish political party was in power between 1950 and 1961 in Turkey.

Misak-ı Milli(The National Pact): It refers to a set of decisions that was formed by Ataturk in order to define purposes of Turkish Independent War. It was also adopted in the last session of the Ottoman parliament in 1920 for the purpose of anouncing its support to Turkish Independence War.

Neo-Ottomanism: It is an identity-based foreign policy thinking in Turkey that is based on a set of imaginations claiming that Turkey would be a hegemon power in the former Ottoman space by embracing historical and cultural ties inherited from the Ottoman Empire.

The West: It is a term holding two meanings for this thesis, first is a group of geopolitical actors holding common overseas interests to a certain extent and second is a political concert established by these geopolitical actors which are located in Western Europe and America.

Turgut Ozal: He was a Turkish politician serving both as a prime-minister (1983-1989) and as a president (1989-1993) in Turkey.